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CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
THURSDAY, JANUARY 29,1998 
HOUSE OF REPRESENrrATIVES, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
Washington, DC. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in Room 
2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles Canady [chair-
man of the subcommittee] presiding. 
Present: Representatives Charles T. Canady, Henry J. Hyde, Ed 
Bryant, William L. Jenkins, Bob GoOdlatte, Bob Barr, Asa Hutch-
inson, Robert C. Scott, Maxine Waters, and Melvin L. Watt. 
Staff present: John Ladd, Counsel; Keri Folmar, Chief Counsel; 
I Brett Shogren, Research Assistant; Michael Connally, Staff Assist-
ant; Brian Woolfolk, Minority Staff; Julian Epstein, Minority Staff 
Director, and Robert Carry, Counsel. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CANADY 
Mr. CANADY [presiding]. The subcommittee will be in order. 
The subcommittee is holding thi.s hearing today to examine the 
respective roles of the Congress and the Supreme Court in inter-
preting the Constitution. With the help of our witnesses today, we 
will consider whether one branch of our Federal Government has 
a monopoly on Constitutional interpretation. 
I believe the framers of our Constitution expected the Congress 
to play an important role in debating and legislating our constitu-
tional issues. It is important to the CongreE;s to ask itself if def-
erence to the Supreme Court is always the order of the day. We 
have a responsibility to consider the circurnstances under which 
the Congress 'should or should not defer to the Supreme Court in 
making Constitutional interpretations. And we have the duty to en-
sure that the requirements of the Constitution are consistently rec-
ognized and honored in the legislative process. 
While the exclusive focus of today's hearing is not the Court's 
Boerne v. Flores decision of last term, that case does represent the 
most recent expression of tension in an ongoin~ relationship be-
tween the Congress and the Court. Despite the Cou.rt's holding in 
Boerne, Justice Kennedy stated to the Court that, and I quote, 
"When the Congress acts within its sphere of power and respon-
sibility, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own in-
formed Judpnent of the meaning and force of the Constitution." 
In light Of the result in Boerne, it is incumbent on Members of 
Congress to retlect on the scope of our sphere of power and respon-
(1) 
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sibilities so that we can exercise our duty, as Justice Kennedy put 
it, "to make our own informed judgment on the meaning and force 
of the Constitution." 
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I now 
recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes. 
Mr. SCOTT. Thank. you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the op-
portunity we're taking to examine the relationship between Con-
gress, the Court, and the Constitution. Constitutional tension be-
tween Congress and the judiciary is nothing new. The drafters of 
the Constitution established three branches of -Government, all 
with ~qual responsibilities, to protect and uphold the Constitution. 
The strength of our system of Government is based on the inter-
dependence of three separate but equal branches of Government. 
The fact that from time-to-time the branches disagree is a tribute 
to our democracy and in no way threatens the sovereignty of its 
people. We should take pride in knowing that our vigorous system 
of checks and balances not only protects us from external threats 
at home and abroad, but also protects us from the greatest threat 
ever imagined by our Founding Fathers, and that threat is our-
selves. 
I understand that there have been a number of proposals in-
tended to minimize the healthy tension now existing between Con-
gress and the courts. I am particularly concerned by the suggestion 
by some that we should more frequently exercise our impeachment 
powers to rid ourselves of the actions of activist judges who thwart 
the will of the people, and we should investigate these judges, Mr. 
Chairman. 
I understand that in the 1996-97 term of the Supreme Court, 
four of the seven acts of Congress reviewed were invalidated. Only 
two justices voted to invalidate all seven of the acts of Congress 
cOllsidered in the most recent term, taking every opportunity they 
had to thwart the will of the people. There was another judge that 
voted six out of seven times to thwart the will of the people, and 
we should investigate and expose these justices for thwarting the 
will of the people. And Mr. Chairman, we need to do some research 
to find out who these justices are. 
Mr. CANADY. Wait-
Mr. SCOTT. Wait a minute, Mr. Chairman. My staff has already 
supplied me with that information-seven out of seven; Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas-six out of seven; Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, Mr. 
Chairman, to see whether or not we would have been better off 
without these activist judges on our Court. [Laughter.] 
So I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, Mr. Chair-
man, and thank you for calling the hearing. I am particularly look-
ing forward to hearing from Professor Devins, who is a professor 
at William and Mary Marshall School of Law, which, depending on 
the actions of the General Assembly tomorrow and the next day, 
m~ be in or out of my district. [Laughter.] 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Scott. With the General Assembly 
a such a matter today, I'm velW pleased that you were 
able to (Laughter.] 
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Mr. SCOTT. I'm well-represented today in Richmond, you can be 
sure. 
Mr. CANADY. I'm sure you are. 
We're very pleased to have a distinguished panel of Members to 
start off the hearing today. We have four Members on this panel. 
The first to testify will be the Honorable Ron Lewis. Congressman 
Lewis represents the 2nd District of Kentucky and serves on both 
the Agriculture and National Security Committees in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. 
Next we will hear from the Honorable John Hostettler. Rep-
resentative Hostettler, who represents the 8th District of Indiana, 
has recently published an articled entitled ''The Constitution's 
Final Interpreter: We the People," in the Regent University Law 
Review. 
The Honorable Barney Frank will be the next to testify. A mem-
ber of the House Judiciary Committee and former ranking member 
of this subcommittee, Representative Frank has represented the 
4th District of Massachusetts since 1981. 
Finally, on our first panel, we will hear from the Honorable Tom 
Campbell. Representative Campbell, who serves the people of the 
15th District of California, has taught constitutional law at Stan-
ford University. . 
Without objection, your written statements will be made a part 
of the permanent record, and I would ask you to do your best to 
summarize your testimony in no more than 5 minutes; we'll have 
the light on. Unless some member of the subcommittee insists, we 
won't stay strictly to the 5-minute rule, but as close as you could 
come to that, we would appreciate it. 
So with that we welcome you all, and I'll recognize Representa-
tive Lewis. 
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STATEMENT OF LOUIS FISHER, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these 
hearings. I'm not aware of another time where a congressional 
panel has held a hearing on a broad topic of what the role of Con-
gress is in constitutional interpretation and how that role fits with 
the President and with the courts. 
As you mentioned in your opening statement, people today seem 
to think that the Court has a monopoly on constitutional interpre-
tation. That certainly could not be true for the early decades. Pro-
fessor David Currie has written about this, as have others, to show 
that the prominent constitutional decider in those early years was 
Congress, with the President. The courts played very little role. 
There were few decisions at that time from the courts to guide Con-
gress, so it was up to the two branches, executive and legislative, 
to decide. 
In recent decades, probably the last 40 to 50 years, there has 
been this tendency, both in the Supreme Court and with professors, 
to read Court decisions as the ultimate and final word, with the 
Court having some exclusive role on the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. ' 
The Supreme Court frequently today cites language from 
Marbury that it is emphatically the province and duty of the courts 
to say what the law is; that is true. It's also emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of Congress to say what the law is. It's emphatically 
the province and duty of the President to say what the law is 
through his veto power and through the President's responsibility 
to enforce the law. 
So that part of Marbury doesn't get you very far, and anyone who 
AVVlJ_ at Marbury in 1803 would know that Chief Justice John Mar-
never made the claim that he had some exclusive roll in in .. 
.. ~ft'fl'~ .... 1n,a the Constitution. He knew politically at that time, after 
elelctl(Jm in 1800, that the Court was not in a position to dictate 
I'Wr,GrP branches. 
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And in my testimony I have the letter that he sent to Justice 
Chase saying that if Members of Congress disagree with a Court 
decision, it's not necessary to roll out impeachment; rather, you 
work through your regular legislative process, and we have a dia-
logue between the branches on shaping the meaning. The Marbury 
decision is always taken out of context to say something that Mar-
shall never meant. 
Last year in the Harvard Law Review there was an article by 
Professors Alexander and Schauer arguing that the Court should 
be the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, and that that 
would produce political stability. Neal Devins and I talked about 
that article as to when in American history you could ever say that 
the Court helped settle issues, transcendent or otherwise. Certainly 
on slavery, on child labor-you can go down the list-where Court 
decisions did not settle these issues, that it was left to the larger 
political process. 
Neal Devins and I did an article that will be in the Virginia Law 
Review next month to say that all three branches participate in the 
meaning of the Constitution; the States, as well and the general 
public, as well, and that this larger dialogue is what creates politi-
cal stability, not an exclusive role for the Court. 
My statement talks about the role of Congress in three senses: 
before the Court ever decides, when it decides that something in 
constitutional, and when it decides that something is not constitu-
tional. Before the Court decides, Members of Congress have a huge 
role on many matters that either never get to the Court, or if they 
get to the Court the Court ducks it on various grounds, various 
thresholds. These are important matters. Many of the .issues are 
the veto power, the pocket veto, covert spending, foreign affairs, 
war powers, and so forth, that are basically left to Members of Con-
gress-the commerce power, spending power. 
Now when the Court does take a case and decides that some-
thing is constitutional, that's not the last word because it is simply 
stated by the Court that if the other branches want to do this it's 
okay by the Constitution, an example being McCulloch with the 
U.S. Bank. The Court said it was constitutional. That did not pro-
hibit President Jackson later, when a bill came to reauthorize the 
bank, to say, "According to me, it's unconstitutional. I'm going to 
veto it on that ground." . 
A contemporary issue is the independent counsel. Although that 
was upheld by the Court in Morrison, if Members of Congress 
wanted to say at the next reauthorization of the independent coun-
sel that you have serious constitutional doubts, you don't have to 
reauthorize; or if you do, and it gets to the President, the President 
could veto it by saying that even though the Court says it doesn't 
encroach that much OD executive power, I think it does and I'm 
going to veto it on constitutional grOUIlds. 
Another recent example: In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld the 
Air Force regulation that prohibited members of the military from 
wearing a yarmulke indoors while on duty, and Congress the next 
year overturned that by statute, and that's the meaning of the COD-
stitution on how you balance military duties versus religious free-
dom# 
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E~en when the Court finds unconstitutionality, Congress is a 
partIcipant. I talk about the Boerne case, which I don't think is 
persuasive; I think it's internally inconsistent. I think there is plen-
ty of room for Congress to revisit the issue with new legislation. 
And I conclude by saying that at certain times in our history 
there is a basis for finality by the Supreme Court, the examples 
being the Little Rock crisis, the Watergate tapes case. But by and 
large, American history, I think, is very convincing that the read-
ing of the Constitution is better left to the flow of considerations 
by all three branches, by the States, and by the general public. 
Thank you very much. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LoUIS FISHER, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN SEPARATION OF 
POWERS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
~1r. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the role of Congress in 
interpreting the Constitution. To my knowledge, this is the flIst time that congres-
sional hearings have been used for the purpose of understanding the contributions 
made by legislators in shaping and protecting constitutional values. Too often, espe-
cially in recent years, it is assumed that the judiciary has a monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation and that Congress must defer to the courts. 
The framers expected Congress to play a pivotal role in debating and legislating 
on constitutional issues. Most of the important constitutional issues in the early dec-
ades were decided almost exclusively by Congress and the President. There were 
few decisions by federal courts to guide the elected branches. The record of this 
early period has been ably covered by David Currie in a number of law review arti-
cles, brought together in his book The Constitution in Congress (1997). As he ex-
plains in the concluding chapter, it was "in the legislative and executive branches, 
not in the courts, that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged.» 
Particularly in the twentieth century, scholars, judges, and sometimes Members 
of Congress claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has the "last word" on the meaning 
of the Constitution. Under this theory, if Congress disagrees with a Court ruling the 
only alternative is to pass a constitutional amendment to overturn the Court. This 
belief in judicial supremacy overlooks much of the flexibility and political consider-
ations that characterize the relationship between the judiciary and other elements 
of the political system: Congress, the President, the states, and the general public. 
What About Marbury? 
In recent decades, much has been made of the statement by Chief Justice John 
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (1803), that it is "em~hatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Does that mean that the 
Court alone delivers the "fmal word" on the meaning of the Constitution? According 
to a unanimous ruling by the Court in the Little Rock crisis, Marbury "declared the 
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1956). That ~rinciple was reasserted 
by the Court in the reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr (1962): "Deciding wheth .. 
er a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another 
branch of government, or whether action of that branch exceeds whatever authority 
has been cOmmitted, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, ana 
a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Seven 
years later, in the exclusion case of Adam Clayton Powell, the Court again referred 
to itself as the "ultimate interpreter" of the COnstitution. Powell v. McCormack. 395 
U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
These statements distort what Chief Justice Marshall decided in Marbury. While 
it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is," ce the same can be saia of Congress and the President. All three 
branehes say t the law is. The Court states what the law is on the day a deci-
sion comes down; the law may change later by actions taken by the elected 
branehes. I will ~ft a number_ ~f prominent exampl~s of this institutional inte~lay. 
In 1803, Man did not think he was powerful enoup to g!ve orders to Con-
and. the Pre.ident. After the elections of 1800, with the Jeffersonians in con-
Con the Pl'8lidency the Federalist Court was in no ~sition to dic-
tate to the he •. Mal'8uif realized that he could not u~Jlola the eonstitu-
ttonaUty of 13 or the Judiciary Act of 1789 and directSeeretary of State 
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James Madison to deliver the commissions to the disappointed would-be judges. 
President Thomas Jefferson and Madison would have ignored such an order. There 
is no reason to think that Marshal! believed that the Court was supreme on matters 
of constitutional interpretation. 
This conclusion is bome out by the impeachment hearings of Judge Pickering and 
Justice Chase. Marbury was decided on February 24, 1803. The House impeached 
Pickering on March 2, 1803 and the Senate convicted him on March 12, 1804. As 
soon as the House impeached Pickering, it tum.ed its guns on Chase. If that move 
succeeded, Marshall had reason to believe he was next in line. With these threats 
pressing upon the Court, Marshall wrote to Chase on January 23, 1804, suggesting 
that Members of Congress did not have to impeach judges because they objected to 
their judicial opinions. Instead, Congress could simply review and reverse objection-
able decisions through the regular legislative process. Here is Marshall's language 
in the letter to Chase: 
I think. the modem doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate juris-
diction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by 
the legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness of our char-
acter than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing 
of his fault. 
The meaning of Marbury is placed in proper perspective when we recall that Mar-
shall never again struck down a congressional statute during his long tenure on the 
Bench, which lasted from 1801 to 1835. Instead, he pl~yed a consistently supportive 
role in upholding congressional interpretations of the Constitution. In the years fol-
lowing Marbury, Marshall upheld the power of Congress to exercise the commerce 
power, to create a U.S. Bank (even though no such power is expressly provided in 
the Constitution), and to discharge other constitutional responsibilities. The judici-
al"l'Junctioned as a yea-saying, not a negative, branch. 
The respect of the Court for congressional judgments is evident in some decisions 
in the 1850s. In 1852, the Supreme Court held that the height of a bridge in Penn-
sylvania made it "a nuisance.' Congress responded with legislation that declared the 
bridges at issue to be "lawful structures," and the Court then ruled that the bridges 
were no longer unlawful obstructions. l In the second decision, Justices McLean, 
Grier, and Wayne objected that Congress could not annul or vacate a court decree 
and that the congressional statute was an exercise of judicial, not legislative, power. 
Yet the Court has never adopted that position. As the Court noted in 1946: "when-
ever Congress' judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the Court's 
previously expressed view that specific action taken by the states in Congress' si-
lence was forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its pre-
vious judgment to Congress' expressed approval." 2 
Settling Constitutional Issues 
In the May 1997 issue of Harvard Law Review, Larry Alexander and Frederick 
Schauer argue that the Supreme Court should be the exclusive and authoritative 
interpreter of the Constitution. Although they caution that their study is not based 
on historical precedents, they conclude that the Court is best situated to decide and 
settle constitutional issues, particularly transcendent questions. They believe that 
vesting such power in the courts would contribute to political stability. 
Neal Devins and I talked about this article. We tried to recall a time when the 
Court ever "settled" a constitutional issue, transcendent or otherwise. Certainly the 
decision in Dred Scott did not settle the slavery issue. Judicial resistance, over a 
period of almost forty years, to the use of the commerce power by Congress did not 
settle the issue of national regulation. Eventually the Court gave way. Roe v. Wade 
did not settle the abortion issue. In 1992, the Court jettisoned the trimester stand-
ard that had drawn criticism from many quarters. The decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia (1972) to strike down death-penalty statutes in Georgia and Texas as cruel and 
unusual did not settle that issue. Under heavy public pressure the Court later ac-
knowledged that the death penalty, if accompamed by revised procedures, was con-
stitutional. 
lPen~lvanitJ v. Wheeling &c. Bridge Co., 13 How. (54 U.S.) 518 (1852); 10 Stat. 112, 16 
(1852); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 421 (1856). 
2 Prudentiallnll. Co. v. Benjamin, IJ26 U.S. 408, 425 (1946). In 1985, the Court said that when 
Con.,es, "SO ChOOleS, state actions which it pJainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional 
attack under the Commerce Clause." Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, FRS, 472 U.S. 
159, 17-4 (1985). In a concurrence in 1995, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor noted: "if we invali-
date a state law, Congtess can in etreet overtum our judgment." United States v. Lo,Pe%, 514 
11JJ, 549, 580 (1995). 
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Even for more popular decisions, such as the desegregation case of 1954, little was 
settled by the Court's ruling. More than a decade later, a federal appellate court 
noted: "A national effort, bringing to.sether Congress, the executive, and the judici-
ary: may he able to make meaningful the right of Negrt? children to equal edu-
catIonal opportunities. The courts acting alone have failed.» 3 To deal with racism 
an~ segregation, it was necessary for Congress and the President, with bipartisan 
m.aJorities, to pass such statutes as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. . 
Devins and I concluded that judit::ial exclusivitr in constitutional lawmaking 
would be contrary to American history I' the framers intent, and legal development. 
We also believe that it would lead to political instability, not stability. Our response 
to the Alexander-Schauer article will appear in the February 1998 issue of Virginia 
Law Review. 
To explain the breadth of congressional activity in interpreting the Constitution, 
the following three sections discuss (1) how Congress resolves these issues before 
the Court decides, (2) what it may do when the Court upholds the constitutionality 
of a measure, and (3) what it may do when the Court decides that a measure is 
unconstitutional. The meaning of the Constitution is not flXed by anyone branch, 
but is rather that product of all three branches acting in concert with the states 
and the public at large. 
Before the Court Decides 
Congress frequently must act on constitutional matters before there are useful 
precedents from the courts. Many of the difficult issues related to the veto power, 
the pocket veto, recess appointments, the incompatibility and ineligibility clauses, 
war powers, covert operations, and other disputes are generally resolved by Con-
gress with little input from the courts.4 
Occasionally these issues move toward the Supreme Court, but just as quickly 
they are turned back by various threshold tests. In the 1970s1 covert funding of the 
intelligence community was challenged as a violation of the Statement and Account 
Clause. In 1974, the Court held that the litigant lacked standing to bring the suit. 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166. That issue was left to Congress and the 
President to decide. In 1987, when it appeared that the Court would decide the con-
stitutionality of a pocket veto by President Reagan, the case was dismissed on 
groWlds of mootness. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361. That issue, too, was pushed 
back to elected officials to resolve. A variety of other doctrines-political questions, 
ripeness, prudential considerations, non justiciability, and equitable discretion-are 
used by the court to sidestep constitutional issues. The result is that a number of 
constitutional issues are returned to the elected branches. 
When the Court Upholds Constitutionality 
When the Court decides that a congressional statute is constitutional, the con-
troversy may remain open for different treatment by the legislative and executive 
branches. For example, President Andrew Jackson received a bill in 1832 to rechar-
ter the United States Bank. Although the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 
had ruled that the bank was constitutional, Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground 
that it was unconstitutional. His veto message said that he had taken an oath of 
office to s~port the Constitution "as he understands it, and not as it is understood 
by others. His position on the veto power has been followed by all subsequent 
Presidents. Regardless of the constitutional decisions reached by Congress and the 
courts, Presidents may independently analyze the constitutionality of bills presented 
to them. 
To take a contemporary example, Presidents Reagan and Clinton signed bills re-
authorizing the office of independent counsel. The Court in Morrison v. Olson (1988) 
upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. Nevertheless, Presi-
dent Clinton or any future President has the independence to veto a reauthorization 
bill on the ground that the office of independent counsel encroaches upon the execu-
tive power granted to the President by the Constitution. For that matter, Members 
of Congress could decide at the next reauthorization stage that the office of inde-
pendent counsel violates the Constitution. Morrison simply means that Congress 
and the President may create the office if they want to. They may rethink and re-
visit the statute at any time. 
3 United States v, Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied sub nom" East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. of Davis, 389 U.S. 840 (1967 (emphasis in 
original), 
"Louis Fisher, "Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts," 18 Pepperdine L. 
Rev. 57 (1000); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President (4th 
ed.I997). 
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My attached CRS Report, "Congressional Checks on the Judiciary," contains a 
number of other examples of Congress acting by statute to neutralize a constitu-
tional decision by the Court. In 1986, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an 
Air Force regulation that prohibited Captain Simcha Goldman from wearing his 
yarmulke indoors while on Quty. The Court decided that the needs of the Air Force 
outweighed Goldman's constitutional right to freely exercise his religion. Goldman 
v. Weinbe,.ger, 475 U.S. 503. Within a year, Congress attached to a military author-
ization bill language permitting militaIy personnel to wear conservative, unobtru-
siv~ religious apparel indoors, provided that it does not interfere with their military 
duties. 101 Stat. 1086-87, sec. 508 (1987). The Court decided the conflict between 
Air Force needs and religious freedom one way; Congress decided it the other way. 
When the Court Finds Unconstitutionality 
If the Court decides that a governmental action is unconstitutional, it is usually 
more difficult for Congress and the President to challenge and override the judici-
ary. But even in this category there are examples of effective legislative and execu-
tive actions in responding to court rulings. 
In his inaugural address in 1857, President James Buchanan announced that the 
dispute over slavery in the territories "is a judicial question, which legitimately be-
longs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, 
and will, it is understood, be speedily and fmally settled." Two days later Chief Jus-
tice Taney handed down the Court's decision in Dred Scott, holding that Congress 
could not prohibit slavery in the territories and that blacks were not citizens. That 
decision was eventually overturned by the Civil War Amendments-the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-but before those amendments were rati-
fied Congress and the President had already reversed Dred Scott. In 1862, Congress 
passed legislation to prohibit slavery in the territories, 12 Stat. 432, and in that 
same year Attorney General Bates released a long opinion which held that neither 
color nor race could deny American blacks the right of citizenship. lOOp. Att'y Gen. 
382 (1862). 
In 1916, Congress relied on the commerce power to enact a child labor law. In 
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. 
A year later Congress passed new child labor legislation, this time relying on the 
taxing power. Again the Court, in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., struck it down. 
Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to give it the power to regu-
late child labor but ratification proved impossible. In 1938, Congress returned to the 
commerce power to regulate child labor and this time the Court, unanimously, 
upheld the statute. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
This record-from 1916 to 1941-was an exceptionally lengthy dialogue between 
Congress and the Court, with the legislative branch eventually prevailing. The 
Court later admitted that ''the history of judicial limitation of congressional power 
over commerce, when exercised afllrmatively, has been more largely one of retreat 
than of ultimate victory." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415 (1946). 
The Court's decision last year in Boerne v. Flores, striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), raises a number of issues about judicial fmality. 
In deciding that Congress had exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and hinting that the Court has the last 
and rmal word in deciding the meaning of the Constitution, the Court nevertheless 
left the door wide open for future congressional action. The reasoning and premises 
in the decision are often unpersuasive and internally inconsistent. The Court invites 
future congressional action by noting that there ''must be a congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end." 117 lr.S. at 2164. Does that mean that adjustments to a redrafted bill 
would pass muster? In comparing RFRA to the Voting Rights Act, the Court says 
that RFRA's "legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally ap-
plicable laws passed because of religious bIgotry." Id. at 2169. Is that the problem? 
If Congress, with rmdings, could identify recent examples of religious persecution, 
would RFRA be constitutional? 
My CRS report includes other examples, but I will end with a dispute in 1970. 
The House Committee on Internal Security prepared a report on the honoraria 
gl.ven to guest speakers at colleges and wliversities. The study included the names 
of leftist or antiwar speakers and the amounts they received. The ACLU obtained 
a copy of the galleys and asked a federal district court to enjoin their publication. 
The court rulea that the report served no legislative purpose and was issued solely 
for the sake of exposure or intimidation. It ordered the Public Printer and the Su-
perintendent of Documents not tf) print the report ceor any portion, restatement or 
facsimile thereof," with the possible exception of placing the report in the Congres-
sional Record. Hentoffv.lchord, 318 F.Supp. 1175, 1183 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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The House of Representatives passed a resolution tha~ told the courts, in essence, 
~ step back. During the course of the debate, Members of Congress explained that 
It was not the rractice of the House to print committee reports in the Record. More-
over, the judge s order "runs afoul not only of the speech and debate clause-article 
I, section 6-of the Constitution, but obstructs the execution of other constitutional 
commitments of the House as well, including article I, section 5, which authorizes 
each House to determine the rules of its proceedings, and requires each House to 
p~blish its proceedings." .'\f\cr the ~solutiC?n was passed by a large bipartisan mar-
gm (302 to 54), the report was pnnted Without any further interference from the judiciary. 
This collision between Congress and the judiciary was unusually abrupt. For the 
most part, the legislative-judicial dialogue is more nuanced and subtle. In INS v. 
Chadha (1983), the.Supreme Court struck down the "legislative veto" as unconstitu-
tional. Congress no longer attempts to use one-House or two-House legislative ve-
toes to control the executive branch. On the other hand, it continues to use commit-
tee and subcommittee vetoes to monitor agency actions. 5 
Conclusions 
At certain points in our constitutional history, there has been a compelling need 
for an authoritative and binding decision by the Supreme Court. The unanimous 
ruling in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), signed by each Justice, was essential in dealing 
with the Little Rock desegregation crisis. Another unanimous decision in United 
States v. Nixon (1974) disposed of the confrontation between President Nixon and 
the judiciary regarding the Watergate tapes. For the most part. however, court deci-
sions are tentative and reversible like other political events. 
There is no reason for Congress to defer automatically to the judiciary because 
of ita supposed technical skills and political independence. !rfuch of constitutional 
law depends on factf"mding and the balancing of competing values, areas in which 
Congress justifiably can claim substantial expertise. Each decision by a court is sub-
ject to scrutiny by private citizens and public officials. What is "fmal" at one stage 
of our political development may be reopened at some later date, leading to revi-
sions, fresh interpretations, and reversals of Supreme Court doctrines. Members of 
Congress have both the authority and the capability to participate constructively in 
constitutional interpretation. 
Through this process of interaction among the branches, all three institutions are 
able to expose weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually forge a consensus 
on constitutional values. Also through this process, the public has an opportunity 
to add a legitimacy and a meaning to what might otherwise be an alien and short-
lived document.6 
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Congressional Checks on the Judiciary 
SUMMARY 
This report identifies the methods available to Congress to check the. 
judieiary. The first part is devoted to checks embedded in the text or the 
Constitution: statutes that derme the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
impeachment of judges, constitutional amendments, and limitations imposed on 
the Court by the Case or Controversy standard. The second part examines the 
claim of judicial supremacy on constitutional questions. The third focuses on 
constraints that operate through the regular political and legislative processes. 
Although it is conventional to view the judiciary-and especially the 
Supreme Court-as the ultimate and final arbiter' on constitutional law, 
numerous examples over two centuries suggest a more dynamic and less 
hierarchical model. Faced with challenges from Congress and the President, the 
Court has repeatedly recognized that it is not the only branch with the 
authority and capacity to interpret the Constitution. Included within this 
report are examples from a variety or constitutional disputes: the U.S. Bank, 
the Independent Counsel, women's rights, financial privacy, reeess 
appointments, religious freedom, slavery, child labor legislation, sedition, 
congressional investigations, the commerce clause, criminal procedures, search 
and seizure, enforcement or the Civil War Amendments, end sex discrimination. 
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Congressional Checks on the Judiciary 
This report identities the methods available to Congress to check the 
federal courts. The first part oC the report is devoted to checks embedded in the 
text of the Constitution: statutes that define the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, impeacbment of judges, constitutional amendments, and limitations 
imposed on the Court by the Case or Controversty standard. The second part 
examines the claim ofjudicia1supremacy on constitutional questions. The third 
focu8e8 on constraints that op&rate through the regular political and legislative 
processes. 
Although it is conventional to view the judiciary~nd especially the 
Supreme Court--aa the ultimate and final arbiter oC constitutional law, 
numerous examples over two centuries suggest a more dynamic and lesa 
hierarchical model. Throughout this period, Congress has disagreed with court 
decisions and has pressed its own independent views on the meaning of the 
Constitution, often with substantial effect. Similar challenges have ~"Ome Crom 
Presidents, who assert their own right to reach independent and coequal 
constitutional opinions. In this ebb and flow, all three branches strive Cor 
ascendancy without ever attaining it. Repeatedly, the Court has recognized that 
it is not th~ only branch with authority and capacity to interpret the 
Constitution. The result is a judiciary that is regularly checked and guided by 
the other branches. 
I. Constitutional Ten 
A. Withdrawing Jurisdiction 
On a number of occasions, Congress has titreatened to withdraw the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals in such areas 88 abortion, school 
busing, and school prayer. This strategy is based on language in Article m oC 
the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both 88 
to law and fo;ct, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, 88 the 
Congress shall make.· The Exceptions Clause, it is argued, gives Congress 
plenary power to determine the Court's appellate jurisdiction. However, this 
grant of power must be read in concert with other provisions in the 
Constitution. An aggressive use of the Exceptions Clause would make an 
exception the nile and deny citizens access to the Supreme Court to vindicate 
constitutional rights. A broad interpretation would run counter to the basic 
principles of constitutionalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. 
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In some early decisions, the Supreme Court recognized the power 01 
, ,:"".ongr:ess to make exceptions and to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction. l 
The leading case for empowering Congress to withdraw appellate jurisdiction 
from the Supreme Court came shortly after the Civil War. In 1868, Congress 
withdrew the Court's jurisdiction to review circuit court judgments on habeas 
, corpus actions. The clear purpose was to prevent the Court from deciding a case 
on the constitutionfllity of the Reconstruction military government in the South, 
even though the Court had already heard oral argument in the case. On 
February 17, 1868, the Court dismissed the government's argument that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
318 (1868). The case was argued March 2, 3, 4, and 9. Before the Court could 
meet in conference to decide the case, Congress passed legislation to nUllify the 
plaintiff's relief under an act of February 5, 1867, which allowed a petition to 
a federal circuit court for the writ of habeas corpus. The new legislation 
provided that the portion of the 1867 statute that authorized an appeal from the 
judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court, "or the exercise of any such 
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which bave been or may hereafter 
be taken, be, and the same is, hereby repealed." 15 Stat. 44 (1868). The Court 
unanimously upheld the l'epeal statute and dismissed the case for want of 
jurisdiction. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
The Court retained access to Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1~89 to 
review habeas corpus actions, but to rely on that authority in the faee of the 
repeal statute invited a major collision with Congress. The House of 
Representatives had already passed legislation to requil'e a two-thirds majority 
of the Court to invalidate a federal gtatute, and some of the more assertive 
Radicals wanted to abolish the Court. 
During this same period, when the Court was very vulnerable, Congress 
passed legislation to remove from federal and state courts their jurisdiction to 
hear other cases arising from the Civil War. The legislation responded to the 
Court's decision in & parte MilliglJ1J" 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866), holding that 
military courts couJd not function in states where federal courts bad been open 
and operating. Although cases were already pending with regard to the conduct 
of U.S. officials during and immediately after the war, Congress gave indemnity 
to all omcials who implemented presidential proclamations from March 4, 1861, 
to June 30, 1866, with respect to martial law and military trials. The statute 
provides: "And no civil ccurt of the United States, or of any State, or of. the 
District of Columbia, or of any district or territory of the United States, shall 
have or take jurisdiction or, or in any manner reverse any of the proceedings 
bad or acts diPle 88 aforesaid ....• 14 Stat. 432, 433 (1867). 
Shortly after McCardle, the Supremo Court decided a case which involved 
8 congressional attempt to use the, appropriations power to nUllify the 
President's power to pardon. The Court said that Congress had exceeded its 
I WlICdrt v. DaUwtYt 8 DaD. 3' J (1796); Durousseau Y. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 
306 (1810); 'Barry v. Mercein, 0 How. loa, 119 (1847); Daniels Y. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. 
(3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1866). 
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authority, first by trying to limit a presidential power granted by the 
Constitution, and second by preventing a presidential pardon or amnesty from 
being admitted as evidence in court.' The intent of the statute was to strip the 
Court of its jurisdiction over such eases. The Court agreed that the Exceptions 
Clause gave Congreas the power to deny the right of appeal in a particular class 
or C8.8e8, but it could not withhold appellate jurisdiction "as a means to an end" 
if the end was forbidden under the Constitution. In this ease, the efl"ect of 
withholding appellate jurisdiction was to prescribe impermissible rules of 
decision for the judiciary in a pending case. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 128, 146 (1872). 
Cases decided after McCardle and· Klein have discussed the power of 
Congress to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, provided that 
other provisions of the Constitution are given due regard.2 The Court has 
allowed Congress to limit the availability of certain judicial remedies, sueh 88 
prohibiting district courts from issuing injunctions to control labor disputes or 
the enforcement of price regulations. Laufv. E.G. Shinner It Co., 303 U.S. 323 
(1938); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1942). Although Congress has 
withdrawnjurisdietion from lower federal courts to adjudicate certain issues, the 
exercise of that power -is subject to compliance with at least the requirements 
of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted 
po\Ver to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the 
Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power 88 to deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property 
without just compensation." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 
257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). 
An appropriations bill enacted in 1989 raised a possible violation of Klein. 
The bill stated that Congress determined and directed that the management oC 
forests covered. by previous legislation was -adequate consideration for the 
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements- that were the basis for two 
pending lawsuits. The Ninth Circuit held that ilie language in the 
appropriations bUI was unconstitutional under Klein beeauae it attempted to 
direct courts to reach a particular decision, but a unanimous Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that the language in the appropriations merely changed 
the law underlying the litigation. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.s. 
429 (1992). 
A 1996 decision by the Supreme Court concerned a possible cballenge to the 
Exceptions Clause. A congressiona1statute placed limits on prisoners who seek 
to make successive habeas petitions to the Court. Such petitions must first be 
approved by a three-judge panel. The Court unanimously upheld the statute. 
Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996). 
:I United states v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 893, 899-400 (1908). See &leo The 'Tnmcis 
Wright,- 106 U.S. 381, 386 (1881) and Kline v. Burke CoDat. Co., 280 U,S. 226, 284 
(1922). 
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B. Impeachment of Judles 
The Constitution provides in Article n, Section 4, that the President, the 
Vice President, "and all eivil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Impeachment is done by majority vote in the HOU8e 
of Representatives; cOD\-iction in the Senate requires a two-thirds :m.aJority. 
The first federal judge subject to the impeaehment process was Judge John 
Pickering, who was removed in 1805. Impeachment efforts against Justice 
Samuel Chase (in 1805) and Judge James H. Peck (1830-31) failed. Judge West 
H. Humphreys was impeached and removed from office in 1862. In the 
twentieth century, an etTort to impeach Judge Charles Swayne failed in'1905, 
Judge Robert W. Archbald was impeached and removed in 1913, Judge Harold 
Louderback survived an impeaebment trial in 1933, and Judge Halsted L. Ritter 
was impeached and removed in 1936. The three most recent impeachment 
. efforts led to the removal of Judges Harry E. Claiborne (1986), Walter Nixon 
(1989), and Alcee L. Hastings (1989). 
Vanous grounds were cited for the impeachment of these juciges. Judge 
Pickering was impeached and removed because of his handling of 8 case 
involving the ship Eliza and because of alcoholism. In the trial of the Eliza, 
Judge Pickering was accused of intoxication and the use of ofTell3ive language. 
, or the four articles of impeachment presented to the Senate, three dealt with 
Eliza. Article 1 described. the allegedly improper return of the ship and cargo 
to the owner; Article 2 claimed that Pickering's return of the vessel was 
contrary to the law and a deprivation of revenue to the United States; and 
Article 3 charged that his refusal to allow an appeal derived from his "wickedly 
meaning and intending to iqjure the revenue of the United States."s He was 
convicted on all four artieles of impeachment;' 
Much of the impetus behind the impeachment of Justice Chase reJated to 
his intemperate, partisan, and arbitrary behavior while on the bench. He was 
also charged, in his capacity as federal judge, with failing to comply with 
Virginia state lows. The cbarges against Judge Peck concerned a single issue: 
his decision to hold an individual in contempt of court and sentence him to jail.' 
Seven artieles of impeachment were brought ~nst Judge Humphreys, 
including failure to bold court, gross misconduct, and treason for organizing 
armed rebellion against the United States. The unsuccessful charges against 
Judge Swayne of Florida focused on making unlawfUl claims for expenses, living 
in Delaware in defiance of federal law requiring judges to reside in their 
districts, and punishing three men for contempt of court. 
8 Eleanore Buslmell, Crima, FoUiul and Milrfortuna: "'Iu! Federal Impeaelrmmt 
'J'riaz. 4lS-46 (1992). 
4 Id. at 52. 
, Id. at 80-61,93-96. 
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Judge Archbald was impeached and removed on grounds of personal 
corruption (using his office for personal profit). Judge Louderback was accused 
of favoritiam in awarding receiverships to supervise ailing companies. None of 
the five articles of impeachment came close to tbe two-thirds required in the 
Senate. Judge Ritter, accused oC practicing law after he bad become a federal 
judge, was impeacbed and removed. 
The three impeachment trials of the 19808 concerned judges who had been 
prosecuted for criminal conduct. Two of the judges were convicted: Clairbome 
for tax evasion and Nixon for perjury. Judge Hastings, after being acquitted in . 
a bribery ease, faced charges by ajudicial council that he had committed bribery 
and should be removed from office. The Judicial Conference recommended to 
the House of Representatives that Hastings be impeached. 
c. Constitutional Amendments 
On four occasions, Congress bas used constitutional amendments to reverse 
Supreme Court decisions. The Eleventh Amendment responded to Chisholmv. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which decided that a state could be sued in 
federal court by a plaintiff from another state. To protect states from a flood 
of costly citizen SUits, Congress passed a constitutional amendment which was 
subsequently ratified to provide that "The J'ldicial power of the United States 
shall not be' construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted. against one of the United States by Citizens of another State~ or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
The Fourteenth Amendment nullified the Supreme Court's decision in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford (1857), which beld that blacks as a class were not citizens 
protected under the Constitution. Section 1 of the Amendment provides: "All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and oCthe State wh.erein they reside." 
The Sixteenth Amendment overruled Pollack v. Farmers' Loan and Trust 
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which struck down a federal income tax. Ratifiedjn 
1916, the amendment gave Congreas the power "to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the 
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment was. ratified in 1971 to overturn Oregon v. 
MitcMU, 400 U.s. 112 (1970), a Supreme Court d~ision that had voided a 
congressional effort to lower the minimum voting ag~ in state elections to 18. 
Congre. sent a constitutional amendment to the states and, in record time, 
three months later, a sumcient number of states ratified this language: "The 
rightorcitiz8M aftha United States, who are eighteen years ofap or older, to 
vote .hall Dot be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on 
account ot age," 
. 
Ull8ueceRful constitutional amendments can sometimes prod the Court to 
addreH neglected _uee. In 1970, the House of Representatives 'paased the 
Equal Ripta Amendment. After Senate action, the language sent to the states 
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tor ratification read: "Equality of rights under the law shall _.)t be denied 01" 
, abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." The ERA was 
never ratified, but the debate on the amendment highlighted what many 
legislators thought were inadequacies in judicial rulings. Congresswoman 
Martha Griffiths, during debate in October 1971, said that the whole purpose 
of the ERA was to tell the Supreme Court: "Wake up! This is the 20th century. 
Before it is over, judge women 88 individual human beings." 117 Cong. Rec. 
35323 (1971). A month later, the Court invalidated an Idaho law that preferred 
men over women in administering estates. Reed v. Reed, 404 'U.S. 71 (1971). 
The decision marked the first time in its history that the Court had struck down 
sex discrimination on constitutional grounds. 
In addition to constitutional amendments aimed at particular decisions, 
there have been other proposals aimed at curbing the Court's strength by 
imposing certain procedural requirements. These amendments have in every 
instance been unsuccessful. Of recurring interest are the following: requiring 
more than a 1lU\iority of Justices to etrike down a statute; subjecting the Court's 
decisions to another tribunal, i:luch as the Senate or a judicial body consisting 
of a judge from each state; submitting the Court's decisions to popular 
referenda; allowing Congress by two-thirds vote to override a Court decision just 
as it does a presidential veto; and making laws held unconstitutional by the 
Court valid if reenacted by Congress. 
Other proposed amendments are directed at the Court's tenure and 
qualifications: allowing the removal of Supreme Court justices and other federal 
judges by majority vote of each House of Congress; restricting the term of a 
justice to a set number of years; having justices retire at the age of '75 years; 
requiring direct election from the judicial districts; itemizing the qualifieations 
of justices, such as requiring prior judicial service in the highest court of a state 
or excluding anyone who has, within the preceding five years, served in the 
executive or legislative branch; and vesting the appointment of Justices in 
judges from the highest state courts. 6 
D. Case 01' Controversy Test 
Article m limits judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." The case-or-
controversy standard restricts federal courts "to questions presented in an 
adversary context and in a form. historically "iewed as capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.- Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). By finding 
that a legal dispute is not a case or controversy, courts can push political 
controversies back to the elected branches for resolution. In deciding that a 
dispute is not 8 ease or controversy, judges can determine that a litigant does 
not have standing to sue. By lowering the barrier for standing, courts can 
encourage more lawsuits and risk collisions with other branches ot government. 
Justice Powell warned that a relaxed standing poJicy would expand judicial 
e Mau.rioe I, Culp, • A Survey of the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial 
Review by the Supreme Court ot the United States: 4 Ind. L. J. 386 (1929); Shelden D. 
EUiott, ·Court-Curbin, PIOJ)OIa1I in Con,gras,' 88 Notre Dame Lawyer 597, 606 (1958). 
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power: "It seems to be inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or. citizen 
.standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, 
with a shift away from a democratic Corm oCgovemmenf:..- United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (concuning opinion). 
Litigants able to establish standing may find their personal stake diluted 
or eliminated by subsequent events" to the point that the case is moot and 
therefore dismissed. If the judieiary is unprepared or unwilling to decide an 
issue, perhaps to avoid a contlict with elected branches, mootness is one remedy. 
In 1981. it appeared that the Supreme Court might have to decide the 
constitutionality oC a pocket veto by President Reagan. Instead, the Court held 
that the dispute was moot and therefore retumed the issue to Congress and the 
President Cor possible resolution. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1981). 
Just as a ease brought too late can be moot, a case brought too early may 
not yet be ripe for judicial determination. A collision between certain Members 
oC Congress and President Bush in .1990 over the war power was avoided by a 
federal court on the ground that ·the issue was not ripe for adjudication. 
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F .supp. 1141 <D.D.C. 1990). 
E. PoUtical Questions 
A ~umber oC important constitutional questions are resolved wholly by 
Congrps and the President because the Court regards them as ·political 
questions" unsuited for the judiciary. Efforts to litigate certain issues are 
unsuccessful if the Court decides that it is impolitic or inexpedient to· take 
juriSdiction. . 
The Statement and Account Clause provides that wa regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shali be published 
from time to time." U.S. Const., art, I, § 9, c1: 6. The purpose was to provide 
citizens with a regular accounting of public spending. However, funding for the 
Central Intelligence Agency and other parts of the intelligence community, with 
an aggregate budget of about $30 billion, has not been made public since 1949. 
In 1974, the Court declined an opportunity to decide the meaning oC this 
eonmtutional p-tovision, holding that the litigant lacked standing to bring the 
issue. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.s. 166 (1974). As a result, the 
meaning or the Statement and Account Clause depends on whatever the 
executive and legislative branches decide. 
'!be Constitution prohibita Members of either House from holding any 
other civil office. Called the Incompatibility Clause, the language provides that 
~o Penon holding any OMee under the United States, shall be a Member of 
either House during hi. COntinuance in Offiee.·' U.S. Const., art. It § 6, cl. 2. 
The Incompatibility Claus8has exiated lor more than two centuries without any 
deiinition or application by federal courts. When the issue reached the Supreme 
Court in 1974, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the 
eu8. Schlesinger v. Relervlltl to Stop the ,War, 418 U.S. 209 (1974). 
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The Constitution prohibits Members of Congreao ':"rom being ap!,ointed to 
-any federal position whose salary has been increased during their term of office. 
The constitutionallanguagfJ, called the Ineligibility Clause, provides that "No 
Senator or Representative fJbali, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil Offi,,:e under which the Authority of the United States, 
which shan have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
increased during such time." U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Interpretations of this 
provision by Congress and the executive branch have far outweighed 
contributions from the courts. Efforts to litigate the iesue have been 
unsuccessful, either bec~.use the plaintiff lacked standing or because a court 
decided not to decide. &, parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); McClure v. Carter, 
513 F.Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), afrd Bub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 
1025 (1981). 
Members of Cong7:ess have gone to court to contest military initiatives by 
the President, but tht.)se efforts are regularly turned aside by federal jud~. 
Throughout the Viet,.l8Dl War, such cases were regarded as political questions 
to be resolved solely by the elected branches.7 By the time of the Reagan and 
Bush years, federal judges offered other reasons to avoid decisions on such 
disputes: the issue was moot; it was not ripe; plaintiffs lacked standing; a 
variety of doctrinefJ on judicial prudence and "equitable discretion;" and a finding 
of nonjusticiability because judicial resolution would require fact-finding better 
done by Congre~.8 For the most part, constitutional questions of war and 
peace are left trJ the legislative and executive branches. 
II. The Issue of Judicial Supremacy 
Particularly in the twentieth century, scholars, judges, and sometimes 
Members of Congress claim that the U.S. Supreme Court bas the -last word" on 
the meaning of the Constitution. Under this theory, if Congress disagrees with 
a Court ruling the only alternative is to p9SS a constitutional amendment to 
. overturn the Court. This claim of judicial supremaey overlooks much or the 
flexibility and political considerations that characterize the relationship between 
the judiciary and other elements of the political system; Congress, the President, 
the states, and the geueral public. 
'I E.g., LuNg v. McNamara, 373 F ~ 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Velve! v. JohnaoD, 287 
F.Supp. 846 (D!KaDs. 1968); Berk v. Laird, 317 F.Supp. '115 (E.D. N.Y. 19'10); Orlando 
v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); AtJee v. Laird, 347 F.Sapp. 689 (E.D. Pat 1972); 
Gravel v. Laird, 347 F.Supp. '1 (D.D.C. 1972); DaCosta v. Laird, 471l.2d 1146 (?At Cir. 
1978); aDd Mitchell v. lAIird, 488l.2d 811 (D.D.C. 1973). 
• M~: Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). ripeDEl88: DeUums 
"I. Bush, 762 F.Supp. 1141, 1149-62 <D.D.r.. 1990); standiDg: Doman v. U.S. Secretary 
or Det..., 861 F.2'd 4SO (D.C. Cir. I~J, Judicial prudence and equitable discretion: 
Lotn; v. BeapD. 678 r.supp. 388, 837-89 (D.D.C. 1987); CoDy8l'8 v. Reap.n. 578 
r.Supp. 324 <D.D.C. 1984); ooDjuatieiabiUt;y: Crockett v. Reap.n, 558 F.Supp. 898. 898 
(D.D.C. 1982); 81dlChe1 .. r.piDou v. Reagan, 588 r.supp. 696, eoo <D.D.C. 1988). 
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There are many examples ofjudieial opinions being challenged aDd reversed 
through means other than constitutional amendments. Congress regularly 
overturns judicial rulings that involve statutory interpretations ("Statutory' 
Reversals," treated in a subsequent section), but even when the Court renders 
a constitutional interpretation there are many methods available to Congress to 
counter the Court. 
A. Judicial Posltio:Q.8 on FlDality 
Justices of the Supreme Court have taken different p~sitions regarding the 
titiality of Court decisions. Some see a decision 88 wholly binding on noDjudicial 
parties, including Congress. Others leave room for a sharing of jurisdiction 
among federal institutions over statutory and conatitutional questions. 
Justice Robert H. Jackson once said: "We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are (mal." Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443, 540 (1953). However, the record oC the last two centuries 
demonstrates convincingly that the Supreme Court is neither infallible nor final. 
Its decisions are regularly reshaped by other political institutions, both at the 
nation&! and the state levels. In a speech, Jackson acknowledged the force of 
politics and majority rule in the shaping of constitutional values: 
... let us not deceive ourselves; long-sustained publie opinion does influence the 
process of constitutional interpretation. Each new member of the ever .. 
changing pe1'8Onnel of our courts brings to his task the aa8UmptioDB and 
accustomed thought of a later period. The praetical play of the forees of 
politics is such that judicial power has often de1ayed but never permanently 
defeated the persistent will of a substantiallDl\iority.9 
To Justice Frankfurter, "the ultimate touebstone- of cOnstitutionality is :the 
Constitution itself and 110t what we have said about it-" Graves v. New York ex 
reI. O'Keefe, 806 U.S. 466, 491·92 (1939). Before joining the Court, he put the 
point more bluntly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt: "People have been taught 
to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it i.e not they who speak. but .the 
Constitution, whereas, of course, in 80 many vital cases, it is they who speak and 
not the Constitution.ltlO 
Chief Justice Earl Warren cautioned against an ovetteliance on the courts 
Cor the protection of constitutional rights. In an article in 1962 he spoke with 
regret about Hirobayashi v. United Statu, 320 U.s. 81 (1943), in which the 
Court unanimously upheld a curfew order directed against more than 100,000 
Japanese-Americans, about tw~thirds of them naturally born United States 
citizens. Warren said that the "fact that the Court rules in a case like 
• Robert H. JacUoD, -:Maintaining Our :Freedom&: The Bole of the Judiciary," 
deUveJed to the American Bar Asaoclation, BoatoD, :Ma.., August 24, 1963; reprinted in 
Wltll 8pe«:hu, No. 24, Vol. XIX, p. 761 (October 1, 1963). . 
10 Max Preeclman, anno.; ~lt·arul FranAfurter: Their Corrapo'l&den.t:e 383 
(1967). 
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Hirabaya,tlhi that a given program is constituw· .naI, does not neees8arilyanswer 
the question whether, in a broader sense, it actualJy is." kl Warren, -rile Bill 
of Rights and the Military,- 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 193 (1962). The Co\irt's 
failure to invalidate 8 governmental action did not, by itself, mean that 
constitutional standards had been followed. Warren emphasized that in a 
democratie society, "it is still the Legislature and the elected Executive who have 
the primary responsibility for fashioning and executing polley consistent with 
the Constitution." Id. at 202. He even warned against depending two much on 
Congress and the President: "[T]be day-to-day job of upholding the Cor..stitution 
really lies elsewhere. It rests, realistically, on the shoulders of every ei~en.· 
Id. 
At certairipoints in our constitutional history, there has been a compelling 
need for an authoritative and binding decision by the Supreme Court. The 
unanimous ruling in 1958, signed by each justice, was essential in dealing with 
the Little Rock desegregation crisis. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.8. 1 (1958) . 
. Another unanimous decision in 1974 disposed of the confrontation between 
President Nixon and the judiciary regarding the Watergate tapes. United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For the most part, however, court decisions are 
tentative and reversible like other political events. 
On February 19, 1997, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on the 
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Congress 
enacted in 1993 in response to Employment Di.r.sion v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). Justice O'Connor asked one of the attorneys: "Do you agree that 
Congre8& can't overruletbe court's interpretation of the Constitution?" The 
attorney replied: "We agree." 65 LW 3579. Examples will be provided in this 
paper where Congress does, in effect, overrule the court's interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
B. The "Binding Precedent" of Marbury 
The Supreme Coun's 1803 opinion in Marbury v. MadL-ffOn is the most 
famous case for the proposition that the Court is supreme OD \:!)nstitutional 
questions. Chief Justice John Marshall stated that it is "emphatics!!y the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is: 6 U.8. (1 
Cr.) 137, 177 (1803). When this statement is placed in context, both legal and 
political, there is le88 sweep to Marshall's words than contemporary authors 
often impJy. Nonetheless, Marbury is often cited by the Court as evidence that 
it alone delivers the "fmal word" on the meaning of the CoDStitution. According 
to a 1958 decision, Marbury "declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution: Cooper 
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Court reasserted this principle in 1962: 
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether action of that branch 
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in 
constitutional interpretation md a responsibility of this Court as ultimate 
interpreter of thq Constitution." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.s. 186, 211 (1962). In a 
1969 decision, the Court referred to itself as the "ultimate interpreter" of the 
Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
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"Ultimate interpreter" does not mean exclusive interpreter. The courts 
expect other branches of govermnent to interpret the Constituti~n in their 
initial deliberations. As the Court noted -m. 19'14: -In the -performance of 
888igned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially 
interpret the COllstitution, and the interpretation ot its powers by any branch 
is due great respect from the others." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.,8. 683, 703 
(1974). 
The meaning of Ma.rbury has been debated in recent confirmation hearings 
Cor Supreme Court justices. In 1986, when Justice William H. Rehnquist 
appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee 88 nominee for Chief Justice7 
Senator Arlen Specter iaquired about the "inding precedent" of Marbury. He 
asked Rehnquist whether the Court "is the tinal arbiter, the final decision maker 
otwhat the Constitution meaDS." Rehnquist replied: WUnquestionably." Spect3r 
pursued the point. If the Court ruled on a legal issue, would the President and 
Congress "have a responsibility to observe the decisions of the Supreme Court 
or the United States on a constitutione! matter?" Rehnquist answered: "Yes, I 
think they do." "Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rebnquist," hearings 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99tb Cong., 2nd Sess. 187 (1986). 
The same question, put to Supreme Court nominees Antonio Scalia, 
Anthony Kennedy, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, yielded different and more 
measured responses. In his 1986 confirmation hearings, Scalia was asked by 
Senator Strom Thurmond: "Do you agree that Marbury requires the President 
and Congress to always adhere to the Court-s interpretation oC the 
Constitution?" Conceding that the case was one oCthe tlgreat pillars of American 
law,· Scalia hesitated to say whether "in DO instance can either ot the other 
branche8 call into question the action or the Supreme Court." "Nomination of 
Judge Antonin Scalia," hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong., 2nd Se88. 33 (1986). In this exchange, Scalia declined to state that 
the Court is the exclusive, final authority on constit-.1tional questions. 
A year later, Senator Specter and his colleagues on the committee listened 
to Anthony Kennedy challenge the Dotion of judicial supremaey. In 1982, while 
serving as a federal appellate judge in the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy had already 
expreased his view that other brancbes of government play major roles in 
interpreting the Constitution. He stated at that time: WAs I have pointed out, 
the Constitution, in some of its most critical aspects, is what the political 
hrmches of the government have made it, whether the judiciary approves or 
Dot." "Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States," bearings before the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1987). 
At the hearings in 1987, Kennedy explained to the committee that in such 
areas 88 separation of powers, the omce of the presidency, the commerce clause, 
and federalism, the meaning or the Constitution depends largely on the 
judgmenta at the executive and legislative branches, not the Court. Although 
be agreed that Supreme Court decisions are the law of the land and must be 
obeyed, he W81, "somewhat reluctaDt to say that, in all circumstances each 
legislator is immediately bound by the tull circumstances of a Supreme Court 
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decree." Id. at 221-22. He gave the i" !lowing example. If the Supreme Court 
were to llverrule New YorA Times v. Sullivan, exposing newspapers Cully to libel 
. suits, Kennedy said that legislators should challenge the Court: "I think you 
could stand up on the floor of the U.S. Senate and 88y I am introducing this 
legislation because in my view the Supl'eme Court of the United States is 180 
degrees wrong under the Constitution." Id. at 222-23. 
In her nomination hearings in 1993, Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that Justices "do not guard constitutional rights alone. 
Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the President, the 
States, and the people. Constant realization of a more perfect Union, the 
Constitution's aspiration, requires the widest, broadest, deepest participation on 
matters of government and government policy." "Nomination of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme ColL.--t of the United States,· 
hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, l03rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
50 (1993). 
· c~ The Scope and Reach of Marbury 
No specific language in the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the 
power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress or the President. Several 
delegates at the constitutional convention at Philadelphia spoke in favor of 
judicial review when invoked against st¢e laws. State actionS inconsistent with 
the U.S. Constitution "would clearly not be valid," said Gouverneur Morris, and 
judges "would consider them as null "void." 2 The Records of the Federal 
Convention 92 (Max Farrand 00. 1937). 
tludicial review over Congress and the President, as coequal branches, is 
much more difficult to establish. The Court would need power to strike down 
congressional legislation that threatened the integrity or existence of the 
judiciary. Such actions oC self-defense were part of the system of cheeks and 
balances and separation of powers. Beyond those justifications, the picture was 
unclear. 
From 1789 to 1803, several precedents SUggesk"'Cl a broader role for judicial 
review when applied to congressional and presidential actions. A statute 
enacted in 1792 required federal judges to serve as commissioners on claims 
settlement. Since their decisions could be set aside by the Secretary of War, 
judges were essentially issuing ·advisory opinions· and serving in a subordinate 
capacity to executive officials. Before the Court could rule on the 
constitutionality of the statute, Congress repealed the otTending seetiona and 
removed the Secretary's authority to veto decisions rendered by federal 
judges.ll 
In 1796, the Court upheld a carriage tax passed by Congress. Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). If the Court had the power to uphold 
II 1 Stat. 243-46 (1792); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DaD.) 409 (1792); 1 Stat. 324-25 
(1793). 
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a congressional statute, presumably it had the power to strike one down. 
Justices of the Court remained uncertain about their authority to invalidate 
congressional statutes. Justice Chase, writing in this. case, said it was 
unnecessary -01 this time, for me to determine, whether this court, 
constitutionally POB8e88eS the power to declare an act of Congress void •.• but if 
the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but 
in a very cleo,. case.ft Id. at 175 (emphasis in original). As late as 1800, the 
Court was still \Insure about its authority to invalidate an set of Congress. 
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800). 
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in MtJrbury represents what many regard 
as the definitive basis for judicial review over congressional and presidential 
actioos. But Marshall's· opinion stands for a much more modest claim. He 
stated that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to. say what the law is.ft 6 U.s. (1 Cr.) at 177. So it is, but Congress and the 
President are also empowered under the Constitution to "say what the law is.-
Marshall's statement can stand only Cor the proposition that the Court is 
respoosible for stating what it thinks a statute means, after which Congress 
may enact another law to override the Court's interpretation. The Court state. 
what the law is on the day the decision comes down; the law may change later. 
Several examples of this institutional interplay will be identified in this report. 
It is evident that Marshall did not think he was powerful enough in 1803 
to give orders to Congress and the President. He realized that he could not 
uphold the constitutionality of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and direct 
Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commissions to the disappointed 
would-be judges. President Thomas Jefferson and Madison would have ignored 
such an order.12 Everyone Jmew that, including Marshall. As Chief Justice 
Warren Burger noted, "The Court could stand hard blows, but not ridicule, and 
the ale houses would rock with hilarious laughter- had Marshall issued a 
mandamus that the Jefferson administration ignored. -18 
Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that Marshall believed that the 
Court was supreme on constitutional interpretation. The impeachment hearings 
of Judge Pickering and Justice Chase add to these doubts. Marbury was issued 
on February 24, 1803. The House impeached Pickering on March 2, 1803 and 
the Senate convicted him on March 12, 1804. As soon 88 -the House impeached 
Pickering, it turned its guns on Chase. If that move succeeded, Marsball had 
reason to believe he was next in line. 
With these threats presaing upon the Court, Marshall wrote to Chase on 
January 23, 1864, suggesting that Members of Congreaa did not have to impeacb 
J2 2 Oeorp L. HasJd .... Het'bart A. JohDaOD, HUID"1 of tIut Supreme Court of tIut 
Unit«l 8~ 185 (1981); 8 Albert J. Bevaridp, The life of,John, ManluJll 126-27 
(1919). 
I. WarreD E. BUJ'88ft ..". Doctrine or Judicial Review: Mr. !IarahaJl, Mr. JetT8I'mD, 
ad 1&. MaIbur.Y: iD Vkw. Ftom 1M &nd& 14-·(M'ark Cannon & David'O'BrieD ada. 
1986). 
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judges because they objectee;. • l their judicial opinions. Instead, Congress could 
simply review and reverse objectionable decisions through the regular legislative 
process. Here is ~1ar8ha1I'slanguage in a letter to Chase: 
I think the m.odern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate 
jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed 
unsound by the legislature would certaiD.Jy better comport with the mlldneaa 
of our cbaracter than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them. 
unknow.ing of his fault.]4 
The use of impeachment to punish the Court for issuing unsound decisions 
bas precedent dating back to such prominent works as Federalist No. 81, in 
which Alexander Hamilton denied that there was great danger of the judiciary 
encroaching upon executive authority. Congress bad adequate checks to rein in 
an overactive Court: 
[T]he inference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important 
constitutional check wbichthe power of instituting impeachments in one part 
of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give 
to that body upon the members of the judicial department. 'nUs is alone a 
romplete security. There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of 
deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the 
united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was poaBesae II 
of the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them. from their 
. stations. Iii 
As to the scope and reach of Marbury, it is highly significant that Marshall 
never again struck down a congressional statute during his long tenure. lasting 
to 1885. Instead, he played a consistently supportive roJe in upholding 
congressional power. After Marbury, Marshall upheld the power of Congress to 
exercise its commerce power, to create a U.S. Bank, and to discharge other 
constitutional responsibilities, whether express or implied, without being second-
guessed by the Court. The judiciary functioned as a yea-saying. not a negative, 
branch. As Professor Walter Murphy has written, Tor his part, Marshall in 
Marbury never claimed ajudicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation, nor 
did he allege judicial supremacy, only authority to interpret the Constitution in 
cases before the Court.tllS 
14 3 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John. MorshoJl177 (1919). 
J6 The.Federalist l)()8..O9 (BeJijamin Fletcher Wright ed. 196!) . 
• 1 Walter Murphy, "Why Ma.r6ury MattenJ,w 1 Constitution 62, 68 (1989). For an 
~ tha. wncludes that Marbury did not veat in the Court the fiDal authority to 
interpret the CoDStitution, see Robert Clinton, Jla.t6u.ry v. MtJdUon. and Judicial Review 
(1989), Another detailed critique or Marshall's reasoning in Mtriury is by William W. 
Van AJatyDe, wA Critieal Guide to MGtbul"1 v. MotliMm: 1969 Duke L.l. 1. 
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lB. PoHtical and Legislative Pressures .. 
Other than the eheckS ezpreaely stated in the Constitution, Cederal courts 
are subject to constraints that arise through the regular functioning oC the 
political system. These limitations operate not only when courts sustain the 
constitutionality oC a statute but when they declare it to be invalid. 
A. When the Court Upholds Coll8tltutionaliiy 
When the Court decides that a congressional statute or a presidential action 
is constitutional, the controversy may remain open for different treatments by 
the legislative and executive branches. 
u.s. Bank. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson received a bill to 
recharter the United States Bank. Several Presidents before him and previous 
Congresses bad decided that the bank was constitutional. In McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819), the Supreme Court ruled that the 
bank was constitutional. Nevertheless, Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground 
that it was unconstitutional. In his veto message, he aaid that he bad tal.ten an 
oath of office to support the Constitution "88 he understands it, and not as it is 
understood by others. II The opinion DC juJges, he said, 
has no more authority over CoDgNBB than the opinion of Congress bad over 
the judges, and on that point the President is ind.epend.e1lt of both. The 
authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control 
the Co~ or the Executive when ading in their legislative capacities, but 
to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 17 
Jackson's position on the veto power has been followed by all subsequent 
Presidents. Regardless oCthe constitutional decisions reached by Congress and 
the courts, Presidents may independently analyze the constitutionality of bills 
presented to them. 
Independent Coul&tlel. Presidents Reagan and Clinton signed 
legislation creating and reauthorizing the office oC independent counsel. In 
Mo11"i8on v. Olllon, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court uphelci the 
conatitutionality of the independent counsel statute. Despite those actions, 
President Clinton or any future President retains the independence to veto a 
reauthorization bill on the ground that the office DC independent counsel 
encroaches upon the executive power granted to the President by the 
Constitution. Similarly, Congress could decide at the nen reauthorization mage 
that the office oC independent counsel violates the Constitution. The bolding oC 
Morrison simply means that Congress and the President are at liberty to create 
this office if they want to. Both brancbes retain an independent capacity to 
rethink the constitutionality c~ the statute. 
1'1 8 A Compilation of the 14 .... and Ptipen 0{ the P1widen.ttI 1145 (James D. 
lUchard8oD. ed. 1897). 
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Women'. m.,,;lt •• In 1873, the Supreme Court held that denying women 
the right to practice law was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of privileges and immunities. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (l6 Wall.) 
130 (1873). State courts reached similar conclusions in rejecting the efforts of 
women to practice law. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875). In 1878, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed a bill to remove legal disabilities that prevented 
women from practicing law. When asked whether the question had ever been 
brought before the Supreme Court, Congre88Dl8D. Roderick Butler replied: "It 
has; and they have decided that as the law now stands women eannot be 
admitted." 7 Congo Rec. l285. The bili passed the House by a margin of 169 to 
87. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill adversely, arguing that 
the Supreme Court and every other federal eourt are authorized to make their 
own rules regulating the admission of persons to practice, "so that there is now 
no obstacle of law whatever to the admission of women to practice in those 
courts." 7 Congo Roo. 1821. Senator Joseph MeDonald eoneeded that the Court 
might change ita rules to permit women to praetiee before it, "but as it does not 
seem inclined to do so, I do not think it i8 wrong for us to prescribe in this ease 
a rule fo~ the Supreme Court,," 8 Cong. Bee. 1083. Senator George Hoar 
rejected the argument that the Supreme Court should be left alone to decide by 
its own rules who may practice before it: "Now, with the greatest respeet for 
that tribunal, I conceive that the law-making and not the law-expoundingpower 
in this Government ought to determine the question what class of citizens shall 
be clothed with the office of the advocate." Id. at 1084. The bill passed the 
Senate, 39 to 20. As enacted into law, the bill provided that any woman 'Who 
shall have been a member of the bar of the highest court of any State or 
Territory or of the S~preme Court of the District of Columbia for the space of 
three years, and shall have maintained a good standing before sueh court, and 
who shall be a person of good moral character, 8hall, on motion, and the 
production of sueh reeord, be admitted to praetiee before the Supreme Court of 
the United States."' 20 Stat. 292 (1879). 
Fi7UJncial Pri~. In 1972, agents from the Treasury Department's 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau presented grandjury subpoenas to two 
banks in which a suspect maintained accounts. Without advising the depositor 
that subpoenas had been served, the banks supplied the government with 
microfilms of cheeks, deposit slips, and other records. The Supreme Court held 
that a Fourth Amendment interest could not be vindicated in court by 
challenging such 8 subpoena. The Court treated the materials 88 busineB8 
l'eeords of a bank, not private papers or a person. United States v. Miller, 425 
U.s. 435, 438 (1976). 
Congress responded by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 
92 Stat. 3617 (1978). Congressman Charles Whalen explained that the primary 
purpose orthe statute was to prevent warrantless government searches ofbank 
81.''' ;redit recorda that reveal the nature of one'. private atTairs. The 
Government should not bave access wexcept with the knowledge of the subject 
individual or else with· the supervision of the courta.- 124 Cong. Ree. 33810 
(1978). CoDgressman JOM Rou1881ot remarked about the re.pol18ibility of 
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Congress to redress the shortcomings of the Court's decision: -Another standing 
to challenge the release of information in a court of law is provided for in 
section 1110, which, 88 a practical matter, reverses the holding in the Miller 
case." Id. at 33836. In essence, certain safeguards to Fourth Amendment rights 
that were unavailable because of the Supreme Court's decision were DOW 
secured by congressional action. 
Reeea Appointnumta. Another example of independent legislative and 
executive analysis comes from the field of recess appointments. The President's 
constitutional authority to make rece88 appointments to the federal courts "W88 
upheld by the Second Circuit in 1962 and the Ninth Circuit in 1986.18 
Although this practice was upheld in the courts, Congress had expreued 
opposition to these appointments. In 1960, the Senate adopted a resolution 
objecting to reeess appointments to the courts, and the House Judiciary 
Committee conducted a study oCthia type nC appointment. Both Houses pointed 
to serious constitutional issues: circumvention of the Senate's role in confirmiDg 
regular appointments; judges serving in a recess capacity without the 
independence of a liretime appointment; and litigants forced to argue -
before a part-time rederaljudge. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Confli.c1albl!ttn!II!D 
Congress and the President 43-45 (4th ed. 1997). Because of opposi . 
practice, no President since Eisenhower has used the recess appointm 
to place someone on the Supreme Court, and no President since Carter~ •. ....,.;~ 
the power to place someone on the lower courts. Similar to the in,dellmdellt 
counsel issue, the courts have told the political branches that they 
recess appo~tees on the federal courts if they want to, but if the bnmldJil!ll 
constitutional doubts about the practice they can rely on the D!'i~1J" 
confirmation process Cor lifetime appointments. The political bran 
chosen to do the latter. 
ReligioUII Freedom. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided a 
involving Captain Simcba Goldman, who was told by the Air Force that bl:':1:rr:::;;tJ 
not wear his yarmulke indoors while on duty. The Court u 
constitutionality of the Air Force regulation, reasoning that the re1guJl8C:::D::! .• _ 
necessary for military discipline, unity, and order. Goldb-um v. Weil' lbeD!l!!t 
U.S. 503 (1986). In effect, Air Force needs outweighed Goldman's free e.I!!tClllI! 
of religion. Within a year, Congress attached to a military autbort'za::::z:m 
language permitting military personnel to wear conservative, u 
religious apparel indoors, provided that it does not interfere with their' -c::t~uy 
duties. 101 Stat. 1086-87, sec. 508 (1987). The debate in the Hou 
Senate demonstrated that Members of Congress were capable of SDIIdjZDI£ 
cODstitutiOnal rights and giving greater protection to individuals 
available from the Supreme Court. 
1. United States v. Alloc:c:o, 306 F.2d 7M (2d eire 1962), cert. denied, 371 U 
(1963); United State. Y. Woodley, 751 F .2cll008 (9th Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 
1048 (1986). 
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B. Wh... ~e Court FInds UncoDStitutionailty 
If'the Court decides that a govermnental action is unconstitutional, it is 
usually more difficult for Congress and the President to contest the judiciary. 
Congress frequently rewrites legislation to redress deficiencies found by the 
courts. But even in this category there are examples of effective legislative and 
executive challenges to court rulings. 
Sla'IJftI'Y- In his inaugural address in 1857, President James Buchanan 
announced that the dispute over slavery in the territories "is a judicial question, 
which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before 
whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally 
settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully 
submit, whatever this may be.· Two days later Chief Justice Taney handed 
down the Court's decision, holding that Congress could not prohibit slavery in 
the territories and that blacks were not U.S. citizens. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (9 How.) 393 (1857). 
Several years earlier, in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Taney bad 
cautioned that any judgment issued by the Court was subject to review by 
society and other political institutions. The Court's opinion "upon the 
construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is 
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should 
hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is 
supported. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., 
dissenting). . 
Far from settling the matter and providing the "final word" on the slavery 
issue, the Court's decision in 1857 split the country. During the debates of 
1858, Senator Stephen A. Douglas supported Dred Scott while his opponent, 
Abraham Lincoln, a·ecepted the decib~on only as it affected the particular 
litigants. However, he rejected the larger policy questions decided by the Court, 
including the issues of slavery in the tenitories and citizenship to blacks. He 
considered those parts of the decision a nullity, to be left to political resolution 
outside the courts. 2 Collect::.iI Works of Abraham Lincoln 516 (Roy Basler ed. 
1953). 
Lincoln regarded the Court as a coequal, not a superior, branch of 
govemment. In his inaugural address in 1861, he denied that constitutional 
questions could be settled solely by the Court. If govermnent policy on "vital 
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fIXed" by the Court, "the 
people will bave ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically 
resigned their Government into the hands or that eminent tribunal."I. 
Dred Scot: W'u overturned by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
. Amendments, whicb were ratified from 1865 to 1870. Even before those 
l8 7 A Compilation of tM MelI8Q8l18 and Papers of 1M Pmitkntll 8210 (Jamal D. 
RfcluudsoD ed. 1897). 
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amendments were considered and ratified, Congress and the executive branch 
bad already taken action to repudiate the main tenets of the decision. Congress 
passed legislation in 1862 to probibit slavery in the territories. 12 Stat. 432. 
If Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters can be overturned only by 
,constitutional amendments, it . would seem that someone during the 
congressional debate would have objected to overturning Dred Scott by statute. 
However, the decision was not even mentioned. Members of Congress never 
doubted their constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territories and 
proceeded to announce their independent interpretation, with or without the 
Court. 
Also in 1862, Attomey General Bates released a long opinion in which he 
held that neither color nor race could deny American blacks the right of 
citizenship. He pointed out that "freemen of all colors- had voted in some of the 
states. The idea of denying citizenship on the ground of color was received by 
other nations "with incredulity, if not disgust." The Constitution was -silent 
about race as it is about color." With regard to Drecl Scott, he said that the case, 
"as it stands of record, does not determine, nor purport to determine," the 
question of blacks to be citizens. What Chief J ustice Taney said about 
citizenship was pure dicta and ·of no authority as a judicial decision." Bates 
concluded: "[Tlhe free man of color, ... if born in the United States, is a citizen 
of the United States." 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 413 (1862) (emphasis in original). 
Child Labor Legi8lation. In passing the first child labor law in 1916, 
Cangress relied on the commerce power. The Supreme Court held that statute 
to be unconstitutional. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The 
~ owing year Congress passed legislation again to regulate child labor, this 
time relying on its power to tax. When the constituti ity of this legislation 
was challenged in court, Solicitor General Beck . sed the Court that 
congressional statutes should be struck down onl when "an invincible, 
irreconcilable, and indubitable repugnancy develops n a statute and the 
C itutioD." 21 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the 
U 'ted S tes: Constitutional Law 51 (emphasis in original). He further stated: 
WYnT-aiOD is general---end I believe that it is a m' ievous one-that the 
u::.tClaJ'Y has an unlim.ited power to nullifY a law if . incidental effect is in 
of the governrr.ental sphe~ of the enacting ." Id. at 62. It was an 
etrOD!Ot15 idea" t the Court is the "sole guard! and protector of our 
OI11It1%;u.t]'lOnal form of government," for that bel ier wo lead to an impairment 
grees the people of "what may be ed the constitutional 
COE .. em~." Id. • Beck's importunings were ign . The Court struck 
labor law as well. Bailey v. Drezel Furniture Co., 259 
~,_" point Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to give 
Dle:,PDlR!' to te child labor. 66 Congo Rec. 7295, 10142 (1924). By 1937, 
the 36 states had ratified the a ent, and there was 
ua .. ;'t:Q:_ of the ad~itional states. After a collision between the 
o:.lIEl'Jmd the branches throughout the 1930s, Congress retumed to the 
it included a child labor pro . . un in the Fair Labor 
. 52 Stat. 1067. The issue was taken to the Supreme 
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Cltvrt, which unanimously upheld the child labor section. Uniteo. States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
This record-from 1916 to 1941-was an exceptionally lengthy dialogue 
between Congress and the Court, with the legislative branch eventually 
prevailing. The Court later admitted that "the history of judicial limitation of 
congressional power over commerce, when exercised affirmatively, has been more 
largely one of retreat than oCultimate victory." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 
328 U.S. 408,415 (1946). Justice Owen Roberts, who served on the Court from 
1930 to 1945 and witnessed many oC the confrontations between the judiciary 
and the political branches, commented on the expansion of national power over 
economic conditions: "Looking back, it is difficult, to see how the Court could 
have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the 
country-for what in etTeet was a unified economy." Owen J. Roberts, The 
Court and the Constitution 61 (1951). 
Sedition. In 1956, the Supreme Court invalidated a state sedition law 
because the Smith Act, passed by Congress, regulated the same subject. The 
Court concluded that it had been the intent of Congress to occupy the whole 
field of sedition. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956). 
The author of the Smith Act, Congressman Howard W. Smith, immediately 
denied that he bad ever intended the result reached by the Court. In fact, even 
before the Court decided the question, he criticized the holding of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania that the Smith Act preempted state efforts to regulate 
sedition. 101 Cong. Rae. 143 (1955). He introduced a bill to prohibit the courts 
from construing a congressional statute "as indicating an intent on the part of 
Congress to occupy a field in which such act operates, to the exclusion of all 
State laws on the same subject matter, unless such act contains an express 
provision to that effect." Id. at 31 m.R. 3], 142. 
Congressional commIttees reported legislation to permit concurrent 
jurisdiction by the federal government and the states in the areas of sedition and 
subversion. The legislation would also have prohibited courts from using intent 
or implication to decide questions of Cederal preemption over state activities. 
These bills were never enacted.20 However, Smith's bill was debated at length 
on the House floor in 1958. 104 Congo Rec. 13844-65, 13993-4023, 14138-62 
(1958). He explained that the purpose of his bill was to say to the Supreme 
Court: "Do not undertake to read the minds of the Congress; we, in the 
Congress, think ourselves more capable of knowing our minds than the Supreme 
Court .... We ere telling you that when we get ready to repeal a State law or 
preempt a field, we will say BO and we will not leave it to the Supreme Court to 
guess whether we are or not." Id. at 14139·40. His bill passed the House of 
Representatives by the vote 0(241 to 155. Id. at 14162. The measure was never 
taken up on the Senate floor • 
., H.Rept. 2576, 84th Coo,., 2nd Seal. (1956); S.Rapt. 2117, 84th Cong., 2nd Seas. 
(1966); S.Rapt. 22SO, 84th Cong., 2nd Sees. (1966); H.Rept. 1878, 80th Cong., 2nd Seea. 
(1968). 
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In 1969, these bills were again under consideration.21 Shortly before the 
legislation was debated by the House, the Court "distinguished" ita 1956 decision 
and held that a state could investigate subversive activities against itself. To 
this ot state and federal sedition laws could coexist. Upbaus v. Wyman, 360 
U.S. 72 (1959). See also Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.s. 388 (1960). The Court's 
modifieation in 1959 satisfied congressional critica, who thought the preemption 
doctrine announced in 1956 intruded. upon state sovereignty, and put an end to 
the ooafrontation between the judicial and congressional branches. 
COIIIJNNu,lUJl InrJe8tigatiolU. In 1970, the House Committee on 
Internal Security prepared a report on "Limited Survey of Honoraria Given 
Guest Speakers for Engagements at Colleges and Universities." The study 
included the names of leftist or antiwar speakers and the amounts they received. 
The ACLU obtained a copy of the gPlleys and asked for an injunction. District 
Judge GMell ruled that the report served no legislative purpose and was issued 
IOlely the sake of exposure or intimidation. He ordered the Public Printer 
and t Superintendent of Documents not to print the report "or any portion, 
resta nt or facsimile thereof," with the possible exceptioD of placing the 
report ' the Congressional Record. Hentoffv. Ichord, 318 F.Supp.1175, 1183 
(DD.C. 1970). Gesell claimed that "the authority of a congressional committee 
to pu and distribute a report at public expense is not unlimited but is 
albj to judicial review in the light of the circumstances presented." Id. at 
1181. 
December 14, 1970, the House of Representatives passed a resolution 
c:.1t-.CI'*I the courts, in essence, to step back. During the course of the debate, 
."I!D of Congress ezplained tha.t it was not the practice of the House to 
i==S.C::auUDlOttee report..:; in the CongrelJ3ional Record. 116 Cong. Ree. 41368 
oreover, Judge Gesell's order wruns afoul not only of the speech and 
uae-article I, section 6--of the Constitution, but obstructs the 
t!D!Iadmn of other constitutional commitments of the House as well, including 
eection 5, which authorizes each House to determine the rules of its 
p:xl'-!!C:Il&8" and requires each House to publish its proceedings." Id. 
resolution stated that the Dew committee report was a "restatement" 
• OUI one and ordered the Public Printer and the Superintendent of 
lb:::..-.:t8 to print and distribute it. With an eye toward Judge Gesell and 
o:I~.:w~ might stand in the way, the resolution provided that all persons "are 
fc::fIII~':1Ildvised, ordered, and el\ioined to refrain from molesting, intimidating, 
ca. ..... 1. arresting, imprisoning, or punishing any person_ because of his 
"~_IO· D in" publishing the report. H. Res. 1306, 9lst ,Cong., 2nd Seu. 18 
e resolution passed by a large bipartisan margin of 302 to 54. 116 
. 41373 (1970). The report was , printed without any further. 
i:DII ...... ~ from the judiciary. H.Rept. 1732, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). 
• ~...,...~, 86th CoDl-, lit s... (1969); 106 Cong. Bee. 11486-608, 11625-87, 
lJ:i58. (1869). 
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. c. JudiclallDvltati0D8 
During the 19308 and 19408, after Congre88 and the Court had clashed on 
a tax issue, the Supreme Court invited Congress. to pass legislation and 
challenge previous rulings: "There is no reason to doubt that this Court may fall 
into error as may other branches of the Government. Nothing in the history or 
attitude of this Court should give rise to legislative embarrassment if in the 
performance of its duty a legisla,t-ive body feels impelled to enact laws which may 
require the Court to reexamine its previous judgment or doctrine: Helvering 
v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,400-01 (1948). The Court explained that it is less able 
than other branches lito extricate itself from error,- because it can reconsider n 
matter -only when it is again properly brought before it as a case or 
controversy." Id. at 401. By overruling itself, the Court admits its ability on an 
earlier occasion to commit error. "Congress and the courts," said Justice Stone, 
"both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the performance of their 
constitutional duty." United States v. Butler, 297 U.s. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J't 
dissenting). 
Commerce Clouse. In 1890, the Supreme Court ruled that a state's 
prohibition of intoxicating liquors could not be applied to "original packages" or 
kegs. Only after the original package was broken into smeller packages could 
the state exercise control. 'I'he Court qualified its opinion by saying that the 
states could not exclude incoming articles "without congressional permission." 
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, l20 (1890). Within a matter of months, Congress 
considered legislation to overturn the decision. During debate, Senator George 
Edmunds said that the Opin!ODS of the Supreme Court regarding Congress "are 
of no more value to us than ours are to it. We are just as independent of the 
Supreme Court of the United States 88 it is of us, and every judge will admit it." 
If Members of Congress concluded that the Court had made an error "are we to 
stop and say that is the end of the law and the mission of civilization in the 
United States for that reason? I take it not." Further consideration by the 
Court might produce a different result: "as they have often done, it may be their 
mission next year to change their opinion and say that the rule ought to be the 
other way." 21 Congo Rac. 4964 (1890). 
Congress quickly overturned the Court's decision by passing legislation that 
made intoxicating liquors, upon their arrival in a stata or territory, subject. to 
the police powers -to the same extent and in the same manner as though such 
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not 
be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages 
or otherwise.tt 26 Stat. 313 (1890). A year later the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this !Jtatute. In 18 Rahrer~ 140 U.S. 546 (1891). 
The give-and-take between Congress and the judiciary is illustrated by 
another commerce ease" In 1869, the Supreme Court held that states, rather 
than Conp'e., could regulate illsur8,nce because it was Dot a "transaction of 
commerce." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). 'nlat holding, along with 150 
yean or preeedentt, W88 overturned in 1944 when the Court interpr ~ted the 
transaction or iDlUraDce business across state lines as interstate commerce 
.ubjeet to congressional regulation. The Court said that Congress had Dot 
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intended .to exempt the insurance business from the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.s. 533 (1944). 
The 1944 decision sent a mixed message as to whether the resolution of this 
dispute lay solely with the Court or whether Congress could intervene with new 
legislation. The Court said that the -real answer before us is to be found in the 
Commerce Clause itself and in some of the great eases which interpret it, It 
implying that the matter was judicial in nature. Id. at 549. And yet the ruling 
was conditioned on the -absence of Congressional aetion" and was placed in the 
context of "the continued absence of conflicting Congressional action: Id. at 
548, 549. Evidently, the "real answer" d\"!l9nded on what Congress decided to 
do. If exceptions were to be written into the Sherman Act, "they must come 
from the CollgreS8~ not this Court.1t Id. at 561. Congress quickly passed the 
McCarren Act, authorizing states to regulate insurance, and the Court 
unanimously upheld the statut8. 69 Stat. 33 (1945); Prudential Ina. Co. v. 
Beqjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
Crimi1lD1. ProceduretJ. A 1957 decision by the Supreme Court involved 
aecess by defendants to government fues bearing on their trial. On the basis of 
statements by two informers for the FBI, the government prosecuted Clinton 
Jencks for failing to state that he was a member of the Communist party. He 
asked that the FBI reports be turned over to the trial judge Cor examination to 
detennine whether they had value !n impeaching the statements of the two 
informers. The Supreme Court went beyond Jencks' request by ordering the 
government to produce Cor his illspection all FBI reports "touching the events 
and activities" at issue in the trial. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 
(1957). The Court specifically rejected. the option of producing government 
documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevance and materiality. 
Id. at 669. 
In their concurrence, Justices Burton and Harlan believed that Jencks was 
only entitled to have the records submitted to the trial judge. A dissent by 
Justice Clark, agreeing that the documents should be delivered only to the trial 
judge, encouraged Congress to act: "Unless the Congress changes the rule 
announced by the Court today, those intelligence agencies oC our Government 
engaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop, for the Court bas openEK! 
their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday for 
rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national secrets: 
The Court announced its decision on June 3, 1957. Both Houses of 
Congress quickly held hearings and reported remedial legislation. The Jencks 
Bill passed the Senate by voice vote on August 26 and pused the House on 
August 27 by a vote of 361 to 17. The conference report was adopted with huge 
maVoritiea: 74 to 2 in the Senate and 315 to zero ~n the House. The bill became 
law on September 2, 1967. The statute provides that in any federal criminal 
prosecution, no statement or report in the possession of the government ·which 
. was made by a Government witness or prospective Gov.emmentwitneas (other 
than the dorendant> to an agent of the· Government shall be the 8ubject oC 
subpena, discovery, or inspection unless said witness has testified on direct 
examination in the trial ot the ~." If a witness testifies, statements may be 
50 
delivered to the defendant for examination and use unless the United States 
claims that the statement contaiDS irrelevant. ,tter, in which case the 
statement shall be i118p8Cted by the court in ~ra.. The judge may ucise 
irrelevant portions of the statement betore submitting it to the defendant. 71 
Stat. 595 (1957). 
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
responded to three controversial decisions by the Supreme Court on criminal 
procedures. The first held that 81J.8pects must be taken before a magistrate for 
arraignment as quickly as possible. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 
(1957). Admissions obtained from suspects during illegal detainment could not 
be used against them. The Court made room for congressional involvement by 
basing its decision partly on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure enacted 
by Congress. The decision thus allowed Congress to enter the arena and modify 
the rules. Congress did 80: Title II established six hours as a reasonable period 
before arraignment. 
In the second ease, the Court beld that confessions by criminal suspects 
eould' not be used unless the suspects had been informed of their rights by law 
enforcement offieers. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Whether the 
DU\iority opinion was based on constitutional principles or statutory rules of 
evidence was unclear. The Court referred to a number of constitutional issues 
but also referred to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and invited 
Congress to contribute its own handiwork. Id. at 463, 467. Congress did so 
again: 'Title n allowed for the admissibility of confessions if voluntarily given. 
Trial judges would determine the issue of voluntariness after taking into 
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the confession; including five 
elements identified by Congress. 18 U.s.C. 3501. 
In the third case, the Court decided that iC an accused was denied the right 
to counsel during a poJice lineup, the identification would be inadmissible unless 
the in-court identifications had an independent source or the introduction of the 
evidence would be barmless error. United States v~ Wade, 388 U.s. 218 (1967). 
The Court said that "legislative or othe..- regulations, such as those developed by 
the local police departments, [might] eliminate the risks of abuse and 
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings,. but that ·neither Congress nor 
the Federal authoriti. have aeen fit to provide a solution." Id. at 239. Title n 
provided that eyewitness testimony .-ould be admissible as evidence in any 
criminal prosecution, regardless oCwhether the accused bad an attorney present 
at the lineup. 18 U.S.C. 3502. 
Search and Seizure. In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that law 
enforcement officials could obtain a warrant and enter the premises of a 
newspaper to conduct a search for evidence regarding another party. Zurcher 
v. Stanton! Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Court'. approval of third-party 
searches and the threat to a free preBS triggered nationwide protests and 
conp'e8lional haarinp. The Court, in fact, had invited Congress to act if it 
considered the Court's deei8ioD too restrictive on free pre88 riihts. Tb Court 
stated that notbin, in the Fourth Amendment prevented legislative or executive 
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efforts to establish "nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses oCthe 
search warrant procedure." Id. at 567. ' 
Apparently the word "noneonstitutional" was an efTort to permit the 
participation of Congress and the President without jeopardizing the Court's 
supposed monopoly on constitutional questions. Yet Congress had to do 
precisely what the Court had done: balance the interests oC law enf'oreement 
against free press. Legislation in 1980 limited newsroom searehes by requiring, 
with certain exceptions, a subpoena instead of the more intrusive warrant. 94 
Stat. 1879 (1980). If a newspaper or anyone with a First Amendment interest 
is required by subpoena to respond, they BUlTlJnder only the requested 
document. Law enforcement officials do not enter their space t.o begin a general 
search through files, wastepaper baskets, and other sources. 
ReligioUII Freedom. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause permits a state to prohibit sacramental peyote use by Native 
American Indians and to deny unemployment beneiits to persons discharged for 
such use. State law could prohibit the possession and use of a drug even if it 
incidentally prohibits a religious practice, provided that the state law is neutral 
and generally applicable to all indi".iduals. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990). 
Under this test, there was no need for the state to show a compelling 
interest or to use the least restric+..ive meaos, standards that the Court bad 
adopted in earlier cases. Could Congress enter the tie, .. J and. passlegislatioD that 
would give religions greater protection than the Court offered? In his opinion 
for the Court, Justice Scalia seemed to invite other branches to protect rights 
left unguarded by the courts: 
Values that are protected agaiut government interf'erenoe through 
enshrinement in the Bill of RiPts are not thereby banished from the political 
process. Just as a society that belie'W!B in the negative protection accorded to 
the preaa by the First Amendment is likely to euact Jaws that atfirmativ8J.y 
foster the dissemination of the printed word, 80 also a society that believes in 
the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be spected to be 
lOlici.tous of that value in italegiaJation as well. Id. at 890. 
In 1993, the House Judiciary Committee, voting 35 to 0, reported a bill to 
create a "statutory right" to require the compelling governmental interest teet 
in easel in which the Cree uercise of religion has been ]}1.1rdened by a law of 
general applicability. H.Rept. 103-88. l03rd Cong., 1st Sees. 1-2 (1993) .. The bill 
passed the House under suspension of the rules, which requires a two-thirds 
'DU\iority. 139Cong. Bee. H2856-2S63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993). The Senate 
Judiciary Committee, by a vote oC 15 to 1, reported the bill Cor floor 
considerati~n. S.Rept.l03-11, 103rd Cong., 1st Sese. 2 (1993). On final passage, 
tbe bill passed 97, to 2. 139 Cong. R8c. 814351-14368 (dailyed. October 26, 
1993); id. at 814461-14468 (daily ed. October 27, 1993). As eDaCted, tbe 
Religious Free~om Restoration Act (RFRA) provides that governments mq 
aubltantially burden a persciu'. religious exercia8 only if tbey demoDSb'ate 8 
compellin, interest and UI8 the least reStrictive meaDS or furthering that 
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interest. 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). A year later, Congress passed legislation to 
permit the use of peyote by Native Amer; during religious ceremonies. 108 
Stat. 3125 (1994). 
In the years following enactment ofB.FB.A. numerous courts m.ve examined 
the constitutionality of the statute. Early in 1995, a district court in Texas held 
RFRA to be uDconstitutional, relying OD language from Marbury that it is 
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 8t\y what the 
law is." The district court concluded that Congress eannot enact legislation that 
has the effect of overturning a Supreme Court decision. Flores v. City of 
Boerne, 877 F.Supp. 355, 357 (W.o. Tex.1995). This decision was overturned 
a year later by the Fifth Circuit, which said that the executive and legislative 
branches -also have both the right and duty to interpret the constitution.1t 
Flores v. City of Bourne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth 
Circuit found nothing unusual about Congress protecting constitutional rights 
to a greater degree than the Supreme Court. For example, the Circuit noted 
that in 1959 the Supreme Court upheld literacy tests in voting elections; the 
.Voting Rights Aet of 1965 prohibited the tests. Id. at la~ (citing Lassiter v. 
Northhampton County Bel. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1969». While it is the 
judiciary's duty to say what the law is, "that duty is not exclusive." Id. at 1363. 
Other branches participate in the debate over constitutional values. This case 
is now before the Supreme Court and a decision on the constitutionality of 
RFRA is expected by June. 
D. Enforcement of Civil War Amendments 
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments give Congress the 
power to enforce the amendments "by appropriate legislation.1t The creative and 
constructive task of giving meaning and life to these amendments thus lies 
largely with Congress. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court reviewed the power or Congress to prohibit 
New York's requirement for literacy in English as a condition for voting. 
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had provided that no person who 
had completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico, with the language of instruction 
other than English, could be denied the right to vote in any eJection because of 
an inability to read or write in English. The Court regarded section 4(e) as a 
·proper exerciselt of the powers granted to Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,646 (1966). FaetfindingwBB 
a legislative, not a judicial, responsibility: "It was f()r Congress, as the branch 
that made t,lrls judgment, to assess lUld weigh the various conflieting 
considerations .... It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these 
ractors." Id. at 653. 
In 1980 the Court commented on the competenee of Congress to protect 
. equal protection rights: "It is fundamental that in DO organ of govemment, state 
or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the 
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with r'ltnp1tten' ., and autl 'rity 
to enCorce equal protection guarantees.- Fullilove v. Klutzniek, 448 U.S. 448, 
483 (1980). If there is a collision between the immunity accorded states under 
53 
the Eleventh Amendment and the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the congreSIJional statute prevails.- Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 
445 (1978). 
Congress bas ample powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court baa deCerred to congressional interpretations 80 long 88 Congress uael 
"any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting." South CaroliDa v. Katzenbacb, 383 U.S. 301, 324 
(1966). Congress is -chiefly responsible" Cor implementing the rights created in 
the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 327. Congress may prohibit practices that "in 
and of themselves" do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment "so long as the 
prohibitioD8 attacking racial discrimination in voting are 'appropriate' ... : 
Rome Y. United States, 446 U.8.156, 171 (1980). 
In 1980, a plurality of the Court held that states are prohibited omy from 
purposefully discriminating against the voting rights ofblacb. Abridgement of 
voting rights had to be intentional, not incidental. Mobile Y. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
65 (1980). Congress responded by amending the Voting Rights Act to allow 
plaintiffs to show discrimination se;lely on the ef{ect8 of a voting plan. The 
Court applied this new test to invalidate districtingplans in North Carolina that 
had tbe effect of diluting the black vote whether or not intended by the state. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
E. Statutory Reversals 
It is the practice of courts not to pass on the constitutionality of a statute 
if it can be construed solely on statutory grou:.tds. United States v. Clark, 445 
u.s. 23, 27 (1980). Justice Brandeis described a series of rules under which the 
Supreme Court "has avoided passing upon a large part of the constitutional 
questiona pressed upon it for decision," Ashwander Y. TVA, 297 U.s. 288, 346 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., coneumng). "It is well settled that if a case may be decided 
on either statutory or constitutional grounds, [the] Court, for BOund 
jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory queetion." Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,306·07 (1980). This judicial strategy allows the courts 
to dispose of issues on ~tatutory grounds in the midst of obvious eonstltutional 
questions. Instead of attempting to fIX constitutional doctrine, the judiciary 
enters into a dialogue with the otber branches concerning the intent of prior 
statutes. 
Ses Dl.scrlml'lUllion. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
prohibited sex discrimination in any education program or activity that received 
federal financial assistance. After the Reagan administration issued statements 
indicating that its interpretation of Title IX was not 88 broad as previous 
administrations, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 
414 to 8, opposing the administration's position. The resolution stated the 
18DS8 of the Houee that Title IX and regulations issued purauan-t to the title 
~.hould not be amended or altered -in any manner which will lessen the 
comprehensive coverage of such statute in eliminating gender discrimination 
tbrouFout the American educational system." The resolution, of course, was 
Dot legally binding, but it wu adopted because the Supreme Court was about 
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to hear oral argument on a case regarding Title IX. Congressman Paul Simon 
noted.: "[By] paseingthis resolut··:: be House can send the Court a signal that 
we believe that no institution showd be allowed to discriminate on the basis of 
sex if it receives Federal fuDds." 129 Cong. Bee. 33105 (1983). 
The issue before the Court was whether Title IX. required federal funds to 
be terminated only Cor specific programs in which discrimination 0CCUI'8 or for 
the entire educational institution. The Court adopted the narrow 
interpretation. Grove City College v. BeU, 465 U .. S. 444 (1984). Within four 
months the House oCRepresentatives, by a vote of 375 to 32, passed legislation 
to amend not only Title IX but also three other statutes to adopt broad coverage 
of the antidiscrimination provisions. 130 Cong. Bee. 18880 (1984). The Senate 
resisted action that year, and subsequent efforts were complicated by questions 
oC church-state and abortion. Finally, in 1988, Congress was able to Corge a 
compromise. President Reagan vetoed the measure, but both Houses overrode 
the veto to enact the broader coverage for civil rights that had been rejected by 
the Court. 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
Also in 1988, Congress passed two other statutes to reverse the Supreme 
Court. In one decision, the Court ruled that federal employees could be sued for 
common law torts committed on the job. They were not entitled to absolute 
immunity from lawsuit. However, the Court remarked: ·Congress is in the beat 
position to provide guidance for the complex and often highly empirical inquiry 
into whether absolute immunity is warranted in a particular context.· WestCall 
v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292,300 (1988). Congress passed legislation to overturn this 
decision by protecting federal employees from personal liability ror common law 
torts committed within the scope of their employment. The statute provides the 
il\iured person with a remedy against the United States government. Thus, 
compensation would come from the u.s. Treasury, not the employee'. 
pocketbook. 102 Stat. 4568 (1988). 
The other statutory reversal in 1988 concerned a Supreme Court decision 
that accepted the definition of the Veterans Administration that alcoholism 
results from "willful misconduct- rather than from a disease. For those who 
regarded the decision 88 enoneous, the Court advised them that their arguments 
would be "better presented to Congress than to the courts.- Traynor v. Turnage, 
484 U.S. 535 (1988). Legislation enacted by Congress recognized that veterans 
seeking education or rehabilitation would not be denied those benefits under the 
willful-misconduct standard. 102 Stat. 4110, § 109 (1988). 
Congress has resorted to statutory reversals with greater frequency iD 
recent years.- A single statute-the Civil Rights Act of 1991-overtumed or 
modified nine Supreme Court decisions. 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).28 In 1995, the 
Supreme Court held that a statute criminalizing talse statements -in any matter 
~ William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Overriding SUpl'8Dl8 Court Statutory Interpretation 
DecisioDS," 101 Yale L. J. 331 (1991). 
28 For detailB on the statute and the Court decisione that were overruled or modified, 
see IAuis Fisher, American CoMlilutiolUll Law 1055-66 (1996). 
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within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" did 
not apply to false statements made in judicial proceedings. Hubbard v. United 
States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995). In 80 holding, the Court overruled an earlier case 
that bad applied the statute to a former Member of Congress who had made a 
false statement to· the Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives. 
Congre88 responded to Hubbard by drafting legislation to reinstate criminal 
penalties for making false statement to Congress. The new law makes it a crime 
to make false statements to an official in any of the three branches of 
government. 110 Stat. 3459 (1996). 
F. The Role of Custom 
Congressional and executive practiees over a number of years have been 
instrumental in ruting the meaning of the Constitution. In 1803, faced with a 
challenge to constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court 
stated that "practice, and acquiescenee under it, for a number of years, 
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible 
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary 
interpretation of the most forcible nature: Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.s. (I Cr.) 299, 
309 (1808). 
In upholding the President's power to remove executive offieials, the Court 
in 1903 based its ruling largely on the "universal practice of the government for 
over a century: Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.s. 311, 316 (1903). 
Presidential action in which Congress acquiesced ean become a justification for 
the exercise of power. Presidential decisions in withdrawing public lands from 
private use can, over a period of years, ·clearly indicate that the long-continued 
practice, -known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption 
that the withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a 
recognized administrative power of the Executive in the management of the 
public lands." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915). The 
cumulative force of these customs has helped to transform the Constitution over 
time. 
In the Steel Seizure Case of 1952, cballenging the seizure of steel mills by 
President Truman during the Korean War, several justices spoke about the force 
of custom in shaping constitutional law. Justice Jaebon identified three 
scenarios for presidential power. The President was in the strongest position 
when he acted pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, and 
in the weakest position when taking measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress. The President's legal position was especially 
interesting when Congress neither grants nor denies power: 
WIleD the PreeideDt ..... -ts in abaeDce of either a coDgl'tBliODal grant or 
denial of autho~t.l, he can reJy upon his own independent powers, but there 
is a zone of twilisht in which he ad Ccmgr.s IDII7 haw CODCUr.r8J1t authority, 
01' in which ita distribution is UDC8I'taiD. Theretore, eongressioaal inertia, 
iDdifferenoe or quieeCeDce may aOmetimes. - !l practical matter, en8lM, iCDot 
invite, meuurea on independent p1'88ideatiallWp""aiNJity. Ia this area, aDy 
actual tat of power is 1ikely to depend on the iJilperativat of 8V8I1ts and 
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contemporary imponoerabl_ rather than on abstract theories of law. 
Younptown Co. v. S. 'f', 343 U.S. 579, 635-S'1 (1952). 
In other words, the constitutionality of aD action is sometimes determined 
not by analyzing the words or intent of the Constitution but rather the political 
contu:t in which a President acts. In this same case, Justice Frankfurter also 
explored the impact oC custom and practice on presidential power. Legislative 
and executive power were not defined purely on the basis of textual grants. The 
behavior of each branch added meaning to constitutional power: 
Deeply imbedded traditional ways of ccm.ducting government cannot supplant 
the Constitution or legisiatioD, bat they giw meaning to the wolds of a te:l.t 
or supply them. It is an inadmissibly D8JTOW CODCeption of American 
coDStitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to 
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic, 
unbmkeu, uecutive practice, long pursued to the lmowIedge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, enpged in by Presidents who have also SWOrD 
to uphold the ConstitutioJi, making as it weN such eerci8e of poww part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated 88 a gloss on -executive 
Power- vested in the PrMident by § 1 of Art. D. Id. at 61()"11. 
The thrust of these remarks bas been tempered by other statements. 
Justice Frankfurter earlier noted: "illegality cannot attain legitimacy through 
practice." Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.s. 517, 524 (1940). 
Professor Gerhard Casper has written that wunconstitutional practices cannot 
become legitimate by the mere lapse of time.wit 
24 Gerhard Casper, "Constitutional Constraints on the Conduet of Foreign and 
Defenee PoHcy: A No~udicial Model,- -U-U. Chi ...... Rev.4&.., 479 (1976). See also 
Michael J. GJeDDOD, "The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Power Disputes,· 84 
B.U.L. Rev. 109 (1984). 
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Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Professor Currie. 
STATEMENT OF DAVID P. CURRIE, EDWARD H. 
GUISHED SERVICE PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY 0 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
of the committee. I welcome the opportunity to share 
mittee my thoughts about this important subject. I've 
ing for a long time about constitutional interpretation, 
courts and in other branches of the Federal Government. 
My thesis is quite straightforward. I believe that each br of 
the Federal Government, as well as each branch of the S e Gov-
ernments, has an equal and independent obligation to . terpret 
and to obey the Constitution. The question of constitut" onal inter-
pretation is also the question of constitutional enforcement, the 
question of how these "paper barriers," as Madison once d . d 
them, that are found in the Constitution are to be enforced. and 
how we are to ensure that they are to be respected is a questi n 
that has agitated the framers and has agitated the rest of us d III 
to the present day. 
And James Madison, when he as a Member of Co ss intro-
duced the Bill of Rights in the House of Representati - in 1789, 
identified three checks that were designed to help enforce the Con-
stitution. The first check was the conscience of the em rs of 
Congress; that is to say, having sworn to uphold the Co itution, 
they would be expected to respect their oath and thus to respect 
the Constitution itself. 
The second check was judicial review. The courts wo d vie ~ it 
as one of their special responsibilities to enforce the Constitution 
in case another branch of Government should ever exceed its 
power. 
Third, the final check, and perhaps the most important of all , 
was the check of the voters. The people themselves wo exercise 
a check on actions that exceeded the constitutional po er-s of one 
or another branch of Government by refusing to re-elect embers 
of Congress or Presidents or State officials who abused their au-
thority. 
The judicial check to which Madison alluded was, of co e, C -
firmed by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. Judicial re-
view, as Chiel Justice Marshall said in that case, is an essen ' , 
an indispensable element in a system of checks and balances to 
help ensure that other branches of Government not exceed ir 
constitutional authority. There's not a word in Marbury v. n 
suggesting that judicial review is the sole check on unconstitu . nal 
action, that the court is the only branch of Government with the 
power to interpret the Constitution. 
President. Jackson-and this has been mentioned already several 
times today-identified another check when he vetoed the bill to 
extend the charter of the Second National Bank because he found 
it to be unconstitutional, even though the Supreme Court had said 
Congress had the power to establish a national bank. Because the 
President, too, has sworn to uphold the Constitution, the President, 
too, has an independent obligation to enforce the Constitution, and 
therefore he cannot accept the Supreme Court's determination that 
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Congress has constitutional authority. If he believes a bill to be un-
constitutional, the President has an independent obligation to veto 
the bill. 
And the same is of course true of the Congress. Members of Con-
gress have also sworn to support the Constitution, and whenever 
a bill is introduced in Congress, the first obligation of every Mem-
ber is to ask the question, Do we have the power to pass this bill? 
And that, of course, is a question involving an interpretation of the 
Constitution. As Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachu-
setts said on the floor of the House in 1791, "The whole business 
of legislation is a practical construction of the powers of the legisla-
ture." 
And thus each branch, independently, has an obligation to inter-
pret and to obey the Constitution. No branch has the power to bind 
another branch in the interpretation of the Constitution, and thus 
we have a triple security for the enforcement of the Constitution. 
I've gone so far in my study of the extrajudicial interpretation of 
the Constitution during the first 12 years of our history under the 
1789 Constitution, as to suggest that the original understanding of 
our Constitution was forged not so much in the courts as in Con-
gress and in the executive branch. 
I come now to the issue of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act. I think that statute was wholly justified insofar as it operates 
as a congressional check on Federal action which in the view of 
Congress would violate the Constitution. That is to say, insofar as 
the statute is a refusal to authorize Federal agencies to do what 
Congress believes would violate the Constitution, I think Congress 
is wholly within its rights. 
I think that the statute is also justified as an expression of 
Congress's disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause insofar as it acts as a limitation on the powers of 
the States. But the next question is, What is the respect that is 
owed by the Court to Congress's interpretation of the Constitution 
as reflected in that statute? It seems to me that the answer has 
to be that the Court is no more bound by Congress's interpretation 
of the Free Exercise Clause than Congress is bound by the inter-
pretation of the Comt. 
The same principle that says that Congress has to make up its 
own mind about the meaning of the Constitution says the same 
thing for the Court. And that's essentially what the Supreme Court 
said in the Flores case: We must interpret the Free Exercise Clause 
for ourselves, because we have the constitutional obligation to re-
spect the Constitution and we cannot permit Congress to exceed its 
powers. 
I see I'm out of time. I have more that I could say. 
Mr. CANADY. If you could sum up in another minute or two. 
Mr. CURRIE. Some scholars have suggested-thank you, Mr. 
Chairman-that the Court in the Flores case should have gone be-
yond simply saying Congress has no power to bind us as to the in-
terpretation of the Constitution, that the Court should have re-ex-
amined its own precedent in light of Congress's contrary opinion, 
and therefore maybe taken a different view as to the meaning of 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
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. k the difficulty with that argument is that the Coun 'as 
ed to do that in Flores. The Court was not asked to ov 
cedent in the light of Congress's contrary interpreta . 
ked to accept the statute as having already ove 
decision, and that, I think, Congress had no power to do. 
final question is, hen the Court is finally asked to 
its prior decisions- the Smith case in particular-int e"""""'-ori, .,.,. 
- ree Exercise Clause~ in the light of Congress's contrary in er-
ion as reflected i.e. the Religious Freedom Restor ati _ ct, 
degree of deference should be paid by the Court t o C 
...... - ---retation? 
d that reminds me~ uf course, of the long debate between . or 
Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black during the 1940's. fit 
ly sixties over the degree of judicial restraint, the rt ...... rn-.r' .... 
nce to other br~nes. I'm sure there are members 
, ..".....,'~ ;;·ttee who recall J .lstice Frankfurter's dissent in the .;l"I-~Y'..Ll 
S alute case where _ e said it's really not for the Court 0 5 
. te its opinion for r e onable decisions by other branch, :::._, 
ofar as the inte tation of the First Amendment ~ 
.OO'_ ... . ~i , I think it's fair say that that extreme view of judi . 
to the views of ' er branches has been rejected, 
e Court, but also y a large number of scholars. An -
the Court is right not to take Justice Frankfurter's .--.".,~..--... 
use the enforceme of the Con~titution requires 
b ch take an indepe nt view of the meaning of the 
ti . 
Only if each branch d s that can we ensure maximum 
for the rights of the citizen and for the rights of the State's 
are, of course, involved henever Congress attempts to limit 
authority as it did in e Religious Freedom Restoratio 
you very much. 
e prepared statem t of Mr. Currie follows:] 
'PARED STATEMENT OF - VID P. CURRIE, EDWARD H. LEVI GL -
SERVICE PROFESSO U NIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ScHOOL OF LAw 
Supreme Court's recen: decision in City of Boerne v FlOl?S,l w . 
d Congress's attempt to efme the religious freedom guaranteed ~=s: 
5 by the fourteenth arne ent, has called attention once more to t::=~ss 
ql . n of the respective roles of Congress and of the courts as interpre 
Constitution. As a longtime udent of constitutional interpretation in 
branches of the Government. ! welcome the opportunity to share with this '-"'Wo.o...-;:. ... 
tee my thinking on this impo t subject. 
I begin with the obligatory od to Marbury v Madison.2 I believe 
M rshall was right that co ave an obligation to determine the COIns1;lj-t:c!l=::::::lia.tit 
of federal statutes they are a to apply, and not simply because they 
es required to obey the C titution. As Marshall argued, I am COIl 
'cia! review is an essential element in the constitutional system of ~!I:irS 
baJanc:es-designed, as Hamil said in The Federalist, to help keep the 
within the limits of its autho ' .3 
. does not m,ean that -courts have a monopoly on constitutional n.' _,""""",1~ 0. 
t' . embers of Congress, ' all federal and state officers, are bo 
o to support the Constitu n.4 Thus, whenever a bill is introduced, 
her of the House or Senate must inquire whether or not Congress h 
1117 Set 2157 (1997). 
25 US 137 (1803). 
JThe Federalist No 78. See also dison's remarks in introducing the Bill of ~ Ln the 
H • 1 Annals of Congress 457 (1 9). 
• US Const, Art VI. 
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enact it; and thus Congress is continua] - 'ngag in interpreting the Constitution. 
So, of course, is the President. And th~ great al of constitutional law is made 
outside the courts, by the legislative ana e.' cutive ~anches of government . 
. Congressional debates and executive . _ rs are replete with examples of legisla-
tive and executive interpretation of the 0 titu' . Few constitutional difficulties 
with proposed legislation escape the eyE'5 of vigilant opponents, and the quality of 
argument is often extraordinarily high . b .3 great many instances congressional de-
bates during the early years brought out ~ .. the constitutional arguments that any-
one has been able to think of aince. In - .y cases e continue to rely exclusively 
on legislative or executive precedents, ~ r fie i have never been resolved by 
the courts. The original understandin 0 the titution , I recently conclud£-d 
after an intensive study of the first tv.-€.' _ \ ':' years of its operation, was forged not 
in the courts but in the legislative and e c'..ltive ches.5 
The interesting question is therefore not \,-ho h . wer to interpret the Constitu-
tion but whose view prevails in case of onllic _ What h appens when different 
branches of government, each acting within ItS p . r sphere of authority, disagree 
as to what the Constitution means? I do no . beli this question can be answered 
by a simple invocation of the shibboleth hat the 's a re the ultimate guardians 
of the Constitution. 
There are times when other gove __ 1 actors are plainly obliged to accept ju-
dicial decisions. Judicial power to deci · _ ....... :,e · _ . s authority to render a judg-
ment that binds the parties. Thus, whe ....... _ ~lden R005e'Velt contemplated disobey-
ing an anticipated judicial decision requ: __ .' the 'el"Il.IlleD.t to pay bondb~lders in 
g<r>ld,6 he challenged the very essence Or U i~.' ial er. S a course could be de-
fended, if at all, only as an exercise of 4 · atur righ.! of revolution; it was not 
consistent with the Constitution. 
It does not follow that other branches .... - :.. I d in all cases by judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution. The example!: ._ :amiliar. President Jackson vetoed a 
new che.. ier for the Bank of the United ~~ -l:- _ after the Supreme Court had upheld 
congresf , , ql power to establish it;7 Pn- -- t Je ....... erson pardoned those convicted 
under tLI.,.'\;dition Act on constitution _ "2Jlds that had been rejected by the 
courts.B l ~ , v~ ~ Jackson and Jefferson wer - . ~ witb their rights. Neither did any-
thing that ... uterfered with the power of _. 'Qurts to rt'nder binding judgments in 
particular cases; the pardon power is a:. _ .press lunita " on that principle, and 
it essentially allows the winning party ' . ive a judgment in its favor. Nor was 
either Jefferson's or Jackson's action in - ent with Marbury's principle that the 
courts must have power to prevent other :1ches rom exceeding their powers. On 
the contrary, Jefferson and Jackson's ac . rovided an a.dditional check that fur-
nished even greater security for the righ 0 .he states the people. Indeed what 
these two Presidents did illustrates the ' . our CGns . nal separation of pow-
ers: No measure can be carried out to t 1 riment of people or the states un-
less all three branches agree that it is co ·tional, 
These are the easy cases. More compl the questi posed by Abraham Lin-
coln's attitude toward the Dred Scott !d by (}Qvernor Faubus's actions with 
respect to school segregation after Brown u' rd of Edurotion . The poles of opinion 
on these issues are starkly delineated. ' suggested t although he would not 
attempt to set Scott free in defiance of - : upreme- 's order he would vote 
for a new prohibition of slavery in the te~ -1 S.9 The C in Cooper v Aaron said 
Faubus was bound by Brown because it ""t e law of land." 10 
At one level Lincoln seems to me to . been nght and the Supreme Court 
wrong. The judgments in Scott and in bcund nly the parties. Courta have 
no power to resolve general questions of t utio " terpretation; their only au-
thority is to decide the concrete controve ,fore t . Faubus, of course, was de-
fying not only the principles announced ' ~ ~ Iwn but also a decree entered against 
him by a lower federal court; that was e .1 , on the principle of the above discus-
sion of the Gold Clause question, to jus . - ndemn.ing his action. But Lincoln dis-
claimed any intention of subverting the . eat in Scott; h e merely denied that 
it restricted his freedom to decide for hi::::.. . w hetber prospect ive legislation along 
the same lines would be constitutional. 
5 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Con 
cafo, 1997). 
1 F.D.R.- His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 -
72 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the 
8See Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sep 11, 1 
1897). 
9 Lincoln-Douglas Debates, in 3 Collected Wo 
10 358 US 1, 18 (1958). 
e F list Period, 1789-1801 296 (Chi· 
lEIIi ROOSf!Ye it ed. 1950). 
'll ts 57€ 11896), 
' ritin f mas Jefferson 310 (Ford ed. 
brah Lmcoln 255 (Basler ed 1953). 
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Professor Wechsler has shown the limits of this line of thinking. It is true that 
one does not undennine the Court's judgment-and therefore its power to defmi-
tively resolve the case-by retusing to follow its reasoning in enacting future laws. 
But if one believes (as I do, and as Hamilton and Marshall argued) that judicial re-
view is an essential part of our system of checks and balances, this cannot be a com-
plete answer. For th.at system cannot function if every school district in the United 
States insists on continuing to segregate its schools by race until the Supreme Court 
tells it not to. So long as (and as soon as) there is reason to think the Court might 
overrule its decision, a legislator or administrator who was not a party to the case 
may be justified in doing what the Court has ordered others not to do, for otherwise 
the Court could never correct its mistakes. Unlike res judicata, stare decisis is not 
an inflexible command. But once it is clear that the Court will not change its mind, 
I think Professor Wechsler is right that the Court's view must be accepted; for oth-
erwise it cannot effectively perform its crucial task of helping to keep other 
branches of government within their legitimate authority.11 
This brings me to the current controversy over the Smith decision,12 the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) , 13 and the Supreme Court's response in City of 
Boerne v Flores. 14 Highly respected colleagues have written to criticize the Flores 
decision; 15 I have written to praise it. IS Let me explain my position. 
The Court's acceptance in Smith of Professor Kurland's view 17 that the free exer-
cise clause did not require that reli~ous individuals be exempted from generally ap-
plicable laws was highly controversial. Though certainly not without support in ear-
lier cases, it was (despite contrary arguments in the Court's opinion) squarely op-
posed to the Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject, in Wisconsin v 
Yoder.IS Congress disagreed with the Court's new interpretation, and said so in 
RFRA: Henceforth the adverse impact of even a facially neutral law on religious ex-
ercise could be justified only by a compelling interest. 19 
That was a plausible interpretation of the Constitution, and Congress was entitled 
to make it. Congress was not a party to the Smith litigation, and it made no effort 
to set aside the judgment itself. It merely declared a rule to govern future cases. 
Moreover, one could not confidently say that the Court had said its last word on 
the subject. The decision was rendered by a bare majority; it effectively overruled 
recent precedent; it had been roundly though far from una\'l.imously criticized ever 
since; it had been rendered without the benefit of Congress's views as to the mean-
ing of the constitutional provision. In short, Congress was entitled to believe there 
was a reasonable chance the Court might reconsider its position in light of a well 
considered, reasonable, and nearly unanimous contrary legislative interpretation. 
But of course the Court was no more bound by Congress's interpretation than 
Congress was by that of the Court in Smith. The same argument that proves that 
Congress is entitled to construe the Constitution for it.self applies equally to the 
Court. And that was what the Court said in effect in Flores: Congress has authority 
to enforce the fourteenth amendment but not to amend it, and the Court is not 
bound by Congress's interpretation of its provisions. 
Insofar as RFRA represented a self-denying interpretation of Congress's own 
power to enact laws im~inging on religious freedom, it was squarely supported by 
Jefferson's and Jackson s actions in reading their own powers more narrowly than 
the courts had understood them. Whatever the Court says, Congress may not enact 
laws it believes to be unconstitutional. Nothing in the Flores opinion casts doubt on 
the legitimacy of RFRA as the exercise of a congressional check on congressional ac-
tion. But it was somethin~ else again to expect the Court to accept Congress's inter-
pretation of the free exercIse clause in passing upon the validity of state law. 
Should the Court in Flores be criticized for having rejected the congressional read-
ing of religious freedom without reexamining the issue on the merits? Should it, in 
such a reexamination, have afforded some degree of deference to the views of a co-
ordinate branch on which the framers of the fourteenth amendment expressly con-
ferred the principal role in enforcing its provisions? One would not expect the Court 
to invalidate the clauses of the War Powers Resolution that purport to derme the 
division between presidential and congressional authority simply because Congress's 
11 Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum L Rev 1001, 1008 (1965). 
12Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990). 
13 107 Stat 1488 (1993), 42 USC §§ 2000bb et seq. 
14117 SCt 2157 (1997). 
15 E.g., Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flo-
reB, 111 Harv L Rev 153 (1997). 
16 David P. Currie, RFRA (forthcoming in Wm & Mary L Rev (1998». 
17Phili~ B. Kurland, Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1978). 
18 406 US 205 (1972). 
1942 USC § 2000b})'1. 
62 
interpretation does not bind the Court; one would expect Congress's understanding 
to be taken seriously in the Court's resolution of the dispute. 
That the Court did not do this in Flores may have something to do with the way 
the issue was presented. The Court was not asked to overrule Smith; it was asked 
to accept the fact that Congress had already done so. Even Justice O'Connor, who 
~anted to use the case as a vehicle for reexamining Smith, urged only that that 
issue be briefed by the parties.2o Congress and its defenders seemed to be arguing 
for something more than that the legislative interpretation should be considered; 
the case seemed to turn on whether the special authorization t.o enforce the amend-
ment gave Congress rather than the Court the fmal say when the question arose 
in a judi~ia1 PTC?Ceedi?g. The Court seems to me clearly right that it did not.21 
If the issue is plainly phrased in some future case, I would expect the Court to 
take Congress's intarpretation into account in determining whether or not to adhere 
to its Smith decision. If it does, it will have to address the question of what degree 
of deference to give to Congress's position. And that, it seems to me, boils down to 
the familiar dispute over judicial restraint that has raged since the Constitution was 
adopted, and which is best exemplified by tht! long duel between Justices Frank-
furter and Black.22 
Frankfurter, as illustrated by his famous dissent in the second flag-salute case,23 
argued that to avoid excessive judicial interference the courts should generally defer 
to reasonable interpretations of the Constitution by other branches of government. 
The Court took this position in the fourteenth amendment context in an alternative 
holding in Katzenbach v Morgan, deferring to Congress's "reasonable" conclusion 
that requiring Puerto Rican voters to be literate in English offended the equal pro-
tection clause.24 Justice Black's position, in ~ontrast, was that true judicial restraint 
consisted in refusing to invent limitations on government that could not fairly be 
traced to the Constitution itself; what the Constitution required should be strictly 
enforced. 25 
At least in the area of first amendment freedoms, Justice Frankfurter's approach 
has not stood the test of time; no Justice on the present Court takes such a re-
stricted view of the Court's authority in such cases. Justice Black's position, I be-
lieve, is also more consistent with the purposes of judicial review. Congress's views 
are entitled to consideration and respect when the Court is called upon to construe 
the Constitution. Arguments made m Congress must be taken seriously on their 
merits, and the fact that Congress has accepted a given interpretation is additional 
evidence in its favor. But the Court must ultimately decide for itself what the Con-
stitution requires, not accept someone else's view just because it is "reasonable." For 
only by exercising independent judgment in constitutional interpretation can the 
courts effectively help to ensure, as the Constitution contemplates, that other 
branches of government not exceed the limits of their authority. And that seems to 
have been the position taken in Flores. For the Court made clear that it thought 
there was no occasion to afford the congressional interpretation of the first amend-
ment the degree of deference suggested by the alternative basis of decision in Mor-
gan.26 
The Court in Flores similarly insisted on the right to make its own determination 
with regard to the unrelated question whether RFRA could be justifled as a prophy-
lactic measure to prevent undetectable evasions of the free exercise clause as the 
Court had construed it in Smith, by analogy to the flat ban on literacy tests for vot-
ers upheld in Oregon v Mitchell. 27 The Court found no such problem of evasion in 
Flores and so rejected this argument as well.28 In construing Congress's authority 
to enforce the fourteenth amendment by "appropriate legislation" to require "a con-
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adapted to that end," 29 the Court gave notice once again that it took its re-
sponsibility for judicial review seriously in the field of federalism as well as in that 
of individual rights, as the theory of the Marbury case seems to require.3o 
20 117 SCt at 2176 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). 
21 Contrast US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 10, which gives Congress authority to "defllle" as well as 
to punish piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations. 
12 See David P. Currie, The New Deal Court in the 194ms: Its Constitutional Legacy, 1997 
J Sup_Ct Hist 87. 
23West Virginia Bd of Educ v Barnette, 319 US 624, 648-49 (1943). 
24 384 US 641, 656 (1966). 
2& See, C.2., Adamson v California, 332 US 46 (1947). 
26 117 SC't at 2168. 
27 400 US 112 (19'10). See also South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966). 
28 117 Set at 2169. 
29Id at 2164. See ulso id at 2169,2170, 2171. 
JOef. United State.if v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995); Printz v United States, 117 SCt 2365 (1997). 
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In short, in my view the Constitution contemplates multiple checks to prevent 
anyone exercising public authority from infringing its provisions. Executive officers 
~d Members of Congress have an independent obligation to obey the Constitution 
Itself; they are not bound by a judicial conclusion that a particular action is within 
their authority. For the same reason, the courts are not bound by either executive 
or legislative interpretation of provisions whose construction is not committed to ul-
timate determination by the political branches.a1 For the cou.;:ts too were meant to 
serve as an indispensable element in our system of checks and balances. Respect 
for judicial authority requires not only that other governmental actors comply witn 
Judgments in cases to which they are parties. It also requires that, when it is clear 
that the 3upreme Court will not recede from its position, other branches acquiesce 
in judicial opinions limiting their powers. Finally, the central importance of judicial 
review as a check on other branches requires that the courts exercise independent 
judgment in determining the constitutionality of legislative and executive action, 
giving respectful consideration but not undl~e deference to the views of ·,he inter-
ested branch. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor. Professor Devins. 
STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, GOODRICH PROFESSOR OF 
LAW, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
Mr. DEVINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to 
thank the committee for inviting me to testify this morning. 
My statement makes two points. One is that Congress has a 
long, proud history of countermanding the Supreme Court when it 
disagrees with the Court. That history has been alluded to by sev-
eral of the witnesses. It includes Con.gress' rejection of Dred Scott, 
its rejection of Hammer v. Dagenhardt, which was a case saying 
that Congress was without authority under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate child labor. 
It applies to the 1964 Civil Rights Act's public accommodation 
provision, which was legislation enacted after the Supreme Court 
had said almost a century before in a civil rights case that Con-
gress could not enact a public accommodation provision. And it con-
tinues today with busing, abortion, religious freedom, flag burning, 
voting rights, legislative veto, and Federalism. 
These are all instances where Congress has been willing to tell 
the Court that it thinks its interpretation of the Constitution is 
wrong, and I don't really think there's anything in City of Boerne 
v. Flores to fundamentally challenge Congress' power to disagree 
with the Court. 
Flores is a very important case, of course, but it doesn't call into 
question Congress's power to use its spending authority, to condi-
tion the spending of Federal dollars. It doesn't speak to Congress's 
authority under the Commerce Clause. It doesn't speak to 
Congress's power over Federal programs-something that Prcfessor 
Currie alluded to before. Even with respect to section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment vis-a-vis the States, Flores doesn't challenge 
Congress's ability to remedy actions by the States that it considers 
unconstitutional. An eXaIIlple of this would be voting rights legisla-
tion passed in 1982 in response to City of Mobile v. Bolden. 
So I don't really think there's much doubt that Congress has the 
power to disagree with the Court, and there's no doubt that the 
history of con~essiona1 action is one in which Congress often does 
disagree with the Court. 
91 Contrut the Court's discussion of the impeachment provisi()"":~ in Nixon \: United States, 
506 US 224 (1993) 
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. ~at I'd like to focus in on in my testimony this morning is why 
It. IS that the Constitution is improved by Congress's disagreeing 
wIth the Court. Constitutional decisionmaking, in my view, is im-
proved when all branches of Government engage in a dialogue 
which, of course, includes disagreements among the branches. 
And to start with, I'd like to quote from the confirmation hear-
ings of Justice Kennedy, the author of Boerne, and Justice Gins-
burg. At his confirmation hearing, Justice Kennedy testified that 
lawmakers, quote 1 "would be fulfilling their duty by limiting the ef-
fects of Supreme Court decisions they consider wrong. "-very inter-
esting coming from the author of Boerne v. Flores. 
Justice Ginsburg, at her confirmation hearings, states that 
"courts do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share that 
responsibility with Congress, the President, the States, and the 
people." I think Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg were aware of 
what I consider to be a fairly obvious truth, and that is that by 
challenging the Court, Congress often improves the quality of con-
stitutional decisionmaking. By challenging the Court, Congress 
makes the Constitution more durable, more vital. Let me explain 
why I say this. Much of it has to do with how courts are different 
from policymakers, structurally different from policymakers. 
First off, courts are reactive. Courts don't look for cases. Occa-
sionally people accuse them of doing so, but courts have to have a 
case presented to them, and, as a result, if the Court makes a mis-
take in an earlier case, the only chance it can reconsider its deci-
sion is for there to be a new set of facts which calls into question 
the decision in the first case. 
So for the Court to conclude that it made a mistake when saying 
that Congress was without auth<'rity under the Commerce Clause 
to prohibit child labor, Congress again needed to pass new child 
labor legislation, and that's precisely what happened. In Hammer 
v. Dagenhardt, the Court said it's unconstitutional for Congress to 
regulate child labor, but Congress again passed a child labor stat-
ute and eventually, in United States v. Darby, the Court concluded 
that Congress had that power. 
Another example, a more controversial example, is abortion. In 
1992, the Casey court overturned the trimester test in Roe v. Wade. 
The only way in which the Court could have that opportunity was 
for elected Government to express its disapproval of Roe. If every-
one simply followed Roe, there would never be a chance for the 
Court to say, "Hold on, the trimester test is unsound J medically un-
sound," politically unsound, and so on and so forth. So, a court is 
reactive. 
Another structural deficiency which limits what the Court can do 
is that the Court relies on presentations to it by specific parties at 
a specific moment in time. The Court can not hold a hearing bring-
ing in all interested individuals. No, the Court is stuck, if you will, 
with the people who bring the case before it, and they don't nec-
essarily present the Court with complete information. Also, the 
Court makes a decision at a particular moment in time; facts 
change, circumstances change. A decision that makes sense in 
1988, say Morrison v. Olson and the independent counsel statute, 
may not make decision in 1998. 
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And because of these changed circumstances, it's important for 
elected Government again to express its disapproval of what the 
Court has done. It gives the Court the opportunity not just to re-
consider what it has done, it also gives the Court additional infor-
mation, information unavailable [..<j it when it made its original de-
cision. 
I see my time is up. If I can just summarize, please? 
Mr. CANADY. Please; please continue. 
Mr. DEVINS. Okay; thank you, sir. 
Well, one last substantive point before my conclusion and that is 
that vlhen Congress disagrees with the Court, we tend to focus in 
on ~nstances where, ultimately, the Court may overturn itself, re-
write its doctrine. In other words, as Professor Currie suggested, 
the RFRA was an attempt to get the Court to reconsider employ-
ment Division v. Smith. Likewise child labor legislation in the 
1930's was an attempt to get the Court to reconsider Hammer v. 
Dagenhardt. 
But it's often the case that when Congress disagrees with the 
Court, it's on an issue that the Court will not revisit again, and it's 
particularly important f01 Congress to challenge Court decision-
making in instances where the issue will not be revisited by the 
Court. 
So, for example, it may be that the Court will not revisit Morri-
son v. Olson, the independent counsel decision, and it may be ulti-
mately only for Congress to conclude that that decision was wrong 
by refusing to reauthorize the independent counsel. And it's very 
important that Congress perform that function, because if it does 
not, those bad decisions will remain on the books. 
So, for all these reasons, I am very much convinced that the Con-
stitution is more durable, more vital, more important to the Nation 
when Congress disagrees with it. It gives the Court a chance to up-
date its thinking. It also gives Congress a chance to enact laws 
when the Court will not revisit the issue. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Devins follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, GooDRICH PROFESSOR OF LAw, COLLEGE OF 
WILLIAM AND MARY 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Congress's role in inter-
preting the Constitution. My remarks will both call attention to the ways in which 
Congress can express its disapproval of Supreme Court interpretations of the Con-
stitution and argue that such expressions of disagreement are necessary to "protect 
and defend" the Constituti9n. 
The text and design of the Constitution as well as the historical record underscore 
the pervasive role that elected officials play in shaping constitutional values. Never-
theless, nearly two hundred years after Marbury v. Madison, the question ofwheth-
er Supreme Court rulings bind elected officials remains controversial. In a YVashing-
ton Post survey, for example, six out of ten respondents thought the Supreme Court 
the ultimate constitutional interpreter. In reporting this survey, the Post simply 
noted that those respondents were "correct." 
'rhis view, that constitutional truth derives solely from nine individuals (or a ma-
jority of them) sitting on the Supreme Court, has, on occasion, been embraced by 
the Court itself. Witness City of Boerne v. Flores, a 1997 decision which considered 
Congress's power to "overrUle" a Supreme Court decision. CitinJ Marbury, the 
Boerne Court declared that "[t]he power to interpret the ConstitutIon in a case or 
controversy remains in the Judiciary." Similarly, in its 1992 decision reaffuming 
abortion J'irmts-Planned Parentlwod v. Casey-the Court claimed authority to re-
solve the a60rtion dispute, calling on "the contending sides of a national controversy 
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to end their national division by accepting" "the Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution." 
Decisions like Casey and Boerne are rare, however. Backed into a eomer by elect-
ed government challenges to judicial decisionmaking, the Justices claimed authority 
to settle transcendent values. l For the most part, the Justices adhere to a philoso-
phy that is much more modest, circumspect, and nuanced. Anthony Kennedy (the 
author of Boerne), for example, has testified before Congress that lawmakers "would 
be fulfilling [their] duty" oy limiting the effects of Supreme Court decisions that 
th~ think are "wrong under the Constitution." 2 
The historical record provides overwhelming evidence that other parts of ~overn­
ment challenge the Court's constitutional reasoning and that the Court is influenced 
by these challenges as well as the broader social currents which surround it. The 
Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a particular case, rut not always the larg-
er issue of what the case is a part. Congress, the White House, government agen-
cies, interest groups, the general public and the states all play critical roles in shap-
ing constitutional values. As noted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg a year before her ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court, judges "play an interdependent part in our democ-
racy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine ... they participate in a dialogue with 
other organs of government, and with the people as well."3 
CUNGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Congress participates in constitutional decisionmaking at all phases of the law-
making process, from the enactment of legislation and approval of constitutional 
amendments to the oversight of government departments and agencies. In recent 
decades, Congress also has participated in litigation both in its own name and 
through briefs flIed by individual members. Through the Senate's power to conflrm 
judicial nominees, mon~ver, Congress plays an integral role in defl.1""ling the com-
position of the federal judiciary. 
Elected government's most direct link to judicial decisionmaking is the overtly po-
litical process of selecting and approving federal judges. Accordingly, battles over 
Supreme Court nominations reveal that the president and Senate both recognize 
that the best way to shape outputs (Court rulings) is to control inputs (i.e., to con-
trol who sits on the Court). In particular, members of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee "have learned to shape the constitutional dialogue in the confirmation hearings 
to make clear to nominees that a willingness to profess belief in some threshold con-
stitutional "'alues is a&rerequisite for the joh."4 Beginning with the 1981 nomina-
tion of Sandra Day 0' onnor, ''these threshold values have included a commitment 
to the existence of ... the right to privacy and respect for stare decisis." 5 
Congressional influence over constitutional interpretation through the confIrma-
tion of judges is only the tip of an iceberg. Before legislation is enacted, Congress 
often undertakes a constitutional review of the measure. This review may occur in 
a number of different ways. First, committee and subcommittee staff members as 
well as House or Senate members themselves may assess the bill's constitutionality. 
Second, a number of congressional offices may be called upon to assist in this re-
view. The Congressional Research Service, the offices of legislative counsel to the 
House and to the Senate, and the General Accounting Office all can assist in review-
ing constit.utional questions. Third, through formalized legislative hearings and in-
formal requests, constitutional scholars, Justice Department officials and other gov-
ernment officials, and interest groups share their views of a measure's constitu-
tionality with members and their staffs. 
Consider, for example, the pivotal role played by the House Judiciary Committee 
in the Supreme Court's approval of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of dis-
crimination by restaurants, hotels, and other public accommodations. In the wake 
of hearings raising grave doubts about whether Congress had the authority to 
ground this public accommodations provision in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection guarantee, Congress invoked its commerce power as an alternative basis 
for this prc.vision. Because the statute was framed this way, the Supreme Court was 
1 For a detailing of the defensive nature of Court invocations of judicial supremacy, see Neal 
Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing, F'eb 1998). I have attached a copy of this article to my testimony. 
~Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st. 
Sess. 222-23 (1987). 
3 Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992). 
4 Stephen J. Wermeil, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 121, 122 (Autumn 1993). . 
&Id. 
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able to uphold the measure on commerce grounds without ever having to consider 
the Fourteenth Amendment issue. Had Congress relied exclusively on its authority 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantp.e, the case, of 
course, would not have been decided on commerce grounds and might well have 
come out the other way. 
Aside from framing issues for judicial resolution, Congress and its members also 
participate in the litigation process. Sometimes the Supreme Court invites the 
H~use, the Senate, or individual members of Congress to present an amicus curiae 
(fnend of the court) brief and participate in oral arguments. AmiCU& curiae briefs, 
most notably in abortion and sep~tion-of-powers disputes, also have been flIed at 
the initiative of the Senate, the House, and their individual members. For example, 
a coalition of more than two hundred members of Congress flIed an amicus brief 
in Harris v. McRae, defending the right of Congress to fund or to refrain from fund-
ing abortions as it sees fit. Finally, Congress participates as a party to litigation 
when the Justice Department refuses to defend a statute's constitutionality. In cases 
involving the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court and the legislative veto, for 
example, Congress defended the constitutionality of its handiwork. 
Once thE~ Supreme Court decides a case, Congress may make use of a wide variety 
of powers to signal its approval or disapproval of the decision. When Congress 
agrees with the Court, it may afftrmatively assist in the implementation of a Court 
decision. For example, in response to Southern resistance, Congress took bold steps 
to make Brown v. Board of Education a reality. In 1964 it prohibited segregated 
school systems from receiving federal aid {Title vn and authorized the Department 
of justice to file desegregation lawsuits. More significant, the implementation of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, coupled with the issuance and 
enforcement of Title VI guidelines, marked a significant shift in federal powers over 
state education systems. These federal efforts proved critical in ending dual school 
systems. More actual desegregation took place the year after these legislative pro-
grams took effect than in the decade following Brown. 
Congress, moreover, may also enact legislation at the Court's behest. In 1978 the 
Court, while upholding the constitutionality of third-party searches of newspapers 
in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, invited legislative efforts to establish ''nonconstitu-
tional protections against lWssible abuses of the search warrant procedure." Con-
gress L:ccepted this invitatIon. Concluding that "the search warrant procedure in 
itself does not sufficiently protect the press and other innocent parties" and that the 
Zurcher decision had "thrown into doubt'" "a longstanding principle of constitutional 
jurisprudence," Congress prohibited such newspaper searches in 1980.6 
WHEN CONGRESS AND THE COURT DISAGREE 
Starting with the First Congress, Congress has proven itself willing to act in the 
face of contradictory Supreme Court precedent. During the debate in 1789 on the 
President's removal power, for example, James Madison saw no reason to defer to 
the judiciary on the constitutionality of what Congress was about to do. While ac-
knowledgin:j that ''the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Ju-
diciary," he begged to know on what ground "~kJ:ne department draws from the 
Constitution greater powers than another in m . g out the limits of the powers 
of the several departments." 7 
In response to Dred Scott, Congress passed a bill prohibiting slavery in the terri-
tories.8 Disagreeing with the Court's 1918 ruling that the commerce power could not 
be used to regulate child labor, Congress two decades later again based child labor 
legislation on the Commerce Clause.9 Public accommodations protections contained 
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the wake of a Supreme Court d~i­
sion rejecting such protections.lo More recently, lawmakers have challenged Court 
rulings on abortion, busing, flag burning, religious freedom, voting rights, and the 
legislative veto. I I 
Congressional disagreement with the Court takes many forms. At one extreme, 
Congress simply disregards a Court decision it finds unworkable. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, invalidating the legislative veto, is such a case. 
In the twelve years after Chadha, 1983-1995, well over three hundred legislative 
veto provisions were enacted into law. The reason for such widespread disobedience 
6Staggers Rail Act of 1980,94 Stat. 1895 (1980). 
71 Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
8Ad of June 19, 1862, col11, 12 Stat. 432. 
9 Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060. 
JOTitle II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 78 Stat. 241, 243. 
J J See generally Louis Fisher & Neal Devins. Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (2d ed. 
1996). 
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of Chadha is that "[n]either Congress nor the executive branch wants the static 
model of government offered by the Court." 12 
Congress may also seek to nullify Court rulings by amending the Constitution. 
While constitutional amendment proposals are almost always unsuccessful, these 
proposals nevertheless may drive Judicial decisionmaking. For example, in response 
to the Court's failure to invalidate iender-based decisionmaking, Congress approved 
and sent to the states for ratificatIon a proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
prohibiting the abridgement of "equality of rights. . . on account of sex." These ef-
forts prompted the Court to reconsider its approach to gender decision-making, and 
m the early 1970s Supreme Court decision-making became "fully compatible with 
arguments made by leading mainstream ERA proponents in such documents as con-
gressional committee reports and hearings records on the ERA, and in testimony in 
the Congressional Record by leading ERA sponsors." 13 Ironically. the ultimate de-
feat of the ERA is sometimes attributed to the Court's general adoption of the 
amendment's principles. 
Another area where Congress has been successful is in countering Supreme Court 
decisionmaking that does not protect rights that Congress thinks should be pro-
tected. Two recent examples stand out. After the Supreme Court upheld, in Gold-
man v. Weinberger, an air force regulation forbidding an Orthodox Jew's wearing 
of a yarmulke indoors while on duty, Congress enacted legislation overturning this 
regulation.14 More strikingly, Congress significant! expanded voting rights protec-
tions through its 1982 amendments to the Vot' 'ghts Act. The bill was a direct 
outgrowth of the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden~ in which the Court 
required proof of discriminatory intent as a basis for voting rights litigation. Con-
cluding that the "intent test focuses on the wrong question and places an unaccept-
able burden upon plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases," 15 Congress cleared the 
way for impact·based proofs of discrimination, 
Congress, fmally, has sought to limit the reach of Court decisions that protect 
rights in ways that Congress thinks are inappropriate, Following Roe v. \Vade, Con-
gress l'evealed its hostility to expansive abortion rights through funding restrictions. 
Congress likewise made effective use of its power of the purse in limiting school bus-
ing. 
City of Boerne v, Flores, invalidating legislative efforts to define the content of 
First Amendment religious liberty protections, does not call into question Congress's 
broad authority to limit the effect of Supreme Court decisions. ls To begin with. 
Boerne says nothing about Congress's authority to control federal programs or its 
power to place conditions on the receipt of federal funds (including the denial of fed-
eral funding to disfavored activities). 1t10reover. while specifying that Congress?s au-
thority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to "legislation which deters 
or remedies constitutional violations/' the Court acknowledged that "the line be-
tween measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that 
make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern." Correspond-
ingly, in recognizing that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining" wheth-
er corrective legislation is, in fact, remedial. Boerne acknowledged Congress's power 
to engage the Court in constitutional dialogues. 
THE LAST WORD DEBATE REVISITED 
Congressional practice as well as the design and text of the Constitution all sug-
gest that the overriding value promoted by the framers was a system of checks and 
balances, with each branch asserting its own powers and protecting its own preroga-
tives. Furthermore, constitutional dialogues between the courts and elected govern-
ment often result in more vibrant and durable constitutional interpretation. In par-
ticular, a fmal interpretive authority of the Constitution will make our most fun-
damental text stagnant and irrelevant, rather than preserve and honor it. Lou Fish-
er and I develop this point in a forthcoming article. Judicial Exclusivity and Politi-
cal Instability, which I am attaching to this statement, In our view, the Constitution 
becomes more relevant and more stable when all branches and levels of government 
do battle with one another. 
12!.<ouis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated. It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273, 
292 (Autumn 1993). 
13 Leslie Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 Law and Political Studies 145 
(1987). See also Jane Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 47 (1989). 
14 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 101 Stat. 1019, 1087 
(1987). 
15S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 13 (1982). 
16 For 1L"l elaboration of why I think Boerne is of limited reach. see Neal Devins. How Not 
to Chal1enge the Court. 39 Wm. & Mal:' L.Rev. (forthcoming 1998). 
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Courts and elected officials should both be activists in shaping governmental pol-
icy, in large measure, because judges and politicians sometimes react differently to 
social and political forces. Congress, for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the 
claims of large populous interests, or on the claims of the wealthy and the powerful, 
since that tends to be the best route to re-election.» 17 Courts, in contrast, are less 
affected by these pressures, for judges possess life tenure. Accordingly, because spe-
cial interest group pressures affect courts and elected officials in different ways, a 
government-·~vide decisionmaking process encourages a full-ranging consideration of 
the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes. 
This politicization of constitutional discourse. while contributing to partisan 
value-laden constitutional interpretation, is better than the alternatives-legislative 
or judicial supremacy. Legislative supremacy, as Marbury recognized, would blur 
the line separating the Constitution from ordinary laws. Moreover, subject to the 
pressures of reelection, "legislatures are too likely to get caught up in the passions 
of the moment, be they flag burning, alleged communists in the State Department, 
to the need to really sock it to various types of criminal defendants." 18 For progres-
sives and conservatives alike, lawmakers' propensity to do that which is politically 
expedient makes legislative supremacy unpalatable. 
Judicial exclusivity, like legislative supremacy, creates more problems than it 
solves. ''When technologies are changing rapidly, when facts or values are unclear 
and when democracy is in a state of moral flux, courts [with limited factfmding ca-
pacity and inability to respond quickly to changing circumstances] should recognize 
that they may not have the best or fmal answers."19 Moreover, lacking the powers 
of purse and sword, as Casey recognized, the Court's authority is necessarily tied 
to "the people's acceptance for the Judiciary." The Court is well aware of this: for 
example, Justice Owen Roberts, whose alleged "switch in time" saved the Lochner 
Court from Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, acknowledged that "IlJooking back, it is 
difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform 
standards throughout the country." 20 
To be sure, those who believe that Congress is not "ideologically committed or in-
stitutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values" 21 may ques-
tion the practicality of this dynamic decisionmaking model. Populist constitutional 
interpretation, however, serves as an important foil for the Court. In so doing, elect-
ed government interpretation makes the Constitution more relevant and more dura-
ble. 
The saga of abortion rights underscores the appropriately interactive nature of 
constitutional decisionmaking.22 Roe v. Wade served as a critical trigger to judicial 
recognition of abortion rights, overcoming politically potent pro-life interests that 
have always stood in the way of populist abortion reform. Roe also prompted the 
elected branches of government into action. From 1973 to 1989, 306 abortion-re-
stricting measures were passed by forty-eight states. In 1992, after two decades of 
elected government resistance as well as the appointment of new Supreme Court 
Justices, the Court responded to these pressures and returned much of the abortion 
issue to the states. Repudiating Roe's stringent trimester test in favor of a more def-
erential "undue burden" standard, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, while reafimning 
''the central holding of Roe ," signalled the Court's increasing willingness to uphold 
state regulation of abortion. 
Without question, to a pro-choice advocate, Casey's balance sells out important in-
terests of women, and, to a pro-lifer, it permits moral outrages to continue. But 
there is no realistic alternative to Casey's balancing act. The political upheaval that 
followed (and still follows) Roe reveals the unworkability of a strident pro-choice ju-
risprudence. But a jurisprudence allowing the prohibition of abortion is equally un-
workable. In the years before Roe, when nontheraputic abortions were prohibited in 
nearly every state, abortions were both less safe and almost as common as they are 
today_ tntimately, abortion is too divisive for either pro-choice or pro-life absolutism 
to rule the day_ Absent the constitutional dialogue that followed Roe, however, the 
politically unworkable trimester standard would have remained in place. 
17 Steven G. Calabresi~ Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 269,273 (1993). 
18Id. 
19 Cass Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again the High Court Takes Only Small Steps, 
Wash. Post, July 6, 1997 at C-l. 
20 Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (1951). 
21 Owen Fiss, The Fonns of Justice, 93 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 10 (1979). 
22For a detailed treatment of this point, see Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values: 
Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate (1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress must not shy away from its responsibil:ty to interpret the Constitution 
~d, when necessary, challenge the Court. Delegations of constitutional responsibil-
Ity to th~ courts throu$:h ex:pedited review provisions or suggestions that Court in-
terpretations are deimltive both weaken the Congress and the Constitution.23 Our 
systt:m of government, as Justice Ginsburg rightly observed at their conf"mnation 
heanng, is one where courts "do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share 
that ~sponsibility with Congress, the President, the states, and the people."24 
. 'rhis process of "ambition counteracting ambition" is central to our system of di-
v.lded tI0vernment. By empow.e~g "we the people" through their elected representa-
tives, It also make the ConstitutIOn more vital, more durable, and more democratic. 
Mr. CANADY. Okay; thank you, Professor Devins. Professor 
Kinkopf. 
STATEMENT OF NEIL KINKOPF, VISITING ASSISTANT PROFES-
SOR OF LAW, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL 
Mr. KINKOPF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee. It's a real honor to appear before you today and a particular 
privilege to appear on such a distinguished panel. 
The relationship between Congress and the Court with respect to 
constitutional interpretation calls to mind Justice Jackson's obser-
vation that the Constitution "enjoins upon the branches of the Fed-
eral Government separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity." We've heard a lot of discussion this morning about the 
separateness and the independence of the roles of the branches in 
interpreting the Constitution. 
I would like to focus on the interdependence and reciprocity. In 
particular, I would like to focus on the deference that the Court 
owes to Congress's constitutional interpretations contained in legis-
lation and in the legislative record that supports that legislation. 
There is no broadly-applicable rule to determine whether, or even 
to what extent, the Court owes deference to Congress. It depends 
on the context and content of particular legislation and the legisla-
tive record. For example, the Court will extend differing levels of 
deference depending on whether legislation draws classifications 
based on race, based on gender, or based on, say, age. I want to 
discuss the deference that the Court owes to congressional constitu-
tional interpretation in the ccntext of separation of powers and the 
structure of the Federal Government. 
I think first it would be useful to recall the two fundamental pur-
poses underlying the structure of the Federal Government. First, 
because the framers feared that large concentrations of unchecked 
power are subject almost inevitably to abuse, the Constitution sep-
arates the Government into three branches and makes each branch 
the primary guardian of its own constitutional role, arming it con-
stitutionally with checking powers on the others. 
Second, the Constitution sought to create a viable and effective 
national Government, particularly in light of its experience under 
23 For a critical examination of Congress's employment of an expedited judicial review provi-
sion in 1996 item veto legislation, see Neal Devins and Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Tim-
ing: Raines v. ~yrd and the Modem Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Con-
from;ations, 86 000. L.J. 351 (t997). 
24 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 
(l993). 
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the Articles of Confederation. The power to establish the proce-
dures, structures, and mechanisms of that effective self-government 
is granted primarily to the Congress. 
Now there's tension that arises between these two structural 
purposes, particularly when Congress legislates in a way that is 
perceived to undermine the separateness of the branches. The 
Court has resolved that tension largely by according great def-
erence to Congress's constitutional judgment that a given measure 
will be effective and will not subvert the constitutional separation 
of powers. 
In granting that deference, the Court places a great deal of em-
phasis on the initial judgment not to rely on parchment barriers 
between the branches, but rather to defer to each branch's ability 
to act as the primary guardian of its own role. 
One might view the Court's precedents in this area as according 
slightly less preference when the branch affected by a given piece 
of legislation is the judiciary itself. I don't that's cynical on the part 
of the Court, if in fact that's the case, but rather it's because the 
Court's check from the Constitution is judicial review. And so, it is 
in accord with its role as the primary guardian-its duty as the 
primary guardian of its own constitutional role-that the Court 
would perhaps grant slightly less deference where a given statute 
affects the judiciary. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Boerne stands in contrast 
to this approach. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was sup-
ported by an extensive legislative recorj in support of Congress's 
judgment that RFRA \vas constitutional. And the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Boerne case was one that fundamentally in-
volved separation of powers. They were concerned about whether 
Congress had actually sought to exercise the judicial power. 
I believe that in striking down RFRA, the Supreme Court may 
well have been insufficiently deferential to Congress's constitu-
tional judgment. I think the Boerne court's failure to be sufficiently 
deferential can be traced to the fact that although the Court recog-
nized the separation of powers setting for its decision, it didn't rec-
ognize the precedents that it could have looked to for guidance as 
to just how deferential it should have been. 
But it also brings us to a second point-and I notice my time has 
expired--
Mr. CANADY. You may continue. 
Mr. KINKOPF [continuing]. :aut if I can get to the second point, 
which is that Congress can help the Court be deferential. In par-
ticular, Congress can make findings that demonstrate that it recog-
nizes the barriers and boundaries to its own powers, which is what 
particularly motivated the Court in Boerne and in a number of 
other recent cases, particularly I'm thinking of the Lopez decision 
striking down the Gun .. Free School Zones Act. 
The Court has been particularly concerned wIth making sure 
that Congress stays within its enumerated powers, and it views it 
as perhaps its most important function-to make sure that the 
Congress does that. If Congress establishes a legislative record that 
identifies the boundaries of its power and that makes findings that 
demonstrate that the legislation it has enacted is drawn with re-
spect to those boundaries, keeping those boundaries on its power 
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in mind, then the Court has indicated that it will accord great def-
erence to Congress's constitutional judgments. 
And in both Boerne and Lopez, the Court expressed its concern 
that it couldn't find that in the legislative record. Now in the 
Boerne case that's understandable, because there was disagreement 
between the Congress and the Court about where the boundary on 
that power was, whether the power under section 5 was simply 
preventive and remedial, or whether it included some sort of sub-
stantive component. 
But I think the more general point still holds, and that is that 
in the case where it's unclear that Congress has acted within the 
scope of its powers, the Court will look to the legislative record, 
and if Congress has established a legislative record that both iden-
tifies the barriers on its power and the ways in which the particu-
lar enactment stay within respect of those boundaries, the Court 
will, in fact, defer to Congress's constitutional judgments. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kinkopf follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEIL KINKOPF, VISITING AssISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAw, 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAw ScHOOL 
. It is an honor to be invited to give testimony before this subcommittee and to ap-
pear on such a distinguished panel. The topic of today's hearing, "Congress, the 
Court, and the Constitution" calls to mind Justice Jackson's observation on the rela-
tionship between the branches of the federal government. The Constit1.:.tion, he said, 
"enjoins upon [the] branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reci-
procity." 1 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Boerne v. Flores,2 affords en ex· 
cellent opportunity for examining both the separateness and the interdependence of 
constitutional interpretation by the courts and by Congress. I will have a few words 
to say about the separateness and independence of congressional constitutional in-
terpretation, but I want to concentrate on the interdependence and reciprocity of ju-
dicial and congressional constitutional interpretation. In particular, I will examine 
the level of deference that the courts owe to Congress's constitutional judgments. 
I will begin by discussing the level of deference due Congress~s constitutional judg-
ments in separation of powers cases generally. This discussion will set the stage for 
examining the level of deference that was due and that was actually accorded in 
Boerne. I will then draw from this examination observations about how Congress 
can help the Courts defer to Congress's constitutional judgments. I arrive at two 
conclusions, First, where it is unclear whether Congress has acU'd within the scope 
of one of its enumerated powers, the Court will be deferential to Congress's judg-
ment that it has acted within that power, but the extent of the deference will be 
greater-and perhaps determinatively so-where Congress has made fmdings that 
indicate Congress is aware of the nature and limits of the enumerated power it is 
exercising and has drafted its legislation in recognition of and conformance to those 
limits. Second, where there is concern that Congress has actually exercised the 
power of another branch, the legislative history should specifically address this con-
cern and explain how Congress has sought to avoid stepping beyond the legislative 
sphere and has indulged interbranch comity with respect to the executive or judici-
ary. 
After this discussion of the interdependence between Congress and the Courts, I 
will tum to their independenca and review some of the benefits that derive from 
congressional non-acquiescence in Supreme Court doctrine. This discussion draws 
on analogous executive branch approach to non-acquiescence. I conclude that there 
are important benefits to be derived from Congress exercising an independent inter-
pretive role, even where its interpretation conflicts with the Supreme Court's. 
:a Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.635 (952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2117 3. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
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I. INTERDEPENDENCE: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUDGMENTS 
A. The General Separation of Powers Context 
There is in fact no single level of deference that the courts do or should accord 
Congress's constitutional judgments. Instead, me level of deference due a congres-
sional constitutional judgment depends on the subject matter of the legislation 
under review and the specific power under which Congress is acting as well as the 
c,?ntext and content of the specific legislation. So, for example, the courts will accord 
~ering levels of deference to Congress's constitutional judgments in connection 
WIth legislation that draws racial classifications, gender-based classifications, and 
age-based classifications. Because many of the recent cases that have starkly posed 
the question of deference, including Boerne, have arisen in the context of separation 
of powers,3 I will confme my inquiry to the level of deference that the judici~ owes 
Congress's constitutional judgments regarding the allocation and exercise of the fed-
eral government's power. 
Even under the heading "separation of powers," the level of judicial deference due 
Congress's constitutional determinations will vary. It is helpful to remember the 
purposes that the constitutional structure of the federal government is designed to 
serve. The Constitution structures the federal government to achieve two fundamen-
tal purposes. First, it safeguards the liberty of the governed by dividing the federal 
government into three branches and assigning each a distinct role in the exercise 
of federal power.4 The framers accepted the premise that large concentrations of un-
checked power were peculiarly subject to abuse and so divided the constitutional 
powers of the federal government into three branches and subjected each branch in 
the exercise of its power to checking or limiting power vested in the others.5 The 
natural ambition of each branch would lead it to prevent the others from encroach-
ing upon its constitutionally assigned sphere.6 Under this design, then, each branch 
is to be the primary guardian of its own constitutional role. Second, the Constitu-
tion's framers were determined to create a viable and effective national government 
to replace what they regarded as the embarrassing spectacle of ineffectual national 
government under the Articles of Confederation.7 The Constitution assigns Congress 
the function of establishing effective forms of national self-government and grants 
Congress broad powers to structure the federal government primarily through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.8 Congress establishes the structure of the ex~cutive 
and judicial branches. Within that structure it orders and arranges the powers and 
duties of each by establishing departments and agencies 9 and the subunits and bu-
reaus of each, as well as by creating all offices and defIning their duties and powers 
and the limits on those duties and powers. Congress also prescribes the procedures 
officials must follow in exercising federal pciwer and the conditions on which that 
power may be exercised. In sum, while the Constitution creates the executive and 
judicial branches, Congress gives each its form and content, according to its judg-
3 The Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine of separation of powers to resolve a large num-
ber of recent controversies. see. e.g .• Printz v. United States. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Edmond 
v. United States. 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997); Clinton v. Jones. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997); Loving v. 
United States. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Co .• 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). 
including at least one caSE where the litigants apparently did not realize the doctrine was impli-
cated. See Lebron v. National Passenger Railroad C9rp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). 
4See. e.g., Loving v. United States. 116 S. CL 1737, 1743 (1996); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm 
Co .• 115 S. Ct. 1447. 1463 (1995) (Breyer. J .• concurring); Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise. 501 U.S. 25?. 272 (1991); Young v. United 
States ex reI. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 824 (1987); Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714. 
730 (1986); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-35 (1952) (Jackson. J .• 
concurring); THE FEDERALIST No. 47. at 302-03 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter. ed. 1961). 
5 See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-49.51. 
6THE FEDERALIST No. 51. at 337 (Edward Mead Earle. ed. 1976) 
7 See. e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter. ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51, at 321 (Madison). The Court has repeatedly identifie4 effective self-government as an 
important policy derived from. and to be applied in questions regarding. the constitutional struc-
ture of the federal Bovemment. See. e.g .• Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361. 381 (1989); 
Buckley v. United States, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam); Panama Refg Co. v. Ryan. 293 
U.S. 388,421 (1935); Union Bridge Co. v. United States. 27 S. Ct. 367. 374 (1907) Buttfield v. 
Stranahan, 24 S. Ct. 349,355 (1904); Field v. Clark, 12 S. Ct. 495,505 (1892). 
8 U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8 cl. 17. On Congress's broad authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, see M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 316 (1819). The Constitution specifically 
confers significant latitude in Congress to structure the federal judiciary in Article III. See U.S. 
Const. Art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
9In the case of the judiciary. it creates and structures the various article III courts and the 
agencies and offices that support those courts, such as the Administrative Office of United 
States Courts and magistrate judgeships. 
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ment as to which forms will be most effective within the constraints of the Constitu-
tion's text and structure.10 
It is occasionally asserted that Congress has exercised its Necessary and Proper 
Clause power in a way that impermissibly encroaches upon one of the other 
branches by enacting legislation t11at interferes with the ability of one of the other 
b.ranches to perform its functions. 11 The two fundamental purposes of the Constitu-
tion's structure thus often come into tension. Rather than establishing a system of 
specific, categorical rules to resolve this tension, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
this division to be "governed according to common sense and the inherent neceE-
sities of the governmental co-ordination." 12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned a standard that, in both formulation and application, is extremely deferential 
to the Congress's judgment that the resulting arrangement of federal power will 
comport with the constitutional system of sepa1."ation of powers. Thus, the Court will 
fmd Congress impermissibly to have interfered with one of the other branches only 
if its enactment "prevents the [other b]ranch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions." 13 Even then, a statute that does so is unconstitutional only if 
its impact is not justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
Congress's constitutional authority.l4 
The Court has used this same general separation of powers formulation whether 
Congress is asserted to have interfered with the executive branch or with on the judicial branch.15 The Court's application of this formulation has been only slightly 
less deferential where a statute is asserted to have interfered with the judiciary as 
compared with asserted interference with the executive. IS In Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n v. Schor,l7 the Supreme Court held that Congress could authorize 
a non-Article III court to decide a state common ~aw cause of action if raised as a 
counterclaim in a proceeding that is otherwise validly before the tribunal. Generally, 
such tribunals are authorized to hear regulatory or administrative claims but the 
Supreme Court has held that Article III prohibits Congress from assigning them au-
thority to hear causes of action that are within the core of Article III jurisdiction. 
State common law causes of action are at the core of Article III's jurisdiction. In 
Schor, the Court allowed a non-Article III tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over a 
contract dispute, a classic state CGmmon law cause of action, that was raised as a 
counterclaim in a proceeding initiated to resolve an administrative claim. While the 
Court recognized that such claims implicate the core of the judicial power, it was 
extremely deferential to Congress's constitutional conclusion that allowing the 
CFTC to hear such disputes as counterclaims would not subvert the role of the judi-
ciary or the constitutional balance of power. In particular, the Court deferred to 
Congress's judgment that counterclaim jurisdiction was important to the CFTC's ef-
fective operation, pronouncing that the le~slation's "primary focus was on making 
effective a specific regulatory scheme .... 18 
This approach allows Congress to fulfill its constitutional role of arranging and 
ordering the exercise of federal power through the forms it deems to be most effec-
tive and to maintain the constitutional balance of power, while preserving to each 
branch the role of primary guardian of its constitutional sphere. It is in view of this 
latter role that we fmd justification for the Court's somewhat less deferential appli-
10 On the importance of effective self-government as a constitutional value. see GERHARD CAS-
PER. SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD (1997); Peter M. Shane. Independ-
ent Policy making and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis. 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of ARencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch. 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
11 I mean to distinguish those cases where Congress has impermissi andized itself by 
assigning non-legislative power to itself. one of its committees. or an subject to its con-
trol See. e.g., Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). I discuss this anti-aggrandizement prin-
ciple infra. 
12J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
13 Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
141d. 
15 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 3tH, 393 (1S89); CFTC v. Schor. 478 U.S. 833, 
851 (1986) (emphasizing minimal I?ractical effect on the judiciary and importance of asserted 
encroachment to challenged legislatIve scheme). 
IGWhile the Court has typically ~pheld statutes against the assertion that they impermissibly 
encroach upon the judiciary, see Schor; Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985), the 
Court has occasionally struck down a statute on the grounds of encroachment on the judiciary. 
see Schor. 478 U.S. at 851-52 (characterizing Northern Pil'-eline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe-
line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Haybum's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dan.) 408 (1792». In contrast, the 
Court has never struck down a statute as an encroachment on the executive branch. 
17 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
18478 U.S. at 855; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568,594 (1985). Compare Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (applying test in the context of asserted interference with 
the executive branch). 
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cation of the general separation of powers principle to cases involving possible en-
croachments on the judicial branch as compared with the executive branch. In the 
former, the Court acts as guardian of its own role, while in the latter the Court 
steps back and allows the executive branch to guard itself. It bears emphasizing, 
however, that the Court is only slightly less deferential to Congress's judgments in 
cases involving asserted encroachment on the judiciary. The Court's deference in 
these cases demonstrates the significance it places on Congress's function of estab-
lishing effective mechanisms of governance and its respect for Congress's constitu-
tional judgment that the mechanisms it selects will not undermine the separation 
of powers. 
A related question derives from the constitutional division of power: Congress may 
exercise only the legislative power. Any attempt by Congress to exercise judicial or 
executive power, whether itself or through one of its committees or agents, is uncon-
stitutional. 19 This much is uncontroversial. The difficult case arises when, in re-
sponse to an assertion that a statute represents an exercise of a non-legislative 
power, Congress can plausibly point to an expressly enumerated power as authority 
for its statute. Put another way, how do we determine whether Congress, under the 
guise of an enumerated power, has actually exercised an executive or judicial 
power? At least one of the framers, James Madison, recognized this concern and 
wrote: 
The legislative department['s] ... constitutional powers being at once more ex-
tensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, 
mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it 
makes on the coordinate departments. It is not infrequently a matter of real ni-
cety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, 
or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.20 
Recalling the constitutional commitment to effective self-government and rec-
ognizing that the Constitution impresses upon each branch the duty to act as pri-
mary guardian of its own constitutional role and grants each branch powers to fulfIll 
that duty, Congress should expect great deference to its determination that a given 
piece of legislation represents a necessary and proper exercise of one of its constitu-
tionally enumerated powers.21 Indeed, James Madison made the above-quoted ob-
servation in the context of arguing that the only effective means of keeping Con-
gress within the legislative sphere would be through each branch acting to preserve 
its constitutional role rather than through rigid and formalistic "parchment bar-
riers." 
While Madison was prescient in foreseeing this controversy, it has only rarely ma-
terialized. The question whether Ifgislation is within Congress's enumerated power, 
or whether it is properly seen as an exercise of a non-legislative power has most 
often involved concern that Congress has exercised an executive power, particularly 
the appointment power. The Constitution establishes a clear division of labor with 
respect to creating and filling federal offices. The Constitution assigns Congress the 
power to create offices and assigns the President primary responsibility for filling 
them.22 This clear line separating the power to create offices from the power to ap-
point officers is breached when Congress adds duties to an existing office. While 
Congress plainly has authority to defme and redefme offices, there is concern that 
in addi.'1g duties to an existing office with a known occupant, Congress will ha ·,e 
essentially created a new office and chosen the officer to fill the "new" office.23 It 
was on this ground that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act was ruled unconstitutional.24 
19 See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington .Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Air-
craft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher. 478 U.S. at 727; Itlyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52 (1926). 
20THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 323 (Madison) (Edward Mead Earle, ed. 1976). 
21 See, e.g., M'Culioch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
22The Appointments Clause requires the President to obtain the Senate's advice and consent 
and allows Congress, in establishing inferior offices, to provide for appointment by the Presi-
dent, a court of law, or a department head without Senate confirmation. However one character-
izes the President's role, what is clear :s that the Constitution specifically and intentionally 
withheld the power to fill offices from Congress. The framers were concerned placing the power 
to create offices and the power to fill them in the same hands would lead to abuse. 
23 A closely related issue would arise if legislation were to abolish an office and recreate it. 
In this case, the issue would be whether Congress had exercised the executive removal power 
undet" the guise of its structural ~wer under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
2. Until J.989 the savings and loan, or thrift, industry was regulated by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. FIRREA abolished 
Continued 
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As the framers anticipated, these controversies are typically resolved between the 
Congress and the executive branch without involving the judiciary. Nevertheless, 
the courts have had occasion to fashion a standard, known as the Shoemaker doc-
trine, to govern this controversy. As with the approach to separation of powers gen-
erally, the Shoemaker doctrine is. in both formulation and application, extremely 
deferential to Congress. It requires only that the new duties be germane to the of-
fice's pre-existing duties. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that any 
commissioned military officer could be detailed to act as a military judge without 
a formal constitutional appointment because the duties of a military judge are suffi-
ciently germane to the duties of any commissioned officer of thf') armed forces. 25 A 
compa~son of the duties of a Second Lieutenant on a naval supply ship, for exam-
ple, With the duties of a military judge demonstrates just how deferential the 
Court's application of the germaneness requirement can be. 
B. Deference in Boerne 
~ast term, the case of Boerne v. Flores 26 presented the question of how to address 
thiS controversy when legislation is attacked as an exercise of the judicial power, 
rather than the executive power. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine 
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was a valid exercise of 
Congress's broad authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in-
stead represented congressional exercise of the judicial power.27 Consistent with the 
Court's approach to separation of powers generally, as discussed above, and in rec-
ognition of the important constitutional values supporting that approach, the Court 
should have employed a deferential standard similar to the Shoemaker germaneness 
requirement and have applied that standard with slightly greater scrutiny, which 
is to say with slightly less deference, than the Court accords in the Shoemaker con-
text. In fact, this is precisely what the Court purported to do. 
In formulating the governing standard, the Court virtually paraphrased the Shoe-
maker germaneness re'luirement. It held that "[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between Congress's enumerated power and the "means adopted to 
that end." 28 In the same breath, the Court expressed its considerable deference for 
Congress's judgment, ''the line between m.easures that" are within and without 
Congress's authority "is not easy to disceIn, and Congress must have wide latitude 
in determinins where it lies .... " 29 Despite the articulated standard and ex-
pressed intentIon to accord substantial deference to Congress's constitutional judg-
ment that the enactment of RFRA was within its enumerated powers, the Court 
ruled the Act unconstitutional on the ground that RFRA was not within Congress's 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Congress had compiled an impressive and extensive legislative record detailing 
the injuries that it sought to remedy through RFRA and the need for legislation to 
remedy those injuries.30 I believe that the Court articulated an appropriately def-
erential standard by which to review whether RFRA was within Congress's enumer-
ated power to enact but that, in light of the extensive legislative fmdings and con-
clusions, the Court was insufficiently deferential in applying that standard to 
Congress's constitutional judgment that RFRA was within its authority. Why, then, 
was the Court insufficiently deferential to Congress's determination? Part of the 
blame obviously rests with the Court. The Court failed to locate its analysis within 
the broader separation of powers context or even within the more specific context 
of cases, like Shoemaker and Weiss, that examine whether Congress has actuaily 
exercised the power of another branch or has remained within its enumerated pow-
ers. Had it explored this context, it would have found further support for the "con-
these entities and replaced them with the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Savings Associa-
tion Insurance Fund. OTS differed from FHLBB primarily in that it would be headed by an indi-
vidual director, rather than a three-member board. FIRREA provided that the chainnan of the 
board of the FHLBB would serve as the initial director of OTS. See Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loon 
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supel"visioll, 732 F. Supp. 1183 <D.D.C. 1990). 
25 Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994). 
26 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
271 do not mean to suggest that this determination turns on Congress's motive. In the Shoe-
maker context, for example, Congress may not add extraneous duties to an office, regardless of 
its motive for doing so. Compare Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 759 (suggesting that where the legislation 
adds the new duties not to a specific office but to a large class of offices, gennaneness may be 
required only if there is evidence that the legislation is motivated by a congressional attempt 
to exercise the appointment power). It is, in that sense, an objective standard. If Congress adds 
non·germane duties to an existing office, it has exercised the appointment power, whether it 
subjectively meant to or not. 
281d. at 2164. 
291d. 
30See, (or example, the extensive history cited by Boerne itself. [d. at 2169. 
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gruence and proportionality" standard it articulated, but would also have garnered 
concrete guidance on how to apply that standard.31 This would have indicated using 
Shoemaker and Weiss as a baseline against which to assess the level of deference 
due Congress's fmdings and conclusion, and should have alerted the Court that the 
level reflected in its decision was inadequate. 
Nevertheless, Congress has the means to provide the Court a basis for appro-
priate deference to Congress's constitutional judgments. The Constitution embodies 
the fundamental judgment that the federal government is a limited government of 
expressly enumerated powers. Although the line between actions that fall within 
these powers and outside of them is not always clear, the line "exists and must be 
observed."32 The Court takes very seriously its role in ensuring that Congress does 
not either itself take action or authorize other federal action that is beyond these 
enumerated powers, and may in fact view this as its most important function.33 One 
might ask why the Court should require Congress to make such fmdings expressly. 
Surely Congress's judgment that a given piece of legislation is within its constitu-
tional power to enact is implicit in its enactment. In the vast majority of cases, the 
Court accepts Congress's implicit judgment. \\1bere it is clear to the Court that the 
enactment is within Congress's authority, it requires no express corroboration. It is 
where the Court cannot perceive how the enactment respects the constitutional lim-
its on Congress's authority that it looks to Congress for an explanation in the form 
of fmdings and a legislative record. First, this exercise ensures that Congress recog-
nizes the same limits on its power that the Court perceives and that Congress has 
drawn its legislation to conform to those limits. Second, there is reason to doubt 
that Congress considers the constitutionality of each provision of each piece of legis-
lation it enacts and therefore to question whether enactment carries an implicit con-
gressional determination of constitutionality. For example, Congress has enacted 
hundreds of legislative vetoes since the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional 
in EN'S v. Chadha.34 There is no indication that Congress pauses to consider the 
constitutionality of these provisions before enacting them. It is understandable, 
therefore, that the Court may have some doubt as to whether Congress actually con-
siders the constitutionality of each provision it enacts. If Congress has not, to what 
is the Court to defer? 
In Boerne the Court examined the legislative record for evidence that Congress 
recognized the extent and limits on its Section 5 power and had drafted RFRA with 
those limits in mind. The Court noted that the record lacked evidence of "animus 
or hostility to the burdened religious practices" and was not directed to the issue 
of the intent underlying generally applicable state laws and local ordinances. More 
important, the legislative record did not attempt, in the view of the Court, to dem-
onstrate a congruence and proportion between the operative provisions of RFRA and 
the Congress's power under Section 5 to remedy or prevent violations of individual 
constitutional rights. In this connection, the Court emphasized RFRA's "universal 
coverage" and, at least by implication, the legislative record's failure to consider 
whether a different standard might be appropriate in different contexts, such as 
prison management as opposed to state employment as opposed to zoning regula-
tion.3s Finally, the legislative record included significant indication that RFRA was 
in fact designed to exercise the judicial power by overruling the Supreme Court's 
------
31 An analogy may be illuminating. Merely articulating the strict scrutiny standard, which re-
quires that legislative means be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest, does 
not fully capture strictness with which that standard is applied. This can be seen most clearly 
by examining the practical application of the standard in the Court's precedents. Similarly, a 
full appreciation for the deference due Congress is most clearly seen from the deference actually 
accorded in separation of powers cases involving the judiciary. such as Schor, as compared with 
those involving the executive, such as Morrison. as well as those involving concern that Con-
gress has exercised the power of another branch, such as Shoemaker and Weiss. 
32Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. 
33See id. at 2162 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803»; see also United 
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
34 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Louis Fisher, The Legislatiue Veto: Invalidated It Survives, 56 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 273,288 (1993). 
36 117 S. Ct. at 2162. 
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decision in Oregon v. Smith.36 It is, at least conceivably, within Congress's ability 
to remedy each of these shortcomings in the legislative record.37 
A second case is instructive, United States v. Lopez. This case raised the question 
whether Congress had acted within the scope of its power under the Commerce 
Clause.38 Congress had enacted a statute making it a federal offense to possess a 
gun in a school zone. T'ae question presented was, in shorthand, whether tlie JlC?sses-
sion of a gun in a school zone is an "activity ... that substantially affect[s] inter-
state commerce." There, the Court did not perceive the substantial effect and so 
looked for legislative fmdings in order that it might defer t.o Congress, but found 
them lacking.39 
This review of Boerne and Lopez yields two observations. First, where it is unclear 
whether Congress has acted within the scope of one of its enumerated powers, the 
Court will be d.eferential to Congress's judgment that it has acted within that power, 
but the extent of the deference will be greater-and perhaps determinatively so-
where Congress has made fmdings that indicate CongJ."ess is aware of the nature 
and limits of the enumerated power it is exercising and has drafted its legislaticn 
in recognition of and conformance to those limitS.40 Put another way, the courts will 
defer to Congress's interpretation of its own constitutional authority, such as under 
the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, when there is an 
interpretation to defer to. Second, where there is cnncern that Congress has actually 
exercised the power of another branch, the legislative history should specifically ad-
dress this concern and explain how Congress has sought to avoid stepping beyond 
the legislative sphere and has indulged interbranch comity with respect to the exec-
utive or judiciary, as the case may be. 
II. CONGRESS'S INDEPENDENT ROLE IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 
While Boerne demonstrates that the Court will extend broad deference to 
Congress's constitutional judgment, reflected in a well-developed legislative record, 
that it has drafted legislation that remains within the boundaries of enumerated 
congressional authority, Boerne also indicates that the Court will not defer to 
Congress's determination on the logically prior question: precisely where those 
boundaries are drawn. Nevertheless, there are important benefits t.o be derived from 
Congress expressing, including as the declared basis for legislation, its own constitu-
tional interpretation. First, where Congress adheres to a constitutional interpreta-
tion that is at odds with the Court's precedents and legislates on that basis, it gives 
the Court an opportunity to reconsider and overrule its precedents. Once again, 
Boerne is instructive. Each of the three dissenting justices urged the Court to use 
RFRA as an occasion to revisit and overrule its decision in Smith.41 A less dramatic 
consequence than overruling a precedent or line of precedents, Congress's adherence 
to its own constitutional interpretation may give the Court an opportunity to de-
velop its doctrine within the confmes of existing precedent or to consider constitu-
36 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Boerne Court began its analysis by observing that "Congress en-
acted RFRA in direct response to the Court·s decision in ... Smith."" 117 S. Ct. at 2160. The 
findings and purposes set forth in RFRA support the Court's view. These findings include state-
ments that may be taken to assert the meaning of religious liberty protected under the first 
amendment, criticize Smith, and articulate a different constitutional standard for assessing 
First Amendment claims than the Court had fashioned in Smith. See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a) & 
(b). The Court appears to have adopted this understanding of RFRA. 117 S. Ct. at 2161 ("Many 
[members of Congress] criticized the Court's reasoning thY} Smith]. and this disagreement re-
sulted in the passage of RFRA. "). 
37 I do not mean to say Congress can necessarily. or easily, satisfy the Court. The legislative 
record that Congress compiled to support enactment of RFRA included an understandable defi-
ciency; it did not recognize that Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was limited to remedial and preventive action. This deficiency is understandable because, 
until the Court decided Boerne, the Court had not articulated. that limitation. It is now possible 
for Co>ngress torevisit the question of how to remedy and prevent religious discrimination with 
these limitations in mind and to draft a bill suppor..ed by a legislative record that reflects 
Congre~s's constitutional judgm~nt that the measure wil~ remed~ ~d ~revent religious. discrimi-
nation m ways that are proportIonal to and congruent WIth the lilDltatlOns of Congress s author~ 
ity under Section 5. The Boerne opinion demonstrates that the Court will regard such the con-
stitutional judgment contained in such a legislative record with great deference. 
38 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
39 See 115 S. Ct. at 1632. But see id. at 1659-61 (Breyer. J., dissenting). 
40See PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adju-
dication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996) (reviewing the benefits 
of requiring legislative findings to determine whether Congress acted within its Commerce 
CJause power). 
41 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2185-86 (Souter. J., dissent-
ing) (expressing desire to reconsider Smith and articulating grave doubts about its its "preceden-
tial value and its entitlement to adherence"). 
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tional theories that had not previously been argued. Thus, when Congress exercises 
its independent constitutional judgment, it can actually support and promote 
Court's ability to perform its "duty ... to say what the law is"42 in a way that 
slavish adherence to precedent does not.43 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Professor Strossen. 
STATEMENT OF NADINE STROSSEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 
CIVll.. LffiERTIES UNION 
Ms. STROSSEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Hyde, Chair-
man Canady, Representative Scott, and other distinguished mem-
bers of the committee and distinguished members of the panel. It's 
really a pleasure, I have to say, to be here, as well as an honor. 
Chairman Canady introduced me as the president of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union. That is my volunteer position. I also 
want to state on the record tha" I earn my living as a law profes-
sor. I teach constitutional law. l,hairman Canady said to me when 
we spoke before these proceedings began that this would be like a 
seminar, and I have to agree; it certainly is an intellectual feast, 
to quote that notorious judicial activist, Antonin Scalia. [Laughter.] 
But, of course, there are also enormous consequences in terms of 
individual rights for these discussions that we're holding, and I'd 
like to zero in on that issue wearing my ACLU hat. It seems to 
me-and I'm delighted-that every person who has testified so far, 
including the Members of Congress as well as the academic ex-
perts, have agreed that Congress has not only the right, but also 
the responsibility to reach its own independent judgments as to the 
constitutionality of parti~ular measures. 
I'm so happy that there is agreement and, apparently, enthu-
siasm about pursuing that role more vigorously, because I have to 
agree with Congressman Frank, when he said that too often his 
colleagues are not sufficiently concerned about constitutional 
issues. Too often we're in the position of trying to persuade Mem-
bers of Congress to vote against something on the ground that it's 
unconstitutional, and we are told that that is not something that 
they feel it is appropriate for them to take into account. So, to the 
extent that there is a consensus that we should redouble our com-
mitment in all branches of Government to enforce the Constitution, 
I think that's wonderful. 
Now, where I see some possible breakdown in the unanimity goes 
to the second point I would like to address and that is what law 
professors and judges often call the one-way ratchet of interpreting 
constitutional rights or individual freedom independently of the 
courts. And the notion there is that, yes, Congress does have-and 
for that matter the executive branch of Government also has-inde-
pendent power and authority to interpret the Constitution regard-
ing individual rights, but only insofar as rights are more securely 
protected or there is a more expansive vision of individual liberty 
that results from that reinterpretation. 
42Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
43 I do not mean to endorse contumacious adherence to rejected interpretations. Such resist-
ance can siplificantly undermine the ability of the judiciary to fulfill its constitutional role. The 
possibility of such a course of action does not alone eliminate the benefits that m~ follow on 
a responsible adherence to a constitut.ional interpretation in conflict with Supreme Court prece-
dent. As is often the case, this is a question of balance. 
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Congress does not, under this theory, have the power to reject a 
Supreme Court decision that says, for example, a certain law vio-
lates the First Amendment, and go ahead and re-pass that law (al-
though obviously, the Congress has the power to pass a constitu-
tional amendment). One way that I like to summarize this for my 
constitutional law students is that the Supreme Court can put a 
floor under our constitutional rights, but it cannot impose a ceiling 
over them. 
Conversely, though, that vl-ould mean that Congress could not 
sink beneath that floor that the Supreme Court has articulated. I 
wasn't sure whether Con~essman Hostettler would agree with 
that one-way ratchet theory. I got a little uncomfortable when I 
heard him criticizing a decision of a Federal court that a certain 
law that had been passed by Congress violated the First Amend-
ment. I don't think it would be within Congress's prerogative to 
second guess such a judicial interpretation if it were from the Su-
preme Court, and the example that he referred to was not from the 
Supreme Court, so perhaps I have no need to be concerned on that 
score. 
The other possible breakdown in the unanimity here on this one-
way ratchet theory of expanding individual rights is, of course, the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Boerne case, and I was happy to 
hear my distinguished colleagues on this panel agree that that de-
cision is quite questionable. 
As Congressman Hyde knows, I had the pleasure of testifying in 
favor of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, both in the House 
and in the Senate. The ACLU spearheaded the coalition, called the 
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, that lobbied very 
strongly for RFRA and argued for it in the Supreme Court, and, 
coincidentally, even as we are meeting here this morning, that coa-
lition is still engaging in discussions about what's next, what steps 
can be taken, either by Congress or in other branches of Govern-
ment, to secure the expanded vision of religious liberty that RFRA 
embodies, and that the Supreme Court rejected. 
1\T ow, I do agree though with colleagues \\"ho have said that the 
RFRA decision, the Boerne decision, does still leave some openings, 
and I think that's important. I didn't hear the Supreme Court there 
to be completely rejecting this one-way ratchet of constitutional 
law. 
May I please beg the Chair's indulgence to continue? 
Mr. CANADY. Please continue. 
Ms. STROSSEN. I'll try to be very brief. So I agree that Congress 
has the power to expand constitutional rights. I am concerned, 
though, about a possible subtext when courts expansively interpret 
constitutional rights beyond what Members of Congress are willing 
to support, at least publicly. I'm going to give you an example. 
When the ACLU lobbied against the Communications Decency 
Act, we were told by a number of Members of Cangress that they 
understood that it was unconstitutional, or probably unconstitu-
tional, but they didn't want to risk the ire of their constituency by 
voting against something that could result in their being labeled 
soft on porn or soft on crime. And, when the Supreme Court agreed 
with us and struck down that law, essentially unanimously, in a 
case that I'm happy is called Reno v. ACLU, a number of Members 
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of Congress who had voted for the law told us they were relieved 
that the Supreme Court had voted as it did. 
I think it's very striking that the members of the Supreme Court, 
as well as the six lower court judges who ruled on the CDA were 
unanimous in finding it unconstitutional across a very broad ideo-
logical and political spectrum. These judges were appointed by five 
different presidents-three Republicans and two Democrats-and 
when this United States Supreme Court is unanimous that a law 
is constitutional, it is really unconstitutional. 
Having said that, it's quite shocking when you consider how 
very, very few Members of Congress voted against the CDA, and, 
of course, the Administration enthusiastically supported it. So, I'm 
very concerned that we have too many elected officials who are not, 
in fact, seriously upholding their oath to defend the Constitution. 
Then, to add insult to injury, they turn around and attack those 
members of the Federal judiciary who do have the political courage 
and who do take those oaths seriously, even in striking down very 
politically popular measures. 
I'm going to end by harking back to the underlying principles of 
separation of powers aJ.ld checks and balances. I wanted to under-
score one additionai function to those that were laid out by Profes-
sor Kinkopf. It's the one that I have foremost in mind, and if I had 
more time I would cite evidence that the founders had foremost in 
mind, and that is to maximize individual liberty. 
The Supreme Court reminded us of that essential function in the 
Mistretta case in 1989. The Court stressed that separation of pow-
ers is not an end in itself; rather, quote, "it is an essential means 
to the preservation of liberty." 
Thank you very much. 
[The prepared statement of Ms. Strossen follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NADINE STROSSEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAI~ CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION 
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee: 
I am Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union and Pro-
fessor of Law at New York Law School, where I teach constitutional law. 
I want to thank House Judiciary Committee Chair Henry Hyde as well as the 
Constitution Subcommittee Chair Charles Canady and Ranking Minority Member 
Bobby Scott for inviting me to testify on the vitally important-and perennially con-
troversial-subject of "Congress, the Court, and the Constitution." 
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU is a nation-wide, non-partisan organiza-
tion of more than 275,000 members devoted to protecting the principles of freedom 
set forth in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. 
I understand that these hearings have been called in response to charges by some 
members of Congress and by some citizens' groups that federal judges have engaged 
in inappropriate "activism" that, in their view, undermines democratic principles 
and the separation of powers. Proposed solutions to this alleged problem include 
calls for impeaching particular judges and amending the Constitution to constrain 
the power and independence of all federal judges through such means as imposing 
fIXed, limited judicial terms of office and allowing Congress to override judicial deci-
sions on constitutional issues. 
While I welcome the Committee's discussion of these important issues, I disagree 
both with the diagnosis of the alleged problem and with the vaunted solutions. Not 
only is there no disease of unwarranted judicial activism, but even if there were, 
the proposed cures would be worse than the disease. And, in so stating, I speak in 
both of my capacities,: as a scholar and teacher of constitutional law and as head 
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of the organization that has been hailed by supporters and critics alike as the most 
influential advocate of constitutional rights in our nation's courts. l 
. Critics denounce as inappropriate activism judges enforcement of constitutional 
nghts, especially when the consequence is to invalidate government measures that 
are supported by the majority of elected officials and the electorate, and especially 
when the most immediate beneficiaries are unpopular or controversial individuals 
or disempowered minority groups. But, far from deciding such judicial action as de-
viating from the judiciary's constitutionally designated role, as critics contend, I ap-
plaud it for faithfully fulfilling the Constitution's commands concerning individual 
rights and the judiciary's responsibility to protect them. 
Although all elected and appointed government officials take the same oath to de-
fend and uphold the Constitution, far too often, elected officials honor that pledge 
in the breach. When it would be politically unpopular to stand up for constitutional 
principles rather than follow the latest public opinion poll, too many politicians ig-
nore our nation's original "Contract with America," our Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. To add insult to injury, they then attack the federal judges who do have the 
political courage to abide by their oath to enforce constitutional limits on govern-
mental power and to uphold constitutional guarantees of individual liberty. 
Regardless of whether I agree or disagree with a particular judge's ruling in a 
specific case-and, certainly, my ACLU colleagues and I have criticized many court 
decisions over the years-I respect the independence of the judicial branch of our 
federal government, and the special role it holds in the carefully structured system 
of limited and divided governmental powers that our constitutional framers devised. 
The remedy for particular decisions with which one disagrees is to seek relief 
within the judicial system itself. A number of rulings that have provoked denuncia-
tions have in fact been overturned-to cite one recent example, Judge Thelton Hen-
derson's preliminary injunction against the implementation of California's anti-af-
firmative action voter initiative, Proposition 209.2 The ACLU led the constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 209, advancing strong arguments-consistent with Supreme 
Court precedents and constitutional principles-that it violated both the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, I 
disagreed with the ruling of the federal appellate court that rejected these argu-
ments and overturned Judge Henderson's order.3 However, in contrast to some Con-
gressional and other critics of Judge Henderson's ruling, neither I nor any of the 
ACLlYs broad-based coalition partners in the Proposition 209 case have called for 
the impeachment of the appellate judges who denied our claims. 
In addition to seeking to overturn particular rulings by appealing those rulings 
themselves, anyone who has a certain vision of constitutional rights-or of limits on 
those rights-can also seek to influence constitutional law through longer-term 
strategies aimed at remolding the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. The most famous example of this longer-range approach is the NAACP's care-
fully orchestrated series of cases that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education,4 
in which the Supreme Court unanimously overturned an earlier decision, Plessy v. 
Ferguson,5 and held that racially segregated public schools violate the Constitution's 
equality guarantee, repudiating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. 
More recently, we have witnessed a campaign using a similar strategy to advance 
a dLlferent constitutional vision: the efforts by "pro-life" forces to overturn Roe v. 
Wade,6 with its recognition of constitutional protection for women's reproductive 
freedom. While these efforts have not achieved the outright and complete reversal 
of Roe, they have resulted in a substantial cutting-back on the scope of the night 
that Roe had upheld, and a concomitant expansion in governmental power to re-
strict women's access to abortions.7 I certainly disagree with the Supreme Court's 
1 See, for example, the article by Ken Chowder in the current issue of the Smithsonian Maga-
zine (January, 1998), "The ACLU Defends Everybody" (p. 86). He writes, "No matter what you 
think of the ACLU, it is probably the most potent legal organization in America. . . . Its story 
is virtually a highlight reel of 20th-centu~ legal history. . . . [O]ur modem defmition of liberty 
has been greatly influenced by the ACLU." ld. at 88, 97. For a comparable assessment from 
an ardent critic of the ACLU-and of "judicial activism"-see Robert Bork, Slouching Towards 
Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline (1996) at 97 ("rr]he American Civil Lib-
erties Union ... has had, through litigation and lobbying, a very considerable effect upon 
American law and culture."); id. at 98 ("The ACLU is the premier litigating and lobbying arm 
of modem liberalism, and it has been extremely successful."). 
2 Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
3 Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 107 F. 3d 704, rehearing denied, 122 F. 3d 692 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997). 
"349 U.s. 294 (1954). 
5163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
?See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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post-Roe decisions that have curtailed women's reproductive rights. Again, though. 
my belief that specific judges or courts are mistaken in particular rulings does not 
undermine either my support for the independent federal judiciary as an institution, 
or for the judicial review power, as essential pillars in our conatitutional structure. 
The evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in abortion cases, in the past 
quarter-century since Roe, illustrates another important avenue of redress for those 
who disagree with particular rulings, which - in contrast with radical proposals to 
impeach judges or curtail their constitutional powers-is wholly consistent with the 
Constitution. Specifically, the Constitution affords the President and the Senate an 
?pportunity to influence the composition of the federal courts by confIrming or reflls-
mg to confirm individuals based on their character, qualifications, and the judicial 
philosophies they espouse. 
In this respect, as in so many others, I celebrate the genius of our Constitution. 
which struck a delicate balance between-on the one hand-making federal judges 
too beholden to majoritarian pressures, and thus not sufficiently protective of indi-
vidual and minority group nghts, and-on the other hand-shielding judges too 
much from majoritarian concerns, hence making them insufficiently accountable to 
democratic processes. Avoiding both of these extremes, our Constitution affords fed-
eral judges some independence from majoritarian forces by guaranteeing them ten-
ure "during good behavior," subject to removal only through the extraordinary proc-
ess of impeachment; but the Constitution also imposes some degree of democratic 
accountaoility on federal judges by requiring them to be nominated by the President 
and confirmed by two-thims of the Senate. 
In recent history, the nomination and conimnation process concerning federal 
judges has received much political, media, and judicial appointments. Indeed, many 
scholars and jurists have charged that this process has become too politicized, tilting 
our Constitution's delicate balance too far away from judicial independence and too 
far toward popular accountability. Putting aside the merits of those charges. it suf-
fices for the present discussion to note that critics of Roe and other "activist" rulings 
have had an enormoul:i influence in remaking the iederal courts, from the Supreme 
Court on down, by electing Presidents who would nominate, and Senators who 
would confmn, judges who shared their constitutional and judicial philosophy. 
In short, critics of judicial "activism" have already had a significant influence on 
the composition and philosophy of our federal courts, by acting through existing con-
stitutional and legal channels. Therefore, I cannot understand either why they con-
tinue to complain of activism or why they still seek to alter our established constitu-
tienal and legal processes. 
The recently stepped-up attack on the perennial bogeymen of many (but, signifi-
cantly, far from all 8) political conservatives, "activist" federal jud~es, is as ironically 
ill-timed as it is dangerously destructive of fundamental constitutIonal values. While 
the courts' critics decry ''tyranny of the judiciary," the alternative they advocate is 
the far more dangerous ''tyranny of the majority." 
The irony of the timing is that this attack comes while our federal courts continue 
to be dominated by jud3!~nappointed during the twelve years of appointments by 
the Reagan and Bush A . istrations. Both Administrations systematically selected 
judges who as a group have a relatively narrow view of judicially enforceable con-
stitutional rights. To compound the irony, as Attorney General, Ed Meese played an 
instrumental role in this selection process; yet he is now railing against the federal 
bench that still bears his stamp. 
Nor has that stamp been significantly muted by President Clinton's subsequent 
judicial app()intments. He has moved slowly and cautiously in filling federal Judicial 
vacancies. He has avoided nominating individuals who would be ideological counter-
weights to the many extreme exponents of "judicial restraint" who had been ap-
pointed during the preceding dozen years. Moreover, as was recently noted by no 
less staunch a conservative than Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Senate has been slow 
to act on the judicial candidates that President Clinton has nominated.9 
B Many prominent conservatives have expressed grave concerns about the campaign against 
"judicial activism," voicing many of the same misgivings set out in this testimony, including that 
this campaign threatens the independence of tile judiciary and the security of constitutional 
guarantees of individual liberty. See, e.g., Statement of Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow and Director, 
Center for Constitutional Studies. Cato Institute, before tne Subcommittee on Courts and Intel-
lectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. May 15, 
1997; Bruce Fein (Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Reagan Administration), Judge 
Not, N.Y, TIMES, M@!{ 8, 1997 at A31. 
'See Bruce Fein, The Chief Justice vs. H(Jt~h, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998. at 
A12 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as stating: "The Senate confirmed only 17 judges in 11196 
and 36 in 1997, well under the 101 judges it confirmed during 1994 .... The Senate is surely 
Continued 
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The ideological tilt of the U.S. Supreme Court typifies the cast of all our federal 
courts. On the one hand, the current Chief Justice and two of his brethren-Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas-are among the most conservative jurists to sit on the 
Court in recent history, voting to overturn many core tenets of post-New Deal juris-
prudence. Io In contrast, the present Supreme Court includes not a single member 
who espouses the energetic enforcement of constitutional rights that was its hall-
mark during the Warren Court era. 
During the Warren Court era, the battle cry against "judicial activism" was at 
least understandable, insofar as it responded to that Court's active protection of in-
dividual liberties and civil rights. Now, more than a generation and two conserv-
ative Chief Justices later, the Court has stepped back from that role. It has signifi-
cantly reduced both the substantive scope of rights it deems constitutionally pro-
tected and the remedies it affords to victims of rights violations. 
Nowhere is this rollback more severe than in the criminal justice arena. The 
Court has overturned many longstanding precedents to curb constitutional rights of 
suspected criminals. Moreover, it has cut off numerous avenues for asserting even 
those truncated rights that it continues to recognize in theory. For example. the 
Court (together with Congress) has hamstrung the hallowed remedy of habeas cor-
pus, or federal court review of state convictions' which Alexander Hamilton hailed 
as "the greatest liberty of all" -so severely that, for all practical purposes, it is un-
available to many prisoners, even if they are on Death Row, their constitutional 
rights were violated, and they have evidence that they did not commit the crimes 
for which they face execution. 
In the area of racial justice-another area where the Warren Court vigorously 
protected constitutional rights-the subsequent cutbacks parallel the pattern in the 
criminal justice area. In a series of decisions over the last several years, the Su-
preme Court has consistentlY prevented lower federal courts and other government 
officials from implementing meaningful remedies for school segregation, discrimina-
tion in voting, and discrimination in government contracting. Of particul.ar note, the 
Court has dramatically restricted the availability of race-conscious aiTmnative ac-
tion remedies. The repeated attacks on federal courts for upholding racial "quotas," 
therefore, illustrates the misguided nature of the current assault on the judiciary. 
In short, the current Supreme Court and other federal courts already exercise the 
very judicial restraint concerning constitutional rights claims for which their critics 
clamor. Apparently, though, these critics are not content for their views to prevail 
on most courts and in most cases. Nor are they satisfied with a series of recent con-
gressional measures that already sharply limits the power of federal courts to hear 
important categories of cases involving basic rights on behalf of relatively unpopu-
lar, powerless groups, including poor people, prisoners, and immigrants-the very 
kind of claims and clients fur which the Constitution and its independent federal 
judiciary are designed to serve as the ultimate protector. 
Nonetheless, these critics call for even more extreme "court-stripping" measures, 
including the elimination of the lifetime tenure that the Constitution guarantees to 
federal judges, and the power of judicial review that has been enshrined since Chief 
Justice John Marshall's historic ruling in Marbury v. Madison.ll They thus endan-
ger the federal judiciary's constitutionally mandated independence from the elected 
branches of government, and prevent it from fulfuling its designated role in the 
Constitution's scheme of checks and balances: to curb overreaching and abuses by 
the other branches of the federal government and by state governments, and to pro-
tect even the politically powerless individuals and minority groups whose rights are 
the least likely to be secured by the political branches of government. 
Our founders wisely structured a government that was not a pure democracy. Al-
though most government policies are detelmined by elected representatives who are 
responsive to the majority will, our Constitution's framers recognized that there are 
some rights that are so fundamental that no majority-no matter how large-could 
deny them to any minority, no matter how small or unpopular. In orner to prevent 
what James Madison termed "tyranny of the majority," the Constitution provided 
for federal courts whose members were insulated from majoritarian pressures 
through lifetime tenure, subject to removal only by impeachment. 
under no obligation to confinn any particular nominee. but after the necessary time for inquiry 
it should vote him up or vote him down. In the latter case, the President can then send up an-
other nominee."); id. (quoting the Chief Justice as stating that "Vacancies Ion our nation's fed· 
eral court benches] cannot remain at such high levels without eroding the quality of justice"). 
IOSee generally Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 427 (1997). 
115 U.S, (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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Modem history provides many examples of federal court jud.ges withstanding pop-
ular pressure to stand up for the rights of embattled racial~ religious, political, and 
other minorities. With twenty-twenty hindsight, the contemporary consensus now 
recognizes recurrent past instances in which the elected branches of government 
~cted in an unconstitutional and unjust manner. Correspondingly, while the federal 
Judges who resisted those political tides were at the time harshly denounced and 
threatened with impeachment or even physical harm, they are now widely re-
spected, even by current critics of judicial autonomy. 
A prime illustr.9f:;on ;9 the ''massive resistance" that Southern officials mounted 
to Brown v. Board olEducatioT! 12 and other Warren Court rulings outlawing racial 
segregation, aqd to the remedial orders issued by such "activist" Southern federal 
judges as Elbert Tuttle, John Minor Wisdom and Frank Johnson. \Vhere would we 
now be, in our national struggle for racial Justice, were it not for the leadership 
of these courageous federal judges, who actually honored the oath that all govern-
ment officials take to uphold the Constitution? As their inspiring example under-
scores, the fact that federal judges are unelected and life-tenured is not a problem-
as current critics contend-but rather a solution ~o some of our nation's most intrac-
table problems, such as racial discrimination. 
The special responsibility of federal judges to enforce constitutional rights even-
indeed, especially-when they are unpopular with elected officials and the majority 
of theit' constituents was most eloquently explained by former Supreme Court Jus-
tice Robert Jackson, who could hardly be accused of being a "judicial activist." Nev-
ertheless, in 1943, he and seven of his fellow Justices struck down a very popular 
measure that had been adopted throughout the country in response to World-War-
II-heightened nationalistic fervor: mandatory flag salutes in the public schools. In 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court recognized that the Con-
stitution protects even such a tiny, unpopular minority as J'ehovah's Witnesses 
schoolchildren from having to participate in even such a deeply revered ritual. 
While the Jehovah's Witnesses objected to the flag salute specifically because it 
violated their religious beliefs, Justice Jackson explained why all constitutional 
rights deserve protection from majoritarian pressures, and hence illustrated the 
uniquely important role of federal courts in general: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to \vithdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal principlES to be applied by the 
courts. One's night to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.13 
While we now recognize Barnette and Brown as landmarks of liberty, at the time 
they were decided, they and the judges who issued them were denounced in pre-
cisely the same terms that critics are now using to attack more recent judicial rul-
ings upholding other human rights claims. Perhaps, in due course, these more re-
cent rulings will also be vindicated in the court of public opinion. 
In any event, the fact that federal judges overturn initiatives supported by the 
majority of citizens or politicians does not cast any doubt on the legitimacy of the 
federal courts. To the contrary, it vindicates the special, essential function of these 
courts as a check against abuses of power by elected officials and intolerant majori-
ties. The independence of the federal courts must be preserved not despite their 
power to overturn majoritarian decisions, hut rather p~cisely because of that 
power. 14 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Professor Franck. 
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW J. FRANCK, CHAIRMAN AND ASSO-
CIATE PROFESSf)R OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, RADFORD UNI .. 
VERSITY 
Mr. FRANCK, Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the sub-
committee. Thank you for inviting me to come here today to discuss 
12349 U,S, 294 (1954), 
23319 U.S. 624, 638 (19<J.3). 
t4 A Bio yhical Statement is attached. Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(4), I affirm 
that nei r nor the Amf,rican Civil Liberties Union receives any federal funds-as a matter 
or organizational policy. 
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the roles of Congress and the Court in interpreting the Constitu-
tion. 
If I may, I think I could correct one mis-statement by Professor 
Strossen. I think it was that even more notorious judicial activist, 
Judge Robert Bork, who referred to his love of intellectual feasts. 
Ms. STROSSEN. I'm sorry; you're right. How could I get them 
mixed up? [Laughter.] 
Mr. FRANCK. Well, for a while there Judge Scalia had a beard. 
On June 25, 26, and 27 of last year, the Supreme Court held 
three acts of Congress in 3 days to be unconstitutional. I don't 
know when was the last time the Court was quite that busy. I do 
know that there are good arguments to be made about all three 
cases, that the Court got them wrong. I'd like to focus, however, on 
one of those three cases, the one that's come under the most scru-
tiny this morning, the City of Boerne v. Flores, because it involved 
the most explicit confrontation between Congress and the Court. 
The Boerne ruling overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act passed in 1993 as an attempt to legislate a reversal of the 1990 
Smith decision of the Court on the meaning of the free exercise of 
religion clause in the First Amendment. 
RFRA, for short, failed, I argue, because it was not a thorough-
going challenge to the regime of judicial supremacy, and, thus, cit-
ing the very notion that the Court is the final authority on the 
meaning of the Constitution, the Justices struck down the act. The 
act, I argue, assumed three things that are at best questionable, 
and at worst, simply mistaken. 
First, it was assumed by RFRA that the Court is properly the en-
forcer of the First Amendment, a view we cannot find espoused by 
the father of the Bill of Rights, James Madison. Second, the act as-
sumed the propriety of the First Amendment's application to the 
actions of State and local governments, a legal fiction of the 20th 
Century based on a misreading of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fi-
nally, RFRA attempted to resurrect the view that the free exercise 
of religion requires Government to make exemptions on religious 
grounds to otherwise valid general laws, a doctrine barely 35 years 
old, which was itself a breach with the original view of this matter. 
Only on this last point did the Court disagree with Congress. The 
Court in Boerne refused to take instruction from Congress on that 
last point but it got away with it-the Court did, that is-because 
the fist two assumptions mentioned gave it a firm ground to stand 
on. 
I would just very briefly suggest some different approaches for 
the Congress in asserting its own vital role in interpreting the Con-
stitution. First, and this actually falls within the Senate's purview, 
nominees to the Federal bench should be challenged to acknowl-
edge, and to state plainly their understanding of, the difference be .. 
tween judicial review and judicial supremacy. 
Second, Congress should take a serious new look at the rules of 
civil procedure and the way they currently facilitate dubious con-
stitutional rulings, thanks to excessively loose standards on stand-
ing to sue, declaratory judgments, class actions, and remedial de-
crees1 for instance. 
Third1 the Con~ess's power to make exceptions to Federal· Court jurisdiction should be considered a potent weapon for reversing ju-
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dicial error. For instance, a great restoration of federalism could be 
effected if Congress were to rule out-of-bounds certain kinds of 
challenges made to state law under the Bill of Rights. 
Fourth, it should not be forgotten that the Framers regarded the 
congressional impeachment power as a significant potential re-
straint on judicial usurpation of power. Impeachment is not a 
criminal proceeding, but a political one, and may be used to redress 
"injuries to the society itself," in the words of Alexander Hamilton. 
The Constitution we have, without any need of amendments at-
tacking the Court's independence, provides Congress with all the 
tools it requires to begin the rescue of the Constitution from the 
Supreme Court. The Congress must take its own role under the 
Constitution seriously before it can induce the Court to do likewise. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of !VIr. Franck follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MA'ITHEW J. FRANCK, CliAlRMAN AND AsSOCIATE 
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ScIENCE, RADFORD UNIVERSITY 
When Congress made its most recent attempt to influence the Supreme Court. the 
result was an unmitigated failure. I refer to the fate of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (RFRA), overturned on June 25 of last year in the case of City 
of Boerne v. Flores. In response to a perceived threat to the free exercise of religion 
in the Court's 1990 Smith decision,l Congress in RFRA sought, through the use of 
its power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, to overturn that rul-
ing and restore, as against every agency of government in the land, the "compelling 
interest" test for judging the validity of incidental burdens on free exercise resulting 
from generally applicable laws. RFRA had overwhelming support from all points on 
the political spectrum, and passed in the Congress nearly unanimously. But to vet.· 
eran Court-watchers, the Boerne decision was entirely predictable, inasmuch as the 
justices of the Court do not take kindly to legislative instruction in how to decide 
constitutional cases. 
But the Act's failure went far deeper: it was in fact not a serious enough challenge 
to the Court's authority, for it conceded too much to the current regime of judicial 
supremacy. The following are the multiple ironies of the clash between Congress 
and the Court that culminated in Boerne. 
1. Congress assumed that the Court is properly the enforcer of the First Amendment. 
This is by now a very old error, and one so venerable that to speak. in correction 
of it is to raise questions about one's sanity in most circles. So deep runs the popu-
lar myth that the Supreme Court is properly the final authority in enforcing vir-
tually every provision of the Constitution that a digression is necessary here into 
the more general question of judicial review. As Professor Robert Clinton has shown, 
the judicial power to invalidate the actions of other branches of the national govern-
ment was widely understood at the founding to be "departmental" or "coordinate"-
a power he calls ufunctional review" enabling the judiciary to pronounce authori-
tatively on the constitutionality of laws touching on the integrity of the courts' own 
functions, for instance where a case concerns jurisdictional issues, standards of evi-
dence, or the provision of simple due process. This limited version of judicial review 
was all that was either exercised or claimed for the Court by John Marshall in the 
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.2 On the other hand, the legislative and executive 
branches have a like authority to have the "last word" on those constitutional ques-
tions bearing on the exercise of their own powers, arising from the provisions of the 
Constitution addressed to themselves. Thus, that same John Marshall, for instance, 
held that the reach of Congress's power over commerce among the states was to be 
controlled authoritatively not by the judiciary, but by the people through democratic 
lE,,!ployment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. u. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
21 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). See Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial 
Review (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989), passim. See also Charles F. Hobson, The Great 
Chief Justice: John lfarshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 47-
71; Matthew J. Franck, AIlainst the Im~rial Judiciary: The Supreme Court us. the Sovereignty 
of the People (Lawrence: Oniv. Press of Kansas, 1996), 65-105; and James Burnham, Congress 
and the American Tradition (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1959, 1996), 129-36. 
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processes: such are "the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in 
all representative governments." 3 
Now obviously, the terms of the First Amendment address themselves to the Con-
~ss and not to the judiciary, and in no way would an infringement of one of the 
nghts therein have an adverse effect on the proper functioning of judicial processes. 
~o~~ver, if the First Amendment had been expected to be the subject of routine 
J~dlClal enforcement, we would expect the subject to have come up frequently in the 
Frrst Congress that debated and drafted the Bill of Rights. Yet, in his brilliant ac-
count of how the Bill of Rights came to be added to the Constitution, Professor Rob-
ert Goldwin manages to tell the whole story in complete detail without ever once 
mentioning that the subject of judicial enforcement of the Bill arose at all. The point 
of the Bill of Rights was not to trigger judicial review, but to weave a love of liberty 
into the American political culture. Here "is how it works," Goldwin tells us in his 
recent book: 
[T]o the extent that these principles of free government [in the Bill of Rights) 
have become a part of our "national sentiment," they do, indeed, often enable 
us, the majority, to restrain ourselves, the majority, from oppressive actions. 
That is the import of the Ill'St five words of the Bill of Rights: "Congress shall 
make no law" that attempts to accomplish certain prohibited things. It means 
that even if a majority in Congress, representing a majority of us, the people, 
wants to make a law that the Constitution forbids it to make, we, all of us, su-
perior to any majority, say it must not be done, because the Constitution is the 
will of all of us, not just a majority of us.4 
So as not to be misunderstood, I should add that certain provisions in the Bill of 
Rights do address themselves to the courts, and so are fit subjects for judicial re-
view~bviously amendments five through seven, arguably four through eight-but 
the First Amendment is not one of them. It is only in this century, with the expan-
sion of judicial authority in every direction, that we have come to think otherwise. 
And RFRA played right into that modem myth, insisting that a clause of the First 
Amendment be enforced by courts in a certain way when, at the very least, clear 
doubt exists that it was meant to be judicially enforced at all. 
2. Congress assumed the validity of the c1incorporation" doctrine. 
Whatever uncertainty there might be about whether the First Amendment is 
gathered into the scope of judicial review, there is none whatever about the propo-
sition that, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, it was intended to restrain only 
the national government and not the states or their subdivisions. And, among schol-
ars who do not hold a prior commitment to judicial activism, a second th~position 
is virtually settled as well: that the Fourteenth Amendment changed no . g about 
that fact. 5 
Of course, on the Court the debate has gone all the other way, so that Justices 
Scalia and Thomas no less than their more liberal brethren act unquestioningly on 
the basis of twentieth-century precedents that declared that much of the Bill of 
Rights is selectively "absorbed" or "incorporated" into the terms of the due process 
clause of the Four'"l.eenth Amendment. But these precedents are worse than doubtful: 
they represent a plain usurpation of power by the Court, and they ought not to be 
respected, on or off the Court, by anyone who regards the Constitution as superior 
to "constitutional law." 
Yet the Congress, in passing RFRA, paid its respects to this judicial usurpation. 
The Act prescribed a judicial test of constitutionality to be applied to the laws and 
policies of all levels of government, including acts of Congress,6 but clearly the legis-
lation was motivated chiefly by fears for religious liberty's fate at the state and local 
level. Thus the Senate report on the Act cited, as part of the authority for its pas-
sage, the "incorporation" precedent of Cantwell v. Connecticut, a 1940 case in which 
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton (22 U.S.) 1 (1824), at 197 . 
.. Robert A. Goldwin, From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights 
to Save the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997), 100. See also Franck, Against the 
Imperial JudiCiary, 83-87. 
f) See Richard G. Stevens, "Due Process of Law," in Stevens, The American Constitution and 
Its Provenance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 12~2; Raoul Berger, Government 
~y Judiciary: The Transformation. of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1997), 155-89; and Berger, 'l'he Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: 
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1989). 
6 Hew the Court could have applied RFRA to nullify any subsequent act of Congress is a mys-
tery, since any such contradictory act would naturally be considered an implicit repeal of 
kFRA's tenns, at least in part. 
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~he free exercise clause of the First Amendment was applied to the actions of states 
ill a casual four sentences carrying no historical analysis whatsoever. 7 
Whatever one's worries about the fate of religious liberty after the Smith case-
and Archbishop Flores of San Antonio was hardly being ground beneath the heel 
of oppression-whatever one's politics in these matters, the proper position of a con-
stitutional consel'Vative is to wonder what on earth the Supreme Court is doing en-
fO':Cing the terms of the First Amendment against state and local governments. 
WIsely or unwisely-and I think the former-the framers of the Bill of Rights and 
tht:: framers of the Fourteenth Amendment left the subject of religious liberty in re-
latIon to state and local policy to be sorted out by state constitutions, state legisla-
tures, and state courts. How members of Congress ostensibly committed to federal-
ism could overlook this is a source of some wonder. Why Congress does not wish 
to restore that federalism from the ashes in which the Court has left it is cause for 
amazement. 
3. Congress assumed the soundness of the "compelling interest" test. 
Even if we assume both that the Supreme Court is the proper enforcer of the First 
Amendment and that it may act against the states under that banner, there re-
mains the fact that the Smith ruling was no innovation, but a return to a previous 
generation of decisions under the free exercise clause. The "compelling interest" test, 
having originated in other areas of constitutional law, was carried over to the adju-
dication of free exercise cases only as recently as 1963 (in Sherbert v. Verner), with 
its full import being discernible only in 1972 (in lVisconsin v . Yoder). 8 The effect of 
the test is to carve out exemptions to generally applicable laws, otherwise held 
valid, for those with religious scruples about obeying them. From the date of the 
very first religion case under the First Amendment until 1963, it was not thought 
that such exemptions are affirmatively required of government by the provision 
against "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. As Chief Justice Morrison Waite 
put it in 1879, "UJaws are made for the government of actions, and while they can-
not interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." To 
hold otherwise, he continued, "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious 
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become 
a law unto himself."9 Precisely so did the Court begin to hold in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
In the 1990 Smith case, the Court did not overrule the 
Sherbert and Yoder precedents, but distinguished them away so that they would 
have practically no value for the guidance of future decisions. In RFRA, Congress 
explicitly identified Sherbert and Yoder as the precedents it wished the Court to fol-
low instead of Smith. Much disagreement persists on and off the Court about just 
how the free exercise clause ought to be applied. But I would offer one fairly mild 
judgment about this matter: that Sherbert and Yoder are the progeny of judicial ac-
tivism, and Smith a return to judicial restraint. One may like Sherbert and Yoder 
and dislike Smith, but it seems clear that if that is one's preference, one is (here 
at least) on the side of judicial activism. 
Thus the Religious Freedom Restoration Act presented the ironic spectacle of the 
Congress complaining that the Supreme Court was not being activist enough in its 
interpretation of the Constitution. "Stop us all before we legislate again!" was the 
rallying cry of the Act's partisans as it swept virtually unhindered through both 
houses of Congress. In the fmal irony, the Court in the Boerne case rebuffed the 
demand, standing on its dignity and defending its newfound judicial !estraint re-
specting the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. 
In a way, Boerne presented a case in which judicial activism was at war with 
itself. Congress, as I have said, demanded of the Court more activism than the 
Court was prepared to provide. But the Court could only refuse the demand by turn· 
ing to its own well-worn precepts of j:'ldicial supremacy in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. Mistakenly citing Marbury v. Madison for support of judicial authority 
to have the last word,lo Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court concluded that Con-
gress overreached with its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment: 
7 Senate Report 103-111, at 14 n. 40. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), at 
303. 
8Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), at 166, 167. Justice Scalia partially quoted 
these words in Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. See also Walter Berns, The First Amendment and the 
Future of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1976; reprint, Chicago: Regnery Gate-
way, 1985), 35-55. 
10800 City of Boerne v. Flores,_U.S. __ ( 1997), slip op. at 6 (Kennedy, J. t for the Court). 
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Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said 
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the 
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. 11 
What everyone (except perhaps Justice Kennedy himself) must surely notice is that 
he is, in effect, saying that only the Supreme Court enforces constitutional rights 
by chan:ging what they are (and sometimes by making them up out of whole cloth), 
and that it will not tolerate the Congress interfering as it goes about its bl!Smess, 
The Boerne case, in the end, presents the friend of the Constitution's original 
meaning .md of judicial restraint with one of those rare instances when he does not 
know which side to choose, and must instead say "a pox on both your houses." On 
the one hand, the Court continued on its accustomed course of asserting its supreme 
position in the decision of all questions of constitutional politics, even where a 
clause of the Constitution (§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) arguably gives Con-
gress a legitimate role to play in such questions. On the other hand, Congress, rath-
er than truly challenge judicial supremacy, had written legislation that embraced 
it: accepting the Court's role as tmal enforcer of the First Amendment, accepting the 
application of that amendment to the states, and importunately demanding that the 
Court return to its activist habits in the interpretation of the free exercise clause. 
Little wonder that the Court had the better of the confrontation. 
The ''judicial usurpation of politics," as First Things magazine referred to our 
present straits a little over a year ago, remains the most pressing problem confront-
ing the American experiment in republicanism. If RFRA is a failed model for con-
gressional challenges to that usu..~ation, what is to be done instead? 
1. Challenge judicial supremacy directly. 
Over eleven years ago, then-Attorney General Meese got a lot of attention for say-
ing, in an address at Tulane University, that "the Constitution cannot be reduced 
to constitutional law," and that in its notorious dicta in Cooper v. Aaron in 1958,12 
the SUJ?reme Court had misread both the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison in 
describmg its own authority to determine the content of the supreme law of the 
land. 13 He was much excoriated on ap-ed pages and by many legal scholars, but he 
was abso1utely right. 
It is time to translate words into action, to move from rhetoric to a more concrete 
approach. If we are serious about the proposition that all the branches of the na-
tional government share a coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution, with 
none of them commanding the obedience of the others as to every sort of constitu-
tional question, then it is past time the Congress began to assert its co-equal au-
thority in practical ways. This reassertion of congressional responsibility can begin 
with the breaking of some comfortable habits. 
First, during Senate confmnation hearings on nominations to the federal bench 
at all levels, senators should cease requiring nominees to declare their allegiance 
to the "Marbury myth" that the Supreme Court has the last word on constitutional 
questions. The Senate should instead demand just the opposite-a clear statement 
from every nominee that he or she recognizes the difference between judicial review 
(properly understood) and judicial supremacy. Other matters of what is infelicitously 
called "judicial philosophy" should also be central to confumation hearings, but this 
is a good place to start. 
Secondly, the Congress should stop bowing in the direction of the Court's pre-
sumed imal authority when it legislates, and should instead consider repealing, or 
at least exempting some legislation from, the standard mechanisms by w:6ich it cur-
rently does so-such as the remedial-power and class-action provisions of the 1938 
Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended in 1966). 
Consider the recent fate of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996. No 
one was ever prosecuted under the Act's ~rovisions. Instead, under federal rules of 
procedure that are within the ~wer of Congress to change, politically interested 
parties led by the ACLU brought suit against the government, secured a hearing 
before a three-judge panel of a district court as required by the CDA itself, and won 
a preliminary injunction from that panel against the governmenes enforcement of 
the law's indecency provisions 'nst anyone whatsoetter. Then, under a "special re-
view provision" of tlie CDA itse a rapid appeal was taken directly to the Supreme 
Court. The resulting aifll"Il18Dce of the district court's injunction means that a writ 
that cannot be gainsaid runs against every U.S. attorney barring enforcement of the 
11 Ibid. at 9. 
12 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
13 The speech was later printed as Edwin Meese III, MlJ'he Law of the Constitution," Tulane 
Law Reuiew 61 (1987): 97g..;..OO. 
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Act, presumably on pain of contempt proceedings if any federal prosecutor seeks to 
enforce it anywhere. Major provisions of the CDA were thus rendered a dead letter 
before they ever really lived. 14 
This method of broadly striking down laws by injunction short-circuits the kind 
of response to judicial error that Lincoln exemplified. In criticizing the Dred Scott 
ruling, Lincoln insisted that the Missouri Compromise was not to be considered un-
constitutional just because the Court had held it so in one case concerning individ-
ual parties. The statute had already been repealed three years earlier by thE:; KaP-
sas-Nebraska Act of 1854-but if the other branches of the government did not 
agree with the Dred Scott ruling, the law could, in Lincoln's view, be revived by the 
Congress and enforced by the executive. (This is exactly what happened in 1862, 
w hen Congress forbade slavery in all federal territories.) And had the :Missouri 
Compromise not already been repealed, it is more than likely that Lincoln would 
have argued for its continued enforcement after Dred Scott, bolstered by supple-
mentary legislation if need be. It would have been a different matter for Lincoln and 
for the fate of self-government if an injunction extending to the whole of the govern-
ment had accompanied the Court's pronouncement on the law's constitutionality. 
It must be said that the CDA was designed to be struck down; it was passed with 
an engraved invitation to the courts to do so. Had Congress, in passing the CDA. 
been confident of its own position as a true equal of the Court in interpreting the 
Constitution, it not only would have refrained from the timidity of the special re-
view provisions in the Act. It would have included instead a provision shielding the 
Act from the injunctive procedure by which the courts declared it unconstitutional. 
Then we would have seen some criminal trials under the Act's provisinns, and if on 
appeal of any convictions the Supreme Court had held the Act unconstitutional, it 
would still be open to Congress to legislate support for the Act's continued enforce-
ment against others, and for the executive to prosecute under it. What would hap-
pen next could get very interesting indeed. 
The fate of the CDA should, more generally, prompt rethinking of some of the pro-
cedural aspects of modem-day judicial power. As Professor Gary McDowell pointed 
out ten years ago, it is within the power of Congress to undo some of the damage 
that has been done to the traditional "case or controversy" requirement of A...rticle 
III by the loosening of standards in the judicial process concerning standing to sue, 
class actions, intervention, consent decrees, declaratory judgments, and the merging 
of actions in law and equity.15 By traditional procedural criteria, the lawsuit that 
resulted in the invalidation of the CDA's indecency provisions would never have got-
ten off the ground. 
2. Start defending the states instead of undermining them. 
In recent cases such as U.S. v. Lopez and Printz v. U.S.,IG some see a trend to-
ward the defense of federalism on the Supreme Court. One may see this trend at 
work in the Boerne case as well; certainly RFRA, whatever one thinks of its solici-
tude toward religious liberty, was an assault on the authority of states and local-
ities. I7 Even if we do not agree with all of these decisions-and I do not-we can 
be happy with the results in them if we care for local self-government. But the ques-
tion remains: why must the Court rather than the Congress be the states' defender? 
The Court is a fickle defEmder in any event, as recent cases on abortion, gay rights, 
and single-sex public higher education clearly show. 
And has the Congress mended its ways since the Republicans became the majority 
party? It doesn't seem so. Last October the House passed H.R. 1534, the "Private 
Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997," which would permit property owners 
to hurry straight into federal court with claims that a local or state regulation has 
resulted in a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. Senator Hatch introduced simi-
lar legislation in the Senate (S. 1256, the "Citizens Access to Justice Act of 1997"). 
These bills are merely RFRA all over again, albeit on a smaller scale-and as the 
least of their sins, would merely add to the workload of our strained federal courts, 
a problem recently noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. I8 Such efforts should be aban-
doned by members of Congress who value the Constitution and reject the "incorpo-
ration" doctrine. It is not really a matter of having to make a hard choice between 
14 See Reno v. ACLU_U.S._(decided June 26, 1997). 
15Gary L. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 168-96. 
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, __ U.S. __ (decided 
June 27, 1997). 
17See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Constitutional Revolution." Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1997, 
A14. 
18800 William H. Rehnquist, "The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary." 1 January 
1998, section I.A. 
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federalism and property rights; in this case the Constitution has already chosen for 
us. 
Instead of such measures that add to their miseries, the Congress should take 
steps to shield state and local governments from the depredations of the Court. 
Where the danger comes from judicial interpretation of federal statutes, Congress 
can (and sometimes does) easily forestall the danger by including language about 
non-preemption of state laws, or declaratory clauses on the rules by which a statuf:e 
is to be construed. But the greatest blows to federalism in this century have come 
from the Supreme Court working quite on its own with no other weapon than what 
it purports to be the Constitution. To beg'.n to reverse that damage, more imagina-
tive approaches are needed. One scholar, for instance, has recently suggested that 
the enforcement power given to Congress in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
can be turned to good use here, to limit rather than expand the reach of judicial 
power over the states.19 
The Fourteenth Amendment is certainly the major "culprit" if we are concerned 
about reining in the Court. By "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, and by creating 
under the doctrine of "substantive due process" rights which are contained nowhere 
in the Constitution at all, the Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to nation-
alize some of the most important policy questions that the Constitution properly 
leaves to the states. 
A broad approach to this problem would be for Congress to avail itself of its sel-
dom-used power under Article III to regulate and make exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction-as well as its complete authority over the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts. It would take careful draftsmanship to close all the loopholes to judicial 
creativity, but Congress ought to take up legislation declaring all questions regard-
ing the application of the Bill of Rights to states and local governments off'limits 
for the federal courts at every level. Where the "extra-constitutional" rights cur-
rently packed into the due process clause are concerned-such as the "right of pri-
vacy" at the heart of the abortion decisions-even more care would need to be take&. 
in drafting appropriate jurisdictional legislation. For how does one describe a pro-
tean legal fiction with sufficient precision so as to exorcise it from the law of the 
land? The problem is rather like legislating that the courts shall no longer hear 
cases concerning dragons only to learn that they are hearing caSf:S concerning uni-
corns instead. But I am convinced it is worth the effort. 
For some, the option of "jurisdiction-stripping" by statute poses a potential dif-
ficulty, inasmuch as the legislation could itself be subject to judicial review, and the 
Court could conceivably declare it unconstitutional. 20 But the leading precedents 
suggest otherwise: if Congress cleanly removes certain types of cases from the 
Court's jurisdiction, the justices will not dare to act on such cases. Only if the Con-
gress attempts to interfere in how the Court decides the cases it does hear, by pre-
determining their outcome or by fIXing the probative value of evidence in a constitu-
tional case, will the justices strike down purported efforts to regulate their jurisdic-
tion-and rightly SO.21 Avoid that sort of problem, and this congressional power can 
be a potent check on the Court. 
3. Keep examining the impeachment option. 
The good news on Capitol Hill in the last session was that members of Congress 
(such as Reps. Tom DeLay and Charles Canady) began to talk of impeaching federal 
judges for their usurpations of political power. Rep. Howard Coble (chairman of the 
House Judiciary subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property) conducted hear-
ings on judicial activism last spring that raised this possibility. This exploration 
should be encouraged. At the same time, however, hasty calls for impeachment on 
the basis of a single wrongheaded ruling by a judge somewhere should be discour-
aged. For impeachment talk to be taken seriously and not dismissed as simply red 
meat for one's partisans, the exploration must proceed with restraint and prudence, 
and a proper marshaling of arguments. 
The basic question is this: can the decisiOD3 of a federal judge, arrived at without 
criminal corruption as that is ordinarily understood, be considered among those 
U~See Dennis Teti, "'the Ten Commandments and the Constitution," The Weekly Standard 
(July 21, 1997), 21-24. 
20See Richard John Neuhaus, "The Anatomy of a Controversy," in Mitchell S. Muncy, ed., The 
End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation ol Politics: The Celebrated First Things Debate with 
Arguments Pro and Con (Dallas: S~nce Publishing, 1997), 254-55. 
2'lCompare Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869), and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 
(1872). 
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"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for which he may be impeached, tried, convicted, 
and removed from office? The answer from the founding is a very clear "yes."22 
In the Federalist, Hamilton describes the impeachment process as "a method of 
NATIONAL INQUEsY' into "the abuse or violation of some :public trust," aimed at dis-
covering political offenses that result in "injuries done Immediately to the society 
itself." And he explicitly extends this interpretation of Congress's power to the judi-
ciary, writing that the threat of impeachment is "a complete security" against "a se-
ries of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature."23 Almost half a 
century later, Justice Joseph Story agreed with Hamilton's reasoning on impeach-
ment's political character, and its application to judges, in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution. 24 
What seems to stand in the way of this method of controlling the judiciary is not 
the Constitution or the framers' intent but history. A handful of lower federal judges 
have been removed who were not found guilty of any criminal offense in the narrow 
sense, but only one Supreme Court justice has ever been impeached, and he was 
acquitted: Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. A common misconception, however, is that 
the Chase trial settled the issue whether "political" impeachrilents may be pursued 
against judges with a firm "no." Our present chief justice has so concluded, in a 
book and in a well-publicized 1996 speech. But more careful scholars than Chief 
Justice Rehnquist (who can hs.rd.ly be considered disinterested in this question) have 
concluded that the Chase trial was inconclusive on the constitutional issues-that 
it settled nothing regarding the breadth of Congress's power to impeach judges.25 
Should impeachment proceedings be launched regarding any federal judge, most 
particularly against any Supreme Court justice, the greatest care must be taken to 
pitch the issues at the highest possible level. Beginning in the House Judicihry 
Committee, and continuing on the floor of the House and in the Senate, members 
of Congress mt.st reeducate themselves about the separation of powers and judicial 
review-about their own role and that of the judges under the Constitution. The 
focus must be, not one or two un~pular rulings, but (in Hamilton's words again) 
a "series of deliberate usurpations of authority not belonging properly to the judici-
ary. The cause being defended by congressional removal efforts must be, and be seen 
to be, not a narrowly partisan one, but the integrity of the Constitution. It will be 
impossible to convince everyone of this. But with adequate preparation of the public 
mind to receive the idea that self-government itself is at stake, and with the freest 
possible opportunity for open and fair-minded colloquy with any judge placed on 
trial in the Senate, an impeachment proceeding can become a great seminar for the 
whole nation regarding the political arrangements under which we choose to live. 
It is possible that even a trial resulting in acquittal could be instructive for the pol-
ity and chastening for the judiciary. But prosecutors do not like to take cases to trial 
that they think they will lose; hence the first defendant judge in particular must 
be one against whom ~ impeachment case can be made absolutely compelling. And 
remember that a two-thirds majority is necessary to convict in the Senate. The 
framers set the bar high with good reason, and under present circumstances in the 
Senate, the politics of impeachment will have to be clearly distinguished from the 
politics of partisan ideology and scorekeeping. 
4. Leave the Constitution alone. 
By no means have we exhausted the possibilities for controlling the judiciary 
under the terms of the Constitution, but I should like to mention one other that is 
generally a bad idea: succumbing to the urge to amend the Constitution. In the last 
session alone, several amendments were introduced, for example, to limit the judi-
cial term of office to eight years in the lower courts (H.J.Res. 74), or to ten years 
at all levels including tlie Supreme Court (S.J.Res. 26 and H.J.Res. 77), or to twelve 
years for all (H.J.Res. 63). The amendments that absolutely limit judicial terms 
would do little to address our difficulties, as judges would be free to act as they 
please during their term of office. And those that provide for reappointment for suc-
cessive terms might endanger the independence of the judiciary that Hamilton and 
his fellow framers were intent on securing. 
For all the branches of government, the courts included, it was the aspiration of 
the framers to create a balance of strength and limitation-with officeholders power-
22See Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary. 45-51; and "The Supreme Court and the Poli-
tics of Impeachment," On Principle (Ashbrook Center). vol. IV. no. 4 (August 1996): 3-5. See 
also McDowell, Curbing the Courts. 121. 
23 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton 
Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), no. 6G, pp. 396-97; no. 81, p. 485. 
~ .. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitutioll. of the United States. 1st ed. (Boston: Hill-
iard, Graj1, 1833),11686-87,740-801, 1629. 
21See Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary, 223-24 n. 90. 
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ful in their own right and free to act on their convictions, yet restrainable by the 
others when power becomes tyranny and the freedom to act becomes mere license. 
I have argued that the Constitution as it already stands provides us with the prin-
ciples that reveal judicial usurpation for what it is, and with the tools necessary to 
fashion remedies for that usurpation. The abuses of the judiciary run deep in the 
body of twentieth-century caselaw, and it will not be the work of a moment to undo 
the damage. But patient toil, and a renewed attention in Congress to the high poli-
tics of constitutionalism, can. begin to move us away from government by judges and 
back to genuine republican government. 
My opposition to amending the Constitution to deal with our difficulties is not 
rooted m mere reverence for the framers' handiwork if evidence shows its insuffi-
ciency in some respect. No institutions crafted by human beings can be truly perma-
nent, never requiring any alterations. Yet the Constitution, as Joseph Story said, 
was "reared for immortality, if the work of man may justly aspire to such a title." 
Before we take risks with a structure whose "foundations are solid" and whose 
"compartments are beautiful, as well as useful" (again Story's wordS),26 we should 
explore the! building thoroughly and be certain we have not overlooked any of the 
useful features it already contains. 
Conclusion. 
All the suggestions I have made will come to nought until members of both houses 
of Congress recover for themselves what the framers had in mind when creating 
truly co-equal branches of government under the Constitution. Only in this century 
did it begin to become commonplace to regard the justices of the Supreme Court as 
the "guardians" of the Constitution, as though only they" and no one else. had this 
charge by virtue of their oath of office. The framers knew better. For them, the fate 
of republicanism, and of constitutionalism itself, rested with "the extent and proper 
structure of the Union," and with institutions that "divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other." They knew 
that men are not angels, nor are they governed by angels-that we have a govern-
ment "administered by men over men," and that judges are no more angelic than 
legislators.27 Thus they charged all public officials, indeed all citizens, with the duty 
to preserve the Constitution, fully expecting us to persuade. to argue, to clash over 
what that preservation means. To forget that, to believe complacently that that 
highest task of our shared political existence is somebody else's business in which 
we will not interfere, is to let the cause of republican self-government slip through 
our fmgers, and to dishonor the memory of the men from whom we inherited that 
cause. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Franck. You get the award for 
giving your testimony within the allotted time. [Laughter.] 
Mr. CANADY. Professor Clinton. 
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. CLINTON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
Mr. CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee, for giving me the opportunity to state my views on this 
very important question of the proper relationship between Ct*.n-
gress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution. 
Despite what so many of the members of the committee and 
panel have said, on my v/ay to the airport yesterday, I shared a 
limo ride with an anthropologist from my university. When I told 
her that I was going to a hearing about Congress's role in constitu-
tional interpretation, she looked absolutely stunned and said, 
"What role?" [Laughter.] 
And this is a woman with a Ph.D. in anthropology who is, in fa.ct, 
one of the most noted anthropologists in the country. So, in spite 
of the fact that we seem all here to agree that Congress has a VE~ry 
important role in constitutional interpretation, apparently that 
view has not gotten out into the general public. 
26 Story's Commentaries, quoted in Fram:k, Against the Imperial Judiciary, 213. 
27 Federalist No. 10, p. 84~ No. 51, p. 32~l. 
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We have witnessed during the last 40 years the rise to promi-
nence of a constitutional theory that gives the U.S. Supreme Court 
a virtual monopoly in American constitutional law. This theory 
grants to the Court final, ultimate, exclusive authority to deter-
mine the meaning of constitutional provisions with conclusive effect 
on Congress, the President, the States and private citizens. The 
power extends even to the determination of the constitutional pow-
ers of the co-equal branches of the National Government. 
Judicial supremacy rests on a number of foundations, one of 
which is the historical claim that the Court's hegemony is firmly 
grounded in American Constitutional history, esper.=ially in the 
landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, which has been cited byal-
most everyone here today. It is to this argument that I will address 
my remarks today. 
Before the Civil War, constitutional interpretation was performed 
by Congress and the President as much as by the Court. This is 
most apparent when one looks at the great Congressional debates 
over the establishment of the National Executive in the 1790's. 
Congres&ional determinations of constitutional meaning were then 
regarded as highly as those of the Court. After the Civil War, the 
Courts became more aggressive in challenging laws believed to be 
defective, but it is not until 1958 that the Court first staked its 
claim to be the exclusive interpreter of the· Constitution. The claim 
was made in Cooper v. Aaron where the Court declared its own 
constitutional rulings to be part of the suprenle law of the land, on 
a par with the Constitution itself. Since 1958, the Court has as-
serted this authority several times, most recently in the City of 
Boerne v. Flores in 1997 
In that case, the Court went even farther than it had in Cooper, 
ruling that Congress has no power to determine the meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause when passing laws designed to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Cooper, Boerne, and the other cases in 
which the Court has exerted its conclusive authority, it relied on 
Marbury v. Madison for support. But Marbury does not support 
such authority. Marbury involved Article Ill's jurisdictional dis-
tribution, which is a provision is directly addressed to the Court. 
Boerne involved the Fourteenth Amendment, whose enforcement 
provision is directly addressed to Congress. ,Marbury contains no 
assertion of an exclusive authority in the Court to bind other parts 
of the Government. Chief Justice Marshall claims only that the 
Court must obey explicit commands of the Constitution in pref-
erence to conflicting laws, when such commands are directed at the 
Court itself, and not to another branch of Government. . 
The Court's own treatment of Marbury as a precedent through-
out most of its history shows that this narrow reading of the case 
is accurate. Between 1803 and 1983, the Court cited Marbury 181 
times. From the beginning to 1865, Marbury was cited only to sup-
port narrow rulings on jurisdiction or mandamus. In Dred Scott, 
the other case of the era in which the Court voided a national law, 
Marbury is not even mentioned. During the 30-year period follow-
ing the Civil War, the Court invalidated at least 20 provisions of 
Federal law; rat Marbury is mentioned in none of these I cases. Not 
until 1895, In the Income Tax Case, did the Court first cite 
Marbury to support judicial review of national laws. Between 1895 
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and 1957, the Court cited Marbury only eight times to support judi-
cial power to invalidate laws, and all eight describe the power in 
a very restrictive way. So, all totalled, there were 92 uses of 
Marbury between 1803 and 1957, and only 10 of these concern judi-
cial power to invalidate laws; all 10 advancing restrictive notions 
of the power. Nowhere can be found any claim that the Court is 
the final arbiter of constitutional questions. If Marbury really 
means what Cooper and Boerne says it means, wouldn't the Court 
have said so during its first 168 years? 
But all this changes in 1958. Over the next quarter century after 
the decision of Cooper, Marbury is employed 50 times to support judicial review; 18 times to support sweeping assertions of judicial 
power; and 9 times to support the idea that the Court is ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution. So if we take the Court's own law 
seriously, we must conclude that judicial supremacy originated nei-
ther in Marbury, nor in the Constitution, but was established by 
the Warren court and developed subsequently by the Burger and 
Rehnquist courts. Thus judicial sUlJremacy is not the correct under-
standin~ of the judicial power established in the Constitution. So 
what is. _ 
The answer to this question is found by consulting Article III of 
the Constitution, Marbury v. Madison, and the thoughts of the 
Framers. In the first Congress, Madison flatly denied the power of 
any branch of the national Government, including tl:le judicial, "to 
determine the limits of the constitutional division of power." The 
separation of powers was a central concern of the Founders who ex-
tended Federal judicial powers to cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws and treaties, only after they had generally agreed that 
the power was limited to cases of a judiciary nature. Marbury is 
the prototypical case of a judiciary nature because it involved .a 
constitutional provision aimed directly at the Court that also em-
bodies a clear restriction on judicial power. This means that the 
Court could not have applied the statute in Marbury without at the 
same time violating the Constitution. Cases of the Marbury type, 
in which the Constitution implicates judicial functions directly, 
may be expected to arise most often under Article III, Amendments 
Four through Eight, and perhaps portions of Article I, Section 9. 
Limiting final constitutional review to the Court only in these 
cases, leaving to co-ordinate branches the final authority to deter-
mine the reach of their own constitutional powers, will preserve the 
co-equality accorded to each division of Government by the Found-
ers, strengthens the Se:paration of Powers by emphasizing the con-
stitutional responsibilitIes of Congress and the President, and re-
covers an important strand of our republican heritage that is no-
where more apparent than in the Supreme Court's own rich con-
stitutionaIlegacy. Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clinton follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. CLINTON, AsSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL 
ScIENCE, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Discussion or the United States Constitution cannot avoid confronting the obvious 
fact that the SUfreme Court is now widely regarded to be the primary guardian of 
our fundaments law. The Court's monopoly in conptitutionallaw rests largely upon 
two kinds or argument. The first argument, political, says that judicial control of 
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the Constitution is required in order to protect individuals and minority groups from 
the majority tyranny which would be implemented by legislatures in the absence 
of the judicial monopoly. The second argument is historical, asserting that judicial 
supremacy in constitutional matters is grounded in American constitutional history, 
especially in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). My expertise is in 
the history of judicial review, so I shall conime my remarks mainly to the second 
argument. 
In Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review,! I described the historical process 
by which legal commentators in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Amer-
ica employed the Marbury case to lay a precedential foundation for modem judicial 
supremacy. Some of the present-day practical effects of the resulting judicialized 
constitutionalism are summarized by Robert F. Nagel in the following passage: 
Today federal courts control more important public decisions and institutions in 
more detail and for more extended periods than at any time in our history. . . 
This unprecedented use of judicial power is not a response to specific and lim-
ited necessity or emergency. The power is exercised in every state and on a wide 
variety of social issues ... Even a relatively "conservative" Supreme Court 
seems transfIXed; recent decisions, such as those dealing with the legislative 
veto and political gerrymandering, illustrate the Court's continuing insistence 
that almost no public - issue should be excluded from judicial oversight ... 
Heavy reliance on the judiciary-in various idoological directions-is fast be-
coming an irlgrained part of the American system; already it is difficult for 
many. . . even to imagine any alternative. 2 
The ever-growing list of judicial intrusions mto areas of activity historically gov-
erned by other institutions makes it clear that it is no longer possible to question 
the observation that we are, in many of the most vital aspects of life in the Amer-
ican polity, governed primarily by judges. Nagel's metaphor is that of "addiction:" 
American society has grown "dependent" on the omnipresent, omnicompetent fed-
eral judge, who appears to have supplanted the ,Priest of earlier times.3 Nagel con-
cludes that "excessive reliance on judicial review undermines long-term support for 
basic constitutional principles, impairs the "general health of the political culture," 
and works against "both the preservation and the healthy growth of our constitu-
tional traditions." 4 I concur with these conclusions. 
One of the most important results of judicialization has been to tum virtually all 
discussions about the Constitution into discussions about the role of judges in its 
interpretation. Here are two prominent examples. Soterios Barber, one of the few 
contem~rary constitutional theorists who has tried to establish that the Constitu-
tion ana constitutional law are two different things,5 nonetheless suggests that the 
most important job of "mainstream scholars" is to justify "a strong and unapologetic 
exercise of judicial power in constitutional cases." 6 The second illustration is pro-
vided by Michael Perry: 
In a society, like American society, in which it is axiomatic that the judiciary 
should enforce the Constitution, the choice among competing conceptions of the 
Constitution is (in part) precisely a choice among competing conceptions of judi-
cial role. In resolving the question how to conceive of the Constitution, we are 
resolving the question what role the judiciary should play. In that sense, the 
two questions are really one question: What conception of "Constitution/judicial 
role" ought we to choose?" 7 
This ~uation of Court with Constitution is pervasive in contemporary constitu-
tional theory. It has led to a form of constitutional nihilism, expressed by Mark 
Tushnet, that judicial review is an "all or nothin~" proposition: "Either one allows 
judges to do whatever they want or one allows maJonties to do whatever they want. 
I Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence, Kansas: Univer-
sity Press of KanIU, 1989). 
~Robert Na.el, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Conseguences of Judicial Review 
(Ber~ley, California: Universit, of California Press, 1989), pp. 1-2. See also Robert Lowry Clin-
ton, God and Man in the Law: The Foundations of Anglo-American Constitutionalism (Lawrence, 
Kansas: Univeb .. ity Press ot Kansas, 1997), pp. 13-14. 
:Jlbtd" p, 2, Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 14. 
"Ibid" p, 3; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 14. 
'Sotetios A. Barber, MMiehaeJ Pes:rY and the Future of Constitutional Theory," Tulane Law 
IUlJuUJ 63 (1989): 1289-1303, at 129~j Cli.nton, God and Man in Law, p. 14. 
- Ibid., at 1290, Clinton, GOd and Man m Law, p. 14. 
u~~1!h~! .. P!!.,." .. ~~iew," Ethics, October 1985 (1985): 202-203, at 203; Clinton, God and 
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Either choice is deeply anticonstitutional-which means, I suppose, that constitu-
tionalism is self-contradictory." 8 
Let's think about this for a moment. Here are three of our nation's leading con-
stitutional theorists unflinchingly declaring: (1) that the main job of constitutional 
scholars today is to justify judicial activism (not to understand the Constitution); 
(2) that in our system, the word "Constitution" really means '~udicial role"; and (3) 
that constitutionalism is "anticonstitutional," or "self-contradictory!" This is as-
tounding. Constitutionalism may be a contradiction under any regime in which judi-
cial review is "all or nothing;" but judicial review is "all or nothing" only under a 
theory of judicial supremacy. So if judicial supremacy is incom~atible with constitu-
tionalism, shouldn't we just get rid of judicial supremacy, ana keep the Constitu-
tion? My answer is an unequivocal aftIrmative; and I would add that American con-
stitutional history supports this answer. Let's consider this history now. 
\ 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
\ 
During the antebellum period, constitutional interpretation was performed con-
tinuously by all three branches of the federal government. The great debates in Con-
gress during this period were arguments over the meanin$' of const.itutional provi-
sions. The record is literally permeated by assertions of legIslative duty to interpret 
the Constitution both rightly and in accordance with accepted canons of construc-
tion.9 In the 1790s, debates in Congress on the meaning of key provisions in Articles 
I, II, and III shaped the contours of the federal government as it was to exist for 
a century-and-a-half.10 At the same time, during the frrst half-century of the repub-
lic, preSidential vetoes of congressional acts were exercised almost solely on con-
stitutional grounds, and most of these were accompanied by explicit, uncontested as-
sertions of executive authority to inteI"pret the funaamentallaw.11 
Note also that the indeterminacy of certain portions of the constitutional text has 
frequently required provision of constitutional meaning via the interplay of non-judi-
cial political forces (for instance, in the establishment of a national executive admin-
istration in the 1790s, in the interposition, nullification, and secepsion controversies 
of the antebellum period, in some famous impeachment controversies, or in more re-
cent conflicts over the reach of executive power in foreign and military affairs). rrhe 
result here has been an extralegal constitutional construction which, though prin-
cipled, is nonetheless primarily a political activity necessarily involving non-judicial 
actors and agencies and is largely unsuitable for courts. When judges go beyond the 
activity of applying determinate legal texts, where all the resources of traditional 
legal practice are available both to circumscribe their efforts and to justify their re-
sults, they enter an area in which they have neither s~ial claim nor special com-
petence. Attention to the importance of constitutional constructions throughout 
American constitutional history makes it clear that constitutional development in 
the United States has been very much a "departmental" affair, involving not only 
the political branches and the administration of the national government, but the 
states as well. 12 
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the Supreme Court itself did not claim ''(mal-
it~ or conclusiveness for its own constitutional interpretations until 1958; 13 nor did 
constitutional commentators until the early twentieth centuty.14 Nor did the Court 
assert any power to control the boundaries of constitutional authority assigned to 
other agencIes of If,overnment until the late nineteenth century, except in "cases of 
a judicia!,), nature. 15 The last-mentioned point reflects the Court's successful asser-
tion, in Marbu"l~ of its power to construe constitutional provisions in such a way 
as to make poSSIble their application as law, but only in the decision of cases involv-
ing the ~rformance of judiCIal functions.16 
Thus the historical record unequivocally establishes that the origin of modem ju-
dicial supremacy in constitutional law can be found neither in the Constitution itself 
nor in its early judicial application. Rather, it originated in the polemics of legal 
8Mark Tushnet, "Judicial Review," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 7 (1984): 77-
79 at 77- Clinton, God and Man in Law, ~. 15. 
fSee Clinton, Marbury and Reuiew, pp. 72-77; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15. 
lOIbid,; Clinton, God and Man. in Law, p. 27. 
"Ibid . .f j), 113; Olinton, God and Man in Law p. 15. 
12 See Keith E, Whittington, Constitutional Constructions: Diuided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning (typeKript, J?epartment of Politi~, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 
1996), •• It chap. 1; C1mton.t God and Man In Law, p. 24. 
1lSH Cooper v, Aaron, 4:J58 U,S, 1, at 18 a95S); see also Clinton, Marbury and Reuiew, pp. 
14-15; Clinton, God alld Man in Law, p. 15. 
14SiJe Clinton Marbu",- and RevieUJ, pp, 190-191; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15. 
ililbld., p. 121, notel4&-48 and accompanlin, testl Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15. 
lflbld., chap. 5; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. ~7. 
99 
academicians and commentators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.17 It emerged in full flower only in the 1950s.18 During earlier periods, ques-
tions about constitutional meaning were not generally regarded as solely, or even 
primarily, judicial. Tocqueville's famous aphorism according to which all political 
questions sooner or later developed into judicial ones described a feared tendency 
rather than a reality. So had the earlier arguments of the antifederalist BrutuS.19 
When Jeffersonian Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats launched early attacks 
on the Court, they did so on the basis of a widespread belief that congressional and! 
or presidential interpretations of the Constitution were entitled to as much respect 
as those of the judiciary. 20 
During the last forty years, the Court has pressed its claim to be the primary 
organ of constitutional interpretation in the United States with increasing fre-
quency, intensity, and success. The Court's first assertion of constitutional guardian-
ship came in 1958. In that year the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron (the Little Rock 
school desegregation case); claiming, for the fIrst time in American constitutional 
history, judicial ''fmality'' for its readings of the Constitution. This ruling effectively 
equated the Court's own constitutional interpretations with the Constitution itself.21 
The legal peg supporting the maneuver was the Court's assertion that its own con-
stitutional rulings possessed Article VI "supreme law" status, along with constitu-
tional provisions, national laws, and federal treaties.22 In another "first," the Cooper 
Court cited Marbury v. Madison as precedent for its newly-discovered ''ultimate'' in-
terpretive authority. 
Since the Cooper decision, many have come to believe that, in Marbury,23 the Su-
preme Court declared itself to be the primary organ of constitutional interpretation. 
The theory that appears to be most widely accepted currently is that the primacy 
of judicial review was established in Marbury on the basis of a comparatively weak. 
or "inconclusive" historical foundation in the Fou:uling and immediate p!>st-Found-
ing eras.24 According to this theory, modem (broad-gauged) judicial review is ex-
plained and justified as an original "creative" fashioning by the Marshall Court that 
was later expanded by subsequent Courts in response to the demands of individuals 
and groups for judicial supervision of states, executives, p.nd Congress in accord 
with the growing "needs" of American society. 
As the Court's own record of precedents demonstrates, this conception of Amer-
ican constitutional history is fundamentally wrong. A limited form of judicial review 
was already established by 1800, but only as to relatively "clear cases." 25 Marbury 
v. Madison did not alter this, but rather established a clear precedent for the 
Court's power to disregard congressional laws in cases "of a judiciary nature"-i.e., 
cases in which judicial functions were threatened by application of a questionable 
statutory provision.26 Marbury thus established only that the judiciary would play 
an important role in constitutional interpretation, not that it would be the sole, ulti-
mate, or fmal constitutional interpreter. The idea that a single organ of government 
must possess such authority is a product of later times. After Marbury the Court 
would not invalidate another act of Congress until the 1850s.27 Nor would it cite 
17 Clinton, Marbury and Review, chapter 10-11; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15. 
18See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, at 18 (1958); see also Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp. 
14-15; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15. 
190n the "Letters of Brutus," probably penned by prominent antifederalist Robert Yates, and 
Alexander Hamilton's (Publius's) response to them, see Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp. 69-
71. Brutus clearly saw vast potential for expansive judicial development in the 1787 Constitu-
tion; but his worst fears did not materialize until a century later. The relevant letters of Brutus 
may be found in Cecelia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 
334-357. Tocqueville's best discussion of the level of judicial power being exercised roughly a 
half-century after the Constitution's adoption c"ay be found in Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America, 2 vola., trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner (New York: He.'-per 
"Row, 1966), pp. 89-93; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27. 
zoSee Clinton, Marbury and Review, chapter 6; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27. 
21 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp. 14-15,207-
211, Clinton, God and Man in LtJw, p. 27. 
2ft Ibid" at p. 18. The Court there declared that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the expo-
sitjun oftbe law Dr the Constitution." See also Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27. 
23 1 Ctanch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 36. 
2. Leonard Leyy, ed., Judicial Review and the Supreme Court (New York: Harper 
and ); Clinton, GOd and Man in LtJw, p. 36. 
2GBy)vi. S Review and the Law of the Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
Univendty Prell, p. chapter 3; Clinton, God and Man in Law p. 38. 
"Clinton, Mar d Review, esp. chapter 6; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38. 
27 Dred Scott v. ford, 19 Howard 393 (1857); Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38 
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Marbury in support of any kind of constitutional judicial review until the 1880s; and 
not in support of broad~gauged review until the 1950s.28 
After its decision in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has used Marbury to support its 
constitutional hegemony at least ten times, most recently in City of Boerne v. Flores 
(1997).29 There, the Court invalidated a provision of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 (RFRA) that attempted to restore the "compelling interest" stand-
ard m free exercise cases that the Court declined to apply in Employment Div., 
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990).30 In promulgating RFRA, Con-
greBS relied upon its authority to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment which, by judicial ruling, applies the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause to the states. But the Court held in Boerne that the 
congressional enforcement authority is only "remedial," not "substantive;" and thus 
that Congress is forbidden to determine "the substance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's restrictions on the States," or to enact legislation which "alters the meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause" by determining "what constitutes a constitutional viola-
tion." 31 
Though it is indeed difficult to see how Congress can "enforce" the Constitution 
without being able to "determine what constitutes a constitutional violation;" for 
purposes of our historical survey, the crucial point that must be understood here 
IS this: the reason why RFRA can be held to have altered the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause is that, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has put its own understand-
ings of constitutional meaning (its "interpretations") on a par with the Constitution 
itself. In other words, according to the logic of Cooper, the Court's decision in Oregon 
v. Smith about the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is the Free Exercise Clause. 
Not content, however, to rest upon this claim alone in Boerne, the Court explicitly 
denies the authority of Congress to interpret the. Constitution conclusively or to define 
its own powers in accordance with it.32 
Thus it appears that the development of judicial supremacy in constitutional law 
is now virtually complete. Modem judicial review is driven by a logic which affords 
the Supreme Court ultimate freedom to strike down laws merely because the jus-
tices believe those laws to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Co-ordinate agen-
cies of government, the policies of which are defeated by the Court, are then ex-
pected to soose-step to the Court-imposed drumbeat, even to the point of conforming 
future pollcy choices to judicial preferences. 
As I have said, it has not always been so. Nowhere is this shown more clearly 
than in the Court's historical treatment of the Marbury case-the very case mis-
represented in Cooper and Boerne to support constitutional judicial supremacy. 
Given the importance of stare decisis in our legal system, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine the Court's treatment of Marbury durin~ previous historical periods, because 
this treatment indicates how the Court conceived its own power during those peri-
ods. 
MARBURY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In Marbu?, v. Madison and Judicial Review, I surveyed and catalogued all of the 
Court's citatIons of Marbury from 1803 through 1983.33 Here's what I found. During 
the remainder of John Marshall's tenure as chief justice (through 1835), ten sepa-
rate opinions contain references to Marbury. Nine arelurely jurisdictional in na-
ture, supporting the distribution of jurisdiction containe in Article III. The remain-
ing reference is made to support the ruling that writs of mandamus may issue to 
executive officials only when engaged in the performance of purely ministerial du-
ties. The Court's power to invalidate laws is not mentioned in any of these cases. 
Between 1835 and 1865, Marbury is cited in 15 separate opinions in the U.S. Re-
ports. As before, the largest number of cites is in the jurisdictional area (eight ref-
erences). Six concern nuances in the mandamus remedy. One clarifie's some dicta 
in Alarbury that were unnecessary to the decision of that case. Judicial review is 
not mentioned at all. Even in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), the only other case be-
fore the Civil War in which the Court invalidated an act of Con~ss, Marbury is 
not mentioned! This pattern continues during the 30-year period following the Civil 
War, a period in which the Court invalidated national laws in no fewer than 20 
cases-yet Marbury is mentioned in none of them! As in earlier periods, the in-
28CHnton, Marbury and Review, chapter 7; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38. 
2 {1 117 S,Ct. 2157, 
30 494 U,S, 872. 
31 117 8,Ct. 2157, at 2164. 
32 117 8,Ct, 2157, at 2168. 
33CHnton, Marbury and Review, chap. 7. Full citations for all the cases may be found in the 
notes accompanying chapter 7, at pp. 266-274. 
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stances in which Marbury is cited pertain primarily to jurisdiction or mandamus. 
It is during this period, however, that Marbury is first cited in support of any kind 
of judicial review-but not over Congress. The citation is found in Mugler v. KanstJ8 
(1887), and is offered in support of judicial authority to overturn state laws via use 
of the doctrine of substantive due process! 
At the beginning of the next period, in the famous Income Tax Case (1895), the 
Court, for the f1l'8t time in its history, cites Marbury in support of its power to deter-
mine the constitutionality of national laws. Between 1895 and 1957, the Court cites l1arbury in 38 additional instances, hardly more often than during the 30-year pe-
nod preceding 1895. As before, most of the citations have nothing to do with judicial 
review. Five refer to the right/remedy maxim. Four support the holding that writs 
of mandamus may be issued only as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Four refer 
to the distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" executive acts. Four con-
fmn that acts in violation of the Constitution are not law, but say nothing about 
the Court's power to deny their enforcement. Three pertain to questions about the 
removal power of the president. Two refer to sections of the Marbury opinion which 
imply that courts may resolve only "cases or controversies" according to the regular 
course of judicial procedure. Two concern the idea that general expressions in judir 
cial opinions are to be taken "in connection with the case in which they are used." 
Two involve the relation between executive appointments and commissions. Two use 
Marbury to support the principle that no words in the Constitution should be pre-
sumed to be without effect. One maintains that constitutional language should re-
ceive a liberal construction whenever individual rights are at stake. Another sup-
ports the idea that the national government is supreme within its lawful sphere. 
Eight of the Marbury citations during this period pertain to the judicial power to 
invalidate laws, and all reflect a narrow or restrictive conception of the power. Two 
are offered in support of the idea that judicial review should be confmed to "clear 
cases." A third is offered to show that courts have no "general veto power" over leg-
islation, but may invalidate laws only in ''proper cases." A fourth is used to confme 
judicial review to "cases or controversies." A rUth restricts court review to cases in 
which literal interpretations of the Constitution are possible. A sixth imposes on the 
Court the obligation to "interpret the law," but only in ''proper cases." A seventh 
merely notes the petitioner's argument that Marbury forbids executive invasions of 
"the Judicial sphere." The eighth citation mentions Marbury as one of a long line 
of cases in which legislation was decla.red unconstitutional "because it imposed on 
the Court powers or functions that were regarded as outside the scope of the judi-
cial power' lodged in the Court by the Constitution." 
Thus it may be fairly concluded that, although the Court began to notice 
Marbury's judicial review aspect dur..ng the fIrSt half of the present century, it rec-
ognized fully its restrictive nature. Nowhere is there anything approaching a dec-
laration that the Court is the fmal arbiter of constitutional questions. All told, of 
the 92 citations of Marbury by justices of the Supreme Court between 1803 and 
1957, only ten refer to that portion of the Marshall opinion that is currently thought 
to have "established judicial review." 
All this changed in 1958. During the 25-year period between 1958 and 1983, there 
are 89 separate citations of Marbury, a number that almost equals the total of the 
previous 154 years. Of these 89, fifty utilize Marbury in support of judicial review. 
Of these 50, at least eighteen employ Marbury to justify sweeping assertions of judi-
cial authority. Of these 18, nine apply Marbury to support the idea that the Court 
is the "(mal" or "ultimate" interpreter of the Constitution, with power to issue "bind-
ing" proclamations to any other agency or department of government respecting any 
constitutional issue whatsoever. As I have noted above, Cooper v. Aaron is the first 
of the cases in this last-mentioned category. If we take the Court's own statements 
seriously, then it must again be concluded that judicial supremacy could not have 
originated in Marbury, but rather is a doctrine firmly established by the Warren 
CoUrt and subsequently developed by the Burger Court. And if we take seriously 
the Court's use of Marbury in the Boerne case, we must also conclude that the 
Rehnquist Court is presently doing its part to perpetuate the doctrine. 
But if the doctrine of Judicial supremacy in constitutional law is not the correct 
understanding of the judicial function established in the Constitution, then what is 
the correct understanding? The best way to answer this question is to contrast the 
modem doctrine with its traditional counterpart. I shall fll'St sketch out the judicial 
lunction as it was understood at the time of the Founding. I will then try to show 
bow the modem practice or review in cases involvinJ the constitutional powers of 
co-ordinate agencIes of gove. rnment like Congress deViates from traditional practice. 
Finally, I sball attempt briefly to make out a case for a return to tradition. 
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THE FOUNDERS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 
. Judicial review of national law in the U.S. is usually thought to be constitu-
tionally grounded in the Article III extension of federal judicial power to cases "aris-
ing under' the Constitution, laws and treaties.34 The most explicit statement re-
garding the scope of this power is found in James Madison's Notes on the Federal 
Convention. According to Madison, the Founders extended federalJ'udicial power to 
such cases only after it had been generally agreed "that the juris iction given was 
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature."35 According to. B.F. Wright, 
Madison's meaning points to "a theory of jud.icial review which did not recognize the 
courts as the exclusive or fmal interpreters of all parts of the Constitution." 36 Ralph 
A. Rossum says that Madison did not believe "that the Court's interpretations were 
su~rior to or entitled to precedence over those of Congress or the President. He 
clauned only that the Court should have n."lal authority to pass on constitutional 
~uestions that affected its own duties and responsibilities, that is, that were of a 
'Judiciary nature'." 37 
Supporting the statements of Wright and Rossum are Madison's own remarks 
during the 1789 congressional debates over the president's removal power. Arguing 
in support of vesting this power solely in the president, and responding to the 
charge that the legislature had no right to interpret the Constitution (via vesting 
of the power by statute), Madison states the following: 
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the exposition of the 
laws and constitution devolves upon the judicial. But, I beg to know, upon what 
nrinciple it can be contended, that anyone department draws from the constitu-
tion greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of 
the several departments. The constitution is the charter of the people to the 
government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks 
out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either 
be brou5dlt into question, I do not see that anyone of these independent depart-
ments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that 
point. . . . There is not one government on the face of the earth, so far as I 
recollect, there is not one in the United States, in which provision is made for 
a particular authority to determine the limits of the constitutional division of 
power between the branches of the government. III all systems there are points 
which must be adjusted by the departments themselves, to which no one of 
them is competent. If it cannot be determined in this way, there is no resource 
left but the will of the community, to be collected in some mode to be provided 
by the constitution, or one dictated by the necessity of the case.3S 
It can be argued that Madison's "mode to be provided by the constitution" is for-
mal amendment and that the modes "dictated by the necessity of the case" may be 
elections, impeachments, or even revolutions.39 It is more plausible, however, to as-
sume that "necessity of the case" refers to the three branches of government work-
ing out in the daily routine of constitutional government the functional differentia-
tions inherent in the separation of powers. It waD Madison who just two years pre-
viously had recorded approvingly the Philadelphia Convention's restriction of the 
"arising under" jurisdictlon of fedf:ral courts to cases "of a Judiciary nature;" and 
in the passage just quoted, Madison straightforwardly denies the power of the 
courts to issue fmal constitutional pronouncements in cases which involve interpre-
tations of the constitutional powers of co-ordinate agencies. Cases not of a judiCIary 
nature that also arise under the Constitution are pre-eminently those that require 
determination of the constitutional authority of the legh;lative or executive branch. 
ApproprilJte cases for judicial review must be those which do not require such a de-
termination. 
34 United States Con9titution, Article III, Section 2: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made under their Authority." 
35Mu Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 4 vols. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1911). vol. 2. p. 430. 
"Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law (Boston: Houghton Miff-
lin, 1942; ChicI",O: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1967 (reprint», p. 18. 
J7RaJpb A. Rouum, write Courts and the Judicial Power," in Leonard Levy and Dennis 
Mahoney, ed •. , The Framing and Ratirreation of the Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1987). 
p.236. 
"Jam .. Madison, "Comment. on the Removal Power of the President" June 17 1789, in 
Chari _ F. HobNn and Robett A. RutJand, eels .• The PaIJe..rs of James M;}ison., 16 vola. (Char-
JottesyjJJe, VirJigia: UniV8t1ity Pre •• of Virginia, 1979), vo], 12, p. 234. 
"Wolle, TIM RttJe of Modern Judlc141 Review, p. 9ft 
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It is likely that the 1787 cases "of a judiciary nature" are exactly those 1789 cases 
in which, ''in the ordinary course of government," the exposition of the "constitution 
devolves upon the judicial." Under this view, it is only in cases which involve con-
stitutional provisions directly addressed to the courts that the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to apply relevant law is necessarily fmal. In cases involving constitutional pro-
visions addressed to other branches of government (e.g., the Article I, Section 8 "nec-
essary and proper" clause), the Court may surely refuse to apply the law, but it may 
not do so with finality in the strict sense. Even though the Court's decision may 
bind the parties in a particular case, Congress may nonetheless choose to disregard 
the Court's constitutional ruling and provide for executive enforcement of the stat-
ute. Congress may even go so far as to utilize its power to regulate the Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction so as to discourage or prevent future appeals on the question of 
the law's constitutional validity. In such instances, it is the judgment of Congress, 
not that of the Court, which will be ''fmal.'' On the other hand, if the case involves 
such a constitutional provision as that in the Sixth Amendment's right to confront 
one's accusers in a federal criminal trial, then the Court's decision on the constitu-
tional question will necessarily be fmal, since carrying on any federal criminal trial 
requires a Cl)urt, and federal trial courts are bound by rulings of the Supreme Court. 
From this perspective, Madison's theory of judicial review partitions constitu-
tionally defective laws into two categories. One group includes those instances in 
which judicial review is appropriate, because fmal authority for nonapplication of 
the unconstitutional law rests in the courts by virtue of the nature of the judicial 
function. The most obvious example is an act which operates "unconstitutionally" on 
a court's performanc~ of its own duties. In the other category, constitutional judicial 
review is inappropriate, because the performance of judicial duty in those instances 
is unaffected by the constitutional infirmity of the law. 
MARBURY AND THE EARLY CASES 
The case which best illustrates Madison's theory is also the one which has been 
most often used to support the modem theory of review, and which (nominally) in-
volved Madison himself as a party. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, writing for a unanimous Court, held a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
(which extended the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to all federal officials) to 
be in contravention of Article Ill's jurisdictional distribution (which restricted the 
Court's original jurisdiction to cases involving "ambassadors, public ministers, con-
suls, and states ").40 Marbury is a case of judiciary nature in the pure sense because 
it involved not only constitutional and statutory provisions aimed directly at the 
Court, but also involved a constitutional provision which embodied a clear restric-
tion on judicial power. The Court's refusal to apply the law thus left the coordinate 
branches of government no alternative but to comply with its decision (i.e., to do 
nothing) because the Court, by enforcing a constitutional restriction on judicial 
powe,:, essentially did nothing. Its decision therefore amounted to a "fmal," or "ulti-
mate" interpretation of the Constitution. 
If this sounds like a strange basis for judicial review, one should be reminded that 
virtually all exercises of review by courts in the early American republic were of 
the Marbury type; that is, they involved courts resisting legislative attempts either 
(a) to impose extra-constitutional duties on judges, (b) to interfere with judicial pro-
cedure in ways that were unauthorized by the Constitution, or to usurp judicial 
functions outright. In the first category, one may point to the Invalid Pensioner 
Cases of the 1790s,41 to the famous Correspondence of the Judges,42 and to Marbury 
itself. In the second category, one can refer to the many early cases involving statu-
40Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
41See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409 (1792); United States v. Yale Todd (unreported at 
the time), .ummarized by Chief Justice Taney in United States v. Ferreira, 13 Howard (54 U.S.) 
40, at 52-63 (1851). Speaking of the judgments in both Hayburn and Todd, Taney said that 
the admini.trative power "proposed to be conferred on the Circuit Courts of the United States 
(by eon ...... ) wu not judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution, and was therefore 
unconstitutional, and could not be lawfully exercised by the courts." See a]so Case of the Judges, 
.. Call (Va.) 135(1788); Turner v. Turner, 4 Call (Va.) 234 (1792); Page v. Pendleton, Wythe's 
Reoort. 211 (Va) 1793, Kamper v, Hawkins, 1 Va Cues 21 (1793). 
---12AuPH 8, 1793, Here the Court refused to render an advisory opinion requested by the 
pre.ident and HCretary or 8tate, on the ground that such an opinion wou]d be "extrajudicial" 
and tbul violative of the H~aration of powers. See David P. Currie. --rhe Constitution in the 
Supreme Court: 1789-1801, Uniuersity of Chicago Law Reuiew 48 (1981): 819-885, p. 829. 
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tory suspension of jury trials.43 In the third, we have frequent instances of legisla-
tive usurpation via passage of attainders and retrospective criminal laws.44 
If one has trouble imagining judicial review so confmed in its scope, it is probablr 
because the modem American mind, conditioned by at least a half-century of judi-
cial supremacy, can hardly help but regard the judicial branch as a co-equal partner 
~ the public policy makinJC1~rocess. But it was doubtless to prevent such participa-
tIon by judges in policy-m . g that the Founders circumscribed the jurisdiction and 
power of courts so narrowly in the first place. And just as surely was it to prevent 
being dragged into such processes that early American judges strongly utilized the 
power of review to safeguard their independence; both br resisting legislative en-
croachment on legitimate judicial functions, and by l'efusmg to intrude themselves 
upon domains they regarded as better left to others. 
Marshall implicitly recognized this in Marbury, by drawing a clear distinction be-
tween the issue of constitutionality and that of judicial review; that is, between (a) 
a law being a nullify due to its incompatibility with the Constitution, on the one 
hand, and (b) a court's having the power to nullify such a law, on the other. In Mar-
shall's words, granting that "the constitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts," 
does it nonetheless follow that an act, "repugnant to the constitution, notwithstand-
ing its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?"45 In answering 
this rhetorical question, Marshall articulated the theory of judicial function for 
which Marbury is justly celebrated: 
It is emphatically the province the duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity ex-
pound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts 
must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Con-
stitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that 
the court must either decide that case conformaoly to the law, disregarding the 
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court 
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the 
very essence of judicial duty.46 
Since these lines recently have been so frequently cited as precedent for a notion 
of judicial power which renders the Supreme Court ultimate arbiter of all constitu-
tional questions, it is important to assess what is not said in them. No exclusive 
power to interpret the fundamental law is claimed for the Court, here or anywhere 
else in Marbury. To be sure, it is ''the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is," but only "of necessity," whenever those "who apply the rule 
to particular cases" must determine which of two "conflicting rules governs the 
case." In other words, the power of review claimed by the Court in Marbury is mere-
ly a power of discretion to disregard existing laws in the decision of particular con-
troversies, provided that the constitutional and statutory provisions involved are, like 
those in Article III and the Judiciary Act, addressed to the Court itself If the provi-
sions are not addressed to the Court, then the Court will not be compelled, as a 
matter of logic, to choose between them in order to decide the case. Since precedents 
are created by holdings on points of law necessarily decided in particular cases, the 
Court's choice between constitutional and statutory provisions, one or both of which 
are not addressed to the Court, should not control the decision of subsequent cases. 
Marbury thus affords no basis ior inferring that the Court is bound to disregard a 
statutory provision in conflict with the Constitution, except in that relatively small 
number of instances in which the Constitution furnishes a direct rule for the courts. 
Where does the Constitution furnish direct rules for the courts? Most of the provi-
sions of this type may_ be found in two places: Article III and Amendments 4-8 of 
the Bill of Rights. The classic example is one that Marshall himself used in 
Marbury: the treason clause, which requires either a confession or the testimony of 
two witnesses in open court to the same overt treasonable act.47 It''or an obvious ex-
.USee, e,g., Austin Scott, "Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent," American Historical 
Review 4 (1899): 456-469; Trevett v. Weeden (Rhode Island, 1786), reported in J.B. Thayer, 
Ca,es on Constitutional Law, 2 vall'. (Cambridge, Mass.: George H. Kent, 1895), vol. 1, PI». 73-
78; Ba,ard v. Singleton, 1 Martin (N.C.) 42 (1787). See generally William E. Nelson, "The Eight-
eenth·Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Juril!J)nadence," Michigan Law Re-
view 76 (MaI1978): 893- 960, See also Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay (S.C.) 252 (1792); Stidger 
v, Rogl!r6, 2 Sneed <Ky,) 129 (1802); Enderman v, Ashby, 2 Sneed (Ky.) 53 (1801). 
"' ~.t e,g., Commonwealth v, Caton, 4 CaJJ (Va.) 5 (1782); Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cases 
21 (l7Wd' ; Caldwell v, The Commonwealth, 2 Sneed (Ky.) 129 (1802). 
46Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U,S.) 137, at 177 (1803). 
4fJlbld., at 177- 178. 
41United States Constitution, Article III, Section 3. 
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ample from the Bill of Rights, one only need add the requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment that such a confession be uncoerced. Now sUPfose that Con~ss, in a 
zealous attempt to suppress subversion, amends the federa rules of crimmal proce-
dure so as to make it possible for the government to obtain a conviction on a char 
of treason on the baSIS of a coerced confession. This situation presents a clear- t 
case of a -judiciary nature precisely because the Court cannot apply the statutory J,.o-
vision without at the same time violating the Constitution. 
Reformulating the emphasized portion above as a question allows formulation of 
a rule which will help one to determine whether any particular case is one of a judi-
ciary nature. In eac1i case, one may ask: "Can the Court apply the law ~cn question 
without itself violating the Constitution?" If the answer to this question is negative, 
then the case is one of a judiciary nature, and the Court will have n· :;ensible alter-
native but to invalidate (refuse to apply) the law. If, on the other 3-,dnd, the answer 
is positive, then the case is no~judlciary in nature, and the Cot' : t must apply the 
law, whether or not the law itselr violates the Constitution. 
Applying this method, one may read down the list of provisions in Article III and 
Amendments 4-8, and be quickly satisfied that most of the cases which have arisen 
(and may yet arise) under them fall into the former category (cases of a judiciary 
nature). At the same time, one may look almost anywhere else in the Constitution 
and be satisfied, though perhaps not so quickly, that most of the cases which have 
arisen (and may yet arise) under provisions other than Article III and Amendments 
4-8 fall into the latter category (cases of a non judiciary nature). 
FUNCTIONAL CO-oRDINATE REVIEW 
What would be the effect of the Supreme Court's adoption of an approach which 
confmes the scope of judicial review in cases involvin~ the constitutlO1:al power of 
co-ordinate agencies of government to those "of a judiCIary nature," leaving to other 
branches the right to construe constitutional provisions addressed to them? Such an 
approach would authorize judicial invalidation of laws only when to do otherNise 
(Le., to uphold the law) would cause the Court to violate a constitutional restriction 
on judicial power. It would not 3ruW the Court to defeat legislative or executive poli-
cies merely on the sround thao: such policies were unauthorized by the Constitution. 
It would not allow Judicial T .llification of policies forbidden by the Constitution, ex-
cept when the participation of courts is required to effectuate them. Would not adop-
tion of this approach, which I call ''functional co-ordinate review," put an end to con-
stitutional law as W P lJresently understand it, leaving us in the grip of tyrannous 
popular majorities? 
Examination of the historical record does not confirm such fears. To be sure, had 
the Supreme Court followed this approach throughout its history, the majority of 
the cases \' 'rein congressional acts were nullified would have been decided dif-
ferently. O t t.he 130-odd cases in which federal laws were invalidated between 1800 
and 198.) , only 38 were "of a judiciary nature." 48 
H wever, when the cases are examined more closely, a different picture emerges. 
Firot., leaving aside Marbury and Dred Scott 49 (the earliest instance of judicial in-
validation of congressional policy in a case not of a judiciary nature), the Court in-
validated national laws in 75 cases between the end of the Civil War and 1936-
on the eve of the Roosevelt Court-packing scheme. 50 Only 14 of these occurred in 
cases "of a judiciary nature;" leaving 61 having occurred in cases inappropriate for judicial reVIew, under Madison's theory. The bulk of these latter cases were decided 
on the ground either of: (a) Fifth Amendment substantive "economic" due _process, 
(b) Tenth Amendment "dual federalism," or the Court's mere opinion that Congress 
had overstepped its constitutional authority. The crucial point is this: virtually all 
the last-mentioned decisions (the "inappropriate" ones) have since been either over-
ruled or so thoroughly emasculated as to nave effectively disappeared from our con-
stitutionallaw. 
During the period following the Court-fight to 1985, the Court overturned some 
53 acts of Congress.51 The ROosevelt and Warren Courts together performed 26 of 
these, all but five in cases "of a judiciary nature." 52 Conversely, the Burger Court 
performed 27 nullifications, only two of which clearly were in cases of a judiciary 
nature. 53 The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey is that, unless 
one happell8 to be a staunch devotee of the Burger Court, adoption of :Madison's the-
' 'Clinton, Marbury v, MadiBonand Judicial Reuiew, pp. 117- 121,207- 211. 
49Dred Scott v, Sanford, 19 Howard (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
60CJinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Reuiew, p, 121, pp. 207- 208. 
61Ibid., pp. 208-210. 
62Ibtd" pp, 208-209. 
" Ibid" pp. 209-210 
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ory of revi~w would hardly reduce our constitutional law to a shambles. Instead, it 
would only serve to elimiriate the more questionable portion of the Court's historical 
interferences with national legislative policy. Indeed, of the 90-odd cases comprising 
this portion, the Court has itself already eliminated roughly two-thirds! 
I believe that this record is a testament to the good sense of Madison and the 
Founders. They knew what we have afparently forgotten, that courts are fragile in-
stitutions, with little political capita to squander, and which must be jealously 
guarded if they are to perform well their most vital function: that of resolving dis-
putes peacefully, so as to prevent alternative resolution by force of arms. This is ar-
guably the most important activity of any governmental office in a constitutional re-
public, and it cannot likely be performed well by any but the "least dangerous 
branch." When that branch attempts self-aggrandizement via constitutional strug-
gles with the more explicitly "political" (and ultimately stronger) organs of govern-
ment, it will not, in the long run, become the "most dangerous branch;" rather, it 
will put the entire machinery of peaceful dispute-resolution at risk, and thereby un-
dermine the real source of its own authority. _ 
The Founders also knew something else that we seem to have forgotten. Three 
decades ago, constitutional historian Donald G. Morgan, warning of the danger of 
the already-advancing judicial monopolization of the Constitution, reported being 
struck by "the solicitude with which citizens and officials [in the early constitutional 
period], when contemplating measures of government action, probed constitutional 
Issues." 54 Jefferson believed that "congressional involvement with constitutional in-
quiries" was "essential to an informed electorate," tb~~ "safest depository of ultimate 
power."55 Madison viewed such constitutional involvt'yo.ent as 'essential to the integ-
rity of the Legislature itself: 
It is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the government 
as to any other that the Constitution should be preserved entire. . . the breach 
of the Constitution in one point, will facilitate the breach in another; a breach 
in this point may destroy that equilibrium by which the House retains its con-
sequence and share of power. 56 
Commenting on Morgan's book, the late Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. issued a call 
whichJ in the wake of the Boerne decision, seems especially appropriate: 
The thesis of this book is that it is the responsibility of every Senator and Rep-
resentative in the national Congress to study the constitutionality as well as the 
wisdom of the legislative proposals pending before the Congress. . . As a mem-
ber of the Senate, I accept the validity of this thesis, which was evidently in 
the minds of the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution.57 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Clinton. Mr. Scott. 
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was delighted with the 
testimony, and one of the things that we kept hearing was whether 
the Court had the last word. One of the things that is interesting, 
the nature of passing legislation; passed by Congress, then the 
President. Just in the order of things, the Supreme Court would be 
tJ~e last one to speak; there's no way to get the Court speaking 
first. 
Let me ask a couple of questions; since this is a political discus-
sion, whether or not the witnesses see any ideological bent in the 
cases where the acts of Congress are invalidated? 
Ms. STROSSEN. I have to say, Congressman Scott, looking at the 
cases that I follow most closely, which are those dealing with civil 
liberties, to a surprising extent on some issues there is a lack of 
ideological bent, and I say surprising because it is quite different 
from what we encounter in elected branches of Government. 
The Communications Decency Act, struck down in the Reno case, 
is a perfect case in point. Essentially, that decision was joined by 
64DooaJd G, Mo an, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, 
Ma •• achuMttl: Hard University Prell, 1966), p. vii. 
Hlbid., p. 362. 
"Ibid. 
IY1lbid. (.,aC"~K;J, 
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all nine Justices, with just small dissents on very small portions 
of the law-by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist. But, 
essentially, they all agreed that the CDA. was unconstitutional, re-
gardless of their own personal ideologies or the ideologies of those 
who appointed them. 
The counter-example that I can think of in the area of the First 
Amendment, is~and I'm sure Congressman Hyde, in particular, is 
familiar with this-some critics have charged that the Court is en-
gaging in an "abortion distortion," and have argued that the 
Court's decisions concerning free speech, or alleged free speech and 
free association rights of anti-abortion demonstrators are less pro-
tective than they would have been of the free speech rights of, let's 
say, pro-civil rights demonstrators. And I think it's interesting that 
in those cases you have Antonin Scalia standing more strongly, for 
a more solid version and a more absolutist version of the First 
Amendment than held by Justices who would be considered liberal. 
Mr. SC(YrT. I think Professor Clinton kind of alluded to this, and 
I wanted to ask if the invalidation of acts of Congress seems to be 
more common today than it has been historically. 
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I don't think'~here's any doubt about that. Of 
course, during earlier periods, prior to the Civil War, there were 
only two acts of Congress invalidated, and in one of those, which 
was the Marbury case it's not clear that the Court even knew, at 
least until the 1880's or 1890's, that the Court had invalidated any 
law there; because if you look at the citations of Marbury during 
that entire period, you get virtually nothing, except very narrow 
references to jurisdiction or mandamus. 
The first time I know of that ltlarbury was ever even cited in 
support of judicial review was 1887 in the Mugler case; and there 
the Court mistakenly cited the case as an example of substantive 
due process, in effect. In other words, they used Marbury as a 
precedent for the Court striking down state laws on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds; and so it's not clear why they even dredged 
it up, and it's Dot clear that they knew what they were citing ei-
ther. Now that all changed in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, which happens to be the same era in which the Court start-
ed striking down more acts of Congress. 
And, I think, if you look-there's an interesting thing that gc·es 
on here. If you look at the modem period, after the Warren court, 
you find that the Warren court struck down more state laws than 
anything else, but very few Federal laws. The Burger court, on the 
other hand, struck down a whole lot of Federal laws. And the 
Rehnquist court seems to have followed suit, although I haven't 
done those numbers. But there's no q11estion that the exercise of 
judicial power over Congress has increased steadily since the late 
19th century. I think that would be a fair enough statement. Some 
of the other panelists may have something to add to that. 
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, I'd just like to say that it certainly is true that 
there have been more Federal statutes struck down in this century 
than the preceding century; but this is not the first period of judi-
cial actiVIsm in tliat regard. One thinks, of course, of the famous 
invalidation of many New Deal measures during the 1930's. And I 
think that this-
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
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Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
This suggests that the degree of invalidation of congressional ac-
tion is proportional, in part, to the degree of congressional action. 
That is, one of the reasons why there were very few congressional 
statutes struck down in the early 19th century was that the Con-
gress was much more restrained in the exercise of its powers dur-
ing those years than it has been since. It is when Congress begins 
breaking new ground and reaching out ,into new areas \vhere there 
are questions about its constitutional power that the Court is natu-
rally given more opportunities to pass on the extent of its powers. 
Mr. SCOTT. No one-there's one other aspect of this that I think 
is significant, and I haven't heard much on it, and that is the fact 
that Congress is elected one way, the President is elected independ-
ent of Congress, but the Judicial Branch is dependent on the other 
two branches, so that if there is a disagreement between the legis-
lative and administrative branches, there's a solution. It takes a 
little time to get there, but there is a solution. Is that any restraint 
on historical, traditional activism, and disagreeing with Congress 
and the President? 
Mr. DEVINS. Well, the ballot box also applies to the Courts be-
cause the selection of judges and Justices is an overtly political 
process. So, to return to the example of the Court striking down 
New Deal legislation that Professor Currie mentioned before, it 
was inevitable that with the death of Justices on the Court, that 
the view of the Court to the New Deal would change over time be-
cause of political events, the reelection of Roosevelt, and the substi-
tution, with it, of old Justices with new Justices. So, I don't quite 
know if the demarcation you suggest is really a true demarcation. 
Mr. FISHER. I am reminded by your question of what happened 
in the early 1940's, and, Nadine said, which is true, that if the 
Court is unanimous, that means something is really unconstitu-
tional. But at times, the Court is nearly unanimous, and the public, 
in this case, reacts in the newspapers and editorials, and so forth. 
I'm thinking about the 1940 case that upheld a compulsory flag sa-
lute. It was an eight-to-one vote by the Court, and the reaction in 
the public was fierce against the Court's ruling. Very strong deter-
mination by the general public and experts that the Court didn't 
understand the Constitution, didn't understand religious freedom, 
and didn't understand individual rights. Two years later, three Jus-
tices recanted; said they had regretted their being part of the eight. 
Two new Justices came on, and in 1943, the Court reversed itself. 
Now, the Court's opinion in 1943 was a beautiful description of 
the Bill of Rights, and what it means, but I think the credit goes 
to the country weighing in and saying this is just unacceptable to 
force school children to take a flag salute that's in violation of their 
religious rights. So, sometimes Congress is the restraint, some-
times it is the President, sometimes the general public. 
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Mr. Hyde. 
Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and ! 
want to conFatulate you on holding this hearing. This is a fas-
cinating subject and I just wish we had two or 3 days on a moun-
taintop retreat where we could not be stymied by the limitations 
of time, and really have some exchanges. Nadine Strossen is a pal 
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of mine, and I admire and respect her, and I don't think there's 
anything we agree on. [Laughter.] 
And that's what makes it such fun, because she brings a level 
of learning, and intelligence, and analysis to these subjects, but I'm 
just going to go through some of the things that trouble me in this 
field. 
Court-stripping as a remedy. Sure, it's in the Constitution, and 
we can limit jurisdiction of the Courts, but just try it. I remember 
some years ago--I won't mention his name, a Senator from a 
southern State, introduced legislation to remove abortion cases 
from the Court, and it produced an explosive reaction from the aca-
demic world. And I remember Arthur Fleming testifying with great 
indignation that this would shred the Constitution, and I asked 
him if he would send me his paper in opposition to the N orris-
LaGuardia Act, and he just smiled and made no response. Judicial 
activism, yes, there is, there really is. Someone, Kissinger, I guess, 
said. that power is the ultimate aphrodisiac" and it is,. and there are judges who exercise this. 
But what I did not hear is who gets the last word. Roe v. Wade 
created a constitutional right out of the air, and it's there, and 
every court and every State in the la..1J.d had their abortion laws 
wiped out with one fell swoop, and the Court has danced around. 
it now with Casey, but reinforced it for the marvelous reason that, 
by God, it's here, and we're used to it. So, who gets the last word? 
We're bound and we're chained by that. State courts, state legisla-
tures are chained by that, and so the court has got the last word, 
and that's really what counts. 
Is the Constitution a living, breathing document ala Justice 
Brennan, or does original intent count for something? "You pays 
your money and you takes your choice;" good question. 
Defining deviancy down-so true, so true, Senator Moynihan-
because obscenity 20 years ago-and NadinE; has written a book on 
this-·but, twenty years ago, the stuff you can see now in some of 
the movies, see on your nightly television, and listen to, would be 
criminalized. The Court has been defining deviancy down, but 
there you are. Flag burning; is burning a flag symbolic speech? The 
Court refuses to recognize that many of us, the majority of Ameri-
cans, don't think it's symbolic speech, but that's where we are. The 
Second Amendment; I don't care what you say, it's there-and the 
right to keep and bear arms is there. Internet porn, which Nadine 
was so concerned about. The consent of the governed is out there 
somewhere as a basis for this whole Government. And parents and 
people are worried about the poison that's on the internet, and it 
may be delightful to say what you want to say no matter how ob-
scene it is, but there's a real problem and I hope we can somehow 
work it out. 
There are noble exceptions to principle. Tort reform, we hear the 
argument from State's Rightists, saying we have 50 states and we 
ought to keep our nose out of their tort laws but in the real world 
today, you have 50 different sets of laws that insurance companies 
and exporters have to comply with and it just won't work. 
So, I remember 8l"guing with a Justice or judge of the Fifth Cir-
cuit one time ovef lunch about judicial activism, and I said-I 'was 
trying to be critical Qi' judicial activism and he pointed out an ex-
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ample where they have to do something they shouldn't do. And I 
said, what's that? And he said, reapportion. He said, your state leg-
islatures won't do it, many times, and, so, it's left to the Courts to 
do. For years, we didn't do it and nothing happened, but the politi-
cal process was distorted because the legislatures abandoned their 
responsibility; we did it and we do it. He's quite right. And I would 
call that a--
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Chairman HYDE. That's all right, I've trespassed on everybody's 
time, but--
Mr. CANADY. We've all trespassed. [Laughter.] 
Chairman HYDE. But this is really a fascinating subject: judicial 
review versus legislative review. It's nice to say we have the same 
responsibility, but we don't really have the power because the 
Court has the last word and it's really a conflict of laws problem. 
But, thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you all for giving your time 
to us. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Hyde. Mr. Watt. 
Mr. WATT" Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I seldom take the oppor .. 
tunity to praise the chairman of this subcommittee, and I--
Mr. CANADY. Let's get this on tape. [Laughter.] 
Mr. WATT. I will do that publicly and I want to make sure that 
our reporter is recording this. I think this has been an outstanding 
exercise. It may just be an exercise, unfortunately. I suspect that 
most of us will go back to our various ways of dealing with these 
issues when the hearing is over, and it'll be a nice academic back-
drop for us. But, it's at least nice for us to have the opportunity 
to have these kinds of exchanges as part of our legislative process. 
I think it's important for the Judiciary Committee, in particular, to 
take up some of these kind of discussions that appear to be -aca-
demic but have some very, very important and powerful legal and 
political implications. 
I should say that I resemble the chairman's remarks about neo-
State Righters. I had the sense that he might have been pointing 
that at me, but I'm sure he wasn't. 
Chairman HYDE. No, sir, I think you're a genuine States Righter. 
[Laughter.] 
Mr. WATT. I haven't heard anything today that I'm surprised by. 
The thing that I have not heard much about, that I'm extremely 
concerned about is impeachment of judges. I mean, there are a 
number of issues, that like the chairman I c~uld go down and differ 
with the Court on going back historically, differ with the Court on 
currently, and call them judicial activism or say that they ought to 
be doing something different. I'm kind of satisfied with that equal-
izing itself over time and coming out in a reasonable way; the polit-
ical process will take care of that. 
The one issue that is very troubling to me though is one that 
only Professor Franck addressed in a tangential way. And that 
when we, on our side, start talking about impeaching judges for ac-
tivism, and because we disagree with their opinions on issues. 
There are several issues I would vigorously disagree with members 
of the Supreme Court, and members of other courts, about, but I 
think that it's another matter to start talking about impeaching a 
judge. I heard what Professor Franck said about it. He thinks it's 
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apparently a legitimate, primary tool that one might consider. I'm 
just wondering how the others on the panel may feel about how 
this whole threat of impeachment plays into the process, and when 
and under what circumstances it might be appropriately threat-
ened and or applied. 
Ms. STROSSEN. May I address that, Congressman Watt? I did ad-
dress that in my written testimony and certainly the ACLU, as a 
staunch defender of free speech, would absolutely defend the right 
of everybody, including you and Congressman Hyde and all of us, 
to criticize particular decisions, and most of us have criticized the 
Boerne decision, as an example. That is protected free speech. But 
when you start not only the impeachment process itself, but even 
threatening to invoke the impeachment process, and when those at-
tacks are voiced by Government officials who are in a position to 
actually initiate the impeachment process, our concern is that 
starts crossing over a very important line between your protected 
right to criticize Government officials, including judges, versus dan-
gerous threats and intimidation. Even if they don't result in im-
peachment, they can have a chilling effect on judicial independ-
ence, which, by the way, no less staunch a conservative than Chief 
Justice Rehnquist called the crown jewel of our system of Govern-
ment. 
And Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote a book about the im-
peachment process in which he, going back to the first incident in 
history in 1804, talked about the extremely important precedent 
that, was set in the case of the impeachment of Justice Chase. It 
was not a legitimate basis for impeachment that somebody dis-
agreed with the judge's constitutional interpretation. That is the 
basis for criticism, certainly, but that is not a basis for removal. 
One can cite not only history for that proposition, and not only 
the text of the impeachment clause of the Constitution, but also, 
I think, even more importantly, the whole structure of checks and 
balances and of the very special role that is carved out for our judi-
ciary to be a check on the majoritarian branches of Government, 
to help them resist political tides that may well-and, unfortu-
nately, throughout our history, have-run roughshod over the 
rights~ especially, of unpopular individuals and dis-empowered mi-
nority groups. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman may have two additional minutes. 
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield? 
Mr. WATT. I'll certainly yield. 
Chairman HYDE. I just want to say on this subject, I think the 
gentleman is absolutely right. The word is thrown around promis-
cuously and wrongfully, and it should never be, and it's usually 
non-lawyers who do it. I don't mean to be critical of non-lawyers, 
but their visceral reaction to a judge they don't like is impeach. 
Thank God it takes a two-thirds vote and requires bipartisan sup-
port to impeach anybody. But I don't think that's a real threat. I 
think. very few people have reacted to a local situation; however, 
it gets a little dicey when you have a Federal judge who waits 8 
years to rule on a case, a serious criminal case that involves the 
freedom of the person, and of having to try it again, and fmd the 
W11tn8181H'. after 8 years-·to have the decision in your bosom for 8 
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years, it gets close to egregious misconduct. And those are tough 
cases; we don't have one before us, although I know of such a case. 
And just one last thing, you mentioned internet pornography and 
that we have a duty to look at the Constitution and say, hey, this 
isn't constitutional. Many times, Members of Congresq want to-it 
isn't a question of sending a message, but they k.,uJW the Courts 
change their mind, and yeu want to give them a chance to get it 
right next time, and they can't unless they get legislation up before 
them. That is sometimes a motive, rather than a blatant disregard 
for doing something that is unconstitutional, but let the Court 
worry about it. Sometimes you want to keep sending it up to them, 
hoping. Roe v. Wade, I'd like to send one every week up there, hop-
ing they'll get it right sometime. 
Thank you. Thanks. 
Mr. WATT. Can I just-I don't have any more questions, but I 
would like to hear from as many of the panelists as you will give 
time to respond to it-
Mr. CANADY. Sure. 
Mr. WATT. The impeachment issue. 
Mr. CANDAY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Mr. CURRIE. I certainly agree with v/hat has been suggested 
about the inadvisability of killing the umpire because you don't like 
his decisions. Impeachment is one form of killing the umpire, and 
the Senate of the United States in a very admirable bipartisan de-
cision back in 1805 in refusing to remove Justice Chase for political 
reasons gave, I think, the definitive answer to the use of impeach-
ment as a means of controlling the exercise of judicial power. The 
use of impeachment for that purpose is squarely contrary to the 
whole idea of judicial review. 
And, so, I think, is any attempt by other branches to destroy the 
effective)~ess of the Court. For example, you go back to the 1930's 
again, when the Supreme Court was frustrating the New Deal, the 
President's reaction was, let us neutralize the Court by packing it 
with a bunch of new Justices who will be sympathetic to my pro-
gram. That is totally inconsistent with the role of the Court as an 
enforcer of the Constitution. That is to say, kill the umpire. 
I have similar problems if the Congress undertakes to kill the 
umpire by removing the jurisdiction of the Court-by stripping the 
Court of jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress or the state legislatures. It was not just people like Mar-
shall and Hamilton who believed in judicial review as an essential 
check on the unconstitutional actions of other bra...ches of govern-
ment. Madison, as I said in my testimony, was also of that view; 
so was Thomas Jefferson. Congress has a role, the President has 
a role, everybody in a sense, Congressman Hyde, has the last word, 
in that if the Congress thinks that a bill is unconstitutional, it 
won't pass it. If the Court thinks that the bill is unconstitutional, 
it will hold it unconstitutional. And I think that's the best way to 
enforce the Constitution. Don't kill the umpire; let every branch of 
Government exercise its independent responsibility to protect us 
agfl1n!n; constitutional violations. This is not to say that there are 
no checks on the Court; of course there are checks on the Court. 
The appointment process has been mentioned. The amendment 
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process has been mentioned. But let's not kill the umpire just be-
cause we don't like his decisions. 
Mr. FRANCK. May I respond since I--
Mr. WATT. I wanted-I may have misstated what your intention 
was. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Mr. WATT. I didn't intend to do that. I'm sorry. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Mr. FRANCK. I don't believe you did misstate my intentions, Con .. 
gressman Watt. Professor Currie refers to the Supreme Court as 
the umpire, and wishes us to not kill the umpire. I would object 
to that noun being applied to the Supreme Court, actually. Profes-
sor Currie and Professor Strossen are in agreement with our es-
teemed Chief Justice on the question of impeachment, but the 
Chief Justice is in disagreement with Alexander Hamilton, with Jo-
seph Story, and with Henry Adams who wrote the most significant 
history of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations back about 
a century ago. Hamilton, you'll recall, of course, is the man who 
puts forward the argument for judicial review in Federalist 78, but 
th,en three essays later in Federalist 81, says that the impeach-
ment power is our complete security against the deliberate 
usurpations of the legislative authority by the Justices of the 
Court. 
Joseph Story agreed with that in his Commentaries on the Con-
stitution in 1833 and when Henry Adams, late in the 19th century, 
took a look at the Chase trial of 1805, he concluded that nothing 
was concluded. That is, nothing was settled conclusively by the 
Chase trial because neither side really came out clearly victorious 
as a theoretical matter. On the side of those seeking to remove Jus-
tice Chase was the argument that the Congress could impeach and 
remove for any reason it chose. Chase's defense team argued to the 
contrary, that something had to be clearly within the ambit of 
criminal law to be an impeachable offense. And Adams' conclusion 
was that neither side really won that argument. The truth has to 
be somewhere in between. 
A similar conclusion was reached about 5 years ago by the 
woman who wrote what I think is the definitive work on this, Elea-
nore Bushnell, whose book, Crimes, Follies and Misfortunes, was 
published by University of Illinois Press. She concludes likewise 
about the impeachment trial, in fact, reviews all the judicial im-
peachments in our history. And, I think her scholarship, frankly, 
is superior to Chief Justice Rehnquist's. 
All that being said, I believe too that impeachment is inadvisable 
almost all the time. I mentioned it today because I did not want 
to leave out what I think is a powerful potential check on the 
Court. 
Mr. WATT. What about on substantive disagreements? Is that a 
permissive basis? 
Mr. FRANCK. If the Congress concludes, if the House by majority 
sends a prosecution team up to the Senate chamber and succeeds 
in persuading two-thirds of the Senators th.at a particular judge or 
Justice has committed a deliberate series of usurpations on the au .. 
thority of the lature, I believe that that is sufficient grounds 
for impeachment. 
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And, of course, the Court itself ruled in Nixon v. United States 
in 1993 that Senate determination of someone's guilt is really a 
procedural issue, but by extension they could be said to have con-
cluded that impeachment proceedings are unreviewable by the 
Courts themselves. They called it a political questiot;l. 
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, I didn't mean 
to--
Mr. CANADY. Oh, no, I think that was a productive line to pur-
sue. M)r. Goodlatte. 
Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank 
you for holding these hearings. I think it's a very important subject 
that we have neglected for too long. Let me also say that I agree 
with Chairman Hyde that we need to avoid trying to change the 
Court's jurisdiction as a solution to this. But I would never say 
never to that. 
And I agree witb the gentleman from North Carolina that im-
peachment is not a suitable alternative, but I would never say 
never to that either, because that's a constitutional power that we 
have and we should preserve and protect it. 
And I would say that the gentleman, Professor Franck, that his 
point's well-taken; that it's only going to be used in the rather ex-
treme circumstance that the body would refer to the Senate for 
trial and action that would require two-thirds majority of the Sen-
ate. Rarely is it even going to be undertaken, and even more rarely 
would it succeed. But, I can envision circumstances where a Justice 
was totally and flagrantly ignoring the provisions of the United 
States Constitution, and under those circumstances, without any 
high crime or misdemeanor, but rather simply the misdemeanor of 
the opinion of the public and of the Congress that they are ignoring 
the dictates of law, would be a basis for their removal, and I would 
not ever foreclose that as a possibility. 
But, it is certainly not an adequate solution to the steady, case-
by-case erosion of the power of the other two branches of Govern-
ment and, in my opinion, of the Constitution itself, that takes place 
when the Court deals with issues in a manner that I think fla-
grantly disregard the Constitution. 
So my question to you then is, what do we do as an alternative? 
And let me take the Smith case and the Boerne case as an exam-
ple. I think most people in this country were stunned at the Smith 
decision. It was an easy decision, perhaps, in that particular fac-
tual scenario. Nobody wants to be upholding the right of people to 
smoke drugs, and that's what they founded that decision on, but 
it was a dramatic erosion of our First Amendment free exercise 
rights, in hindsight. But we read into that decision the inference 
that Congress hadn't spoken on this issue and that if we did speak 
on this issue, the Court would recognize that and honor it, and so 
by overwhelming majorities we passed through the Congress-al-
most no dissent--!-the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, making it 
clear that the higher standard of protection of free exercise of reli-
gion would be the law of the land, and the Court then simply came 
back and said, no, you don't have the authority to do that. 
There are other alternatives. A constitutional amendment is one, 
and, I, frankly, in this particular instance, think a constitutional 
amendment is called for, and I think it would have a great chance 
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as you might like, but nonetheless, I think, a quite significant dif-
ference, and that's on the abortion issue. I think things, in terms 
of Supreme Court doctrine, are very different 25 years after the 
Roe v.Wade. 
And I understand that the Casey case is one that employs stare 
decisis, but in so doing nonetheless overturns the trimester stand-
ard of Roe. The Casey court undoubtedly is responding to its rec-
ognition that Roe may have gone too far. There are new Justices 
on the Court who perhaps think that Roe was not a good decision 
when first decided. But beyond Casey, you have, through the Hyde 
amendm~nts, an opportunity to place further limitations on abor-
tion rights. You have through the initiatives of President Reagan 
and Bush the gag orders--
Mr. GOODLATTE. But none of those overturn the underlying deci-
sion that many of think was incorrect in the first place, and 32 mil-
lion abortions later-to me, I don't think that our ability to chisel 
around the edge of that really is a ' chilling of strength. All it is, is 
being able to operate in areas the Court have not acted and, there-
fore, given us a little more room to operate. But, that's simply like 
saying, well, here are the crumbs that we've left for you to operate 
around the edge of this issue, but the core of the issue, we said, 
stay out of it because of what many people believe is a misinter-
pretation of the Constitution. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Mr. GoODLATTE. Anyone else want to respond to that? 
Ms. STROSSEN. I would love to. Specifically, in the area of reli-
gious freedom and RFRA. As I mentioned, the ACLU had testified 
in favor of it. We're very disappointed by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. By the way, with all due respect, Congressman, the drug in-
volved-peyote-is not smoked, so I'm told. One has to ingest it. 
But, seriously, what was at issue there, of course, was the right not 
to ingest a drug in general, but in · a particular religious ceremony. 
As it happened--
Mr. GoODLATTE. But I'm not trying to go over that. I think-my 
opinion is that the Court picked a case where it would not stir 
great public controversy--
Ms. STROSSEN. I completely agree with that. 
Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing). People's religious freedoms were in-
fringed by that particular decision, yet-
Ms. STROSSEN. And, yet, it had sweeping consequences, abso-
lutely. And in that particular case, the follow-up, I think, points 
the way toward other action that can be taken. Namely, the state 
legislature in Oregon, where that case came from, immediately 
passed a law making an exemption from the drug laws for those 
who were ingesting peyote in religious ceremonies. And, short of a 
constitutional amendment-which not only is difficult to enact, but 
may have some very strong dOY/nsides as well-I'm heartened that 
there are a lot of other possible strategies for securing the religious 
freedom that Congress tried to secure through RFRA. 
One potential vehicle is another Federal statute, and I think a 
couple of the witnesses on this panel testified about a legislative 
record that could perhaps be responsive to the concerns the Su-
preme Court raised. And another possible approach that Congress 
could follow would be not to have a law that is written in such 
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sweeping terms that it sounds like an interpretation of the Con-
stitution, which is what, I think, got the Supreme Court's back up, 
but one could isolate the particular violations of religious liberty 
that are being conducted under Federal laws. 
One example was already given: the regulation that prohibited 
the wearing of religious headgear by members of the military. One 
could find out what all the existing violations are and correct them 
by passing statutes. In addition, the states are very strong avenues 
of potential support for religious freedom. Not only through laws, 
such as the one that was passed in Oregon, but also through state 
courts' interpretations of their religious freedom provisions in their 
constitutions. Since the Supreme Court's Smith decision--
Mr. GoODLATTE. Can I interrupt since I'm going to have to leave 
and I'm sure the chairman doesn't want to go on indefinitely, but 
I don't disagree with what you're saying, that there are other alter-
natives to seek legislative remedies. What I am concerned about is 
the lack of ability to change an overlying Supreme Court decision 
that the majority of the people in this country find offensive and 
your solutions don't address that. Professor Franck, do you want to 
say something? 
Mr. FRANCK. Professor Clinton- ··-
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman will have one additional minute. 
Mr. CLINTON. Yes, I think what's frustrating here is that you're 
looking for something a little more definite and a little more force-
ful, and I think that I can give that to you. And it seems to me 
that you should go back to the Founders, and reread all that his-
tory and then reclaim your authority to interpret the boundaries of 
your own power from the Court, which I think the Congress has 
given away. 
Mr. GoODLATTE. How do we take it back? 
Mr. CLINTON Essentially, take it back. You're simply taking it 
back. You're going back to the original understanding of the Con-
stitution. 
Mr. GOODLATTE. Is that in defiance of Mr. Hyde's concerns about 
the Congress changing the jurisdictional authority of the Court? 
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I don't mean to do it that way. I mean, sim-
ply, I think the understanding was, in the beginning, that each of 
the branches of Government would be the judge of their own con-
stit.utional powers. IVladison said it; he said it flatly in debates in . _ . 
the first Congress. And I think that would be the most-I suppose 
that would be the most direct and the most forceful approach. It 
would answer Mr. Hyde's suggestion-he raised a question-I 
think it was the first or second thal he noted-was, who has the 
last word. I think that's the issue, seems to me. Seems to me, the 
problem is, we have, in the last 40 or 50 years, come to expect that 
the Court has the last word, but I think that's a-historical and it's 
not in accordance with the original design of the Constitution, and 
so, there may be some tension. 
Now, it creates a problem. The problem is, if there's no finality, 
then it looks as like there's going to be a form of anarchy in con-
stitutional interpretation. Well, yes. I think that's precisely what 
was intended. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman's time has expired. 
Mr. GoODLATrE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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. Mr. CANADY. One more time? Without objection, the gentleman 
from Virginia, Mr. Scott, will be recognized for three additional 
minutes for an additional question. 
Mr. SCOTl'. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We've heard a lot about 
the will of the people-and I don't know if this is a question or an 
observation, it just occurred to me that when the Supreme Court 
steps in with a ruling invalidating a statute, that it is always going 
to be in violation of the will of the majority of the people. And 
that's just the way it is, and that's how we like it because we have 
a minimum standard of rights that aren't going to be violated, and 
if something passes 97-to-2 in the Senate, if it's unconstitutional, 
it doesn't matter how popular it is. 
Mr. FISHER. I have a comment. Chairman Hyde had said that on 
Roe v. Wade it's still the last word even though the Court backed 
up a little bit in Casey to give up on the trimester standard. I don't 
think that's a statement on the power of the Supreme Court. I 
think that's a statement of reality of politics in the United States. 
I think that if Roe v. Wade had been resisted by 90 percent of the 
people, it wouldn't be around today. But the country is fairly close-
ly divided on this issue, and it gives the Court enough political 
room to hold on to some of Roe and give up on the rest. 
I think on the other cases that we have been talking about-on 
Boerne and on Lopez, on guns in the schoolyard-it may not be a 
case of the Court being the last word, but Congress not putting 
enough attention into building a record to show why it would have 
that authority to enact the legislation. You probably know-I think 
it was last year, within the last year-Congress passed legislation 
again on guns in the schoolyard and the dialogue continues. So, I 
think the burden is on Congress. Particularly on Boerne, where 
what you were doing was probably fatal. To tell the Court, when 
you gave up on the Sherbert standard in Smith, we are reimposing 
it in RFRA, I think that's probably a red flag for the Court. But, 
you could have stated that although the Court held that religious 
freedom is at this level, we're going to go above it with some other 
language and not to confront the Court by telling it to adopt a 
standard that it itself had rejected. So a lot of the power is left to 
you to build a record and show why the legislation is necessary. 
Ms. STROSSEN. Congressmen Scott, if I could comment just brief-
ly_ I think what you said is partly correct, but I would like to add 
an important caveat. Ifs partly correct that, of course, it's inevi-
table that in striking down a popularly enacted law, whether by 
referendum or through the legislative process, the Court is violat-
ing or thwarting the will ·')f the people that is at that moment in 
the time the majority of the people. So we are talking about tem-
porary, shifting majorities. But in doing so, the Court is honoring 
the will of the people in the larger, more durable sense, as reflected 
in that great document that begins, "We, the people of the United 
States." 
And, it also honors that larger concept of popular will, insofar as 
we the ~people retain the right to amend the Constitution to over-
turn a Supreme Court decision. l.'hat is a power that has been exer-
cised recurrently throug!tout our history. I agree with the remarks 
that were just made. The fact that such a constitutional amend-
ment has not been adopted with respect to abortion, and we cer-
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at passage because the underlying statutory legislation was almost 
unanimously approved by Congress, but that's not often going to be 
the case. ; 
And we also have the alternative proposed by President Jackson, 
,vhich is-I don't recall if it was Justice Marshall or Justice Taney 
who was Chief Justice at the time-but, he said, the Justice has 
issued his opinion, now let him enforce it. Certainly a dangerous 
precedent to follow, but there's certainly a temptation by the execu-
tive branch and the legislative branch to ignore Supreme Court de-
cisions since they obviously ignore our opinions in some of these 
cases. 
I wonder if you all would comment on that. 
Mr. DEVINS. Yes. Congress has an enormous range of tools avail-
able to it to express disagreement with the Court to affect the con-
stitutional value at play in a decision that go well beyond impeach-
ment, restrictions of jurisdiction or even constitutional amendment. 
Mr. GoODLATTE. Let me interrupt you on that point. 
Mr. DEVINS. Sure. 
Mr. GOODLATTE. A. number of us cheered when some California 
Supreme Court justices were removed from office a number of 
years ago; they did not have a lifetime appointment, and they were 
clearly making decisions contrary to the will of the general public 
in California, as evidenced by their removal from office. But, we 
don't have that with the Federal judiciary. They have lifetime ap-
pointments. Are you advocating a change? 
Mr. DEVINS. No, I'm not. As we have seen over the past decade, 
the composition of the Courts changes roughly one-half, I think, 
every decade. It's a quite significant change over a decade. But let's 
get beyond--
Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, I don't want to get beyond that. I think 
you raise a good point, but then we have well-established within 
the Court the document of stare decisis. They are very, very reluc-
tant to go back and overturn previous decisions by the Court. They 
do it, certainly, in some instances, but the progress seems to me 
to be a steady march away from what many would view as the 
original intent in our Constitution. 
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes. 
Mr. GoODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I wonder if you would address that point. Yes, we do get new 
Justices; we work very hard to pick them and to make sure they 
are of the-I don't want to take a liberal or conservative approach 
here-but, of the correct interpretation of the Constitution, that 
they will continue what we think is the established intent, and 
then they refuse to do it because previous Courts have said other-
wise ~nd they're not willing to overturn the precedents of the 
Court. 
Mr. DEVINS. I think, Congressman, you may be a little pessimis-
tic, very pessimistic of your authority, and let me suggest by 
way-
Mr. GooDLAnE. Well, you haven't given me much authority to 
h~g lI!y hat OD-
Mr. DEVINS. Let me give you a concrete example where I think 
Congress and the states, in resisting a Supreme Court decision 
have made a huge difference. Perhaps not as much of a difference 
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~ainly know it's been tried, suggests that the court is in fact honor-
Ing the will of the people in that larger and, I think, more impor-
tant sense. 
Mr. CANADAY. The gentleman has one additional minute. 
Mr. WATT. Let me make a quick comment, and that is that if 
you're. talking about freedom of speech, the only time you have 
standing to rely on freedom of speech is when the Government is 
probably doing something to you like throwing you in jail. What 
you have said, or what you have expressed, has made democrat-
ically-elected officials so mad that they want to throw you in jail, 
and then you resort to the Constitution. I don't see how you can 
ever rely on the First Amendment and be in the majority. That's just a comment. 
Ms. STROSSEN. That's why the ACLU's First Amendment clients 
are such unpopular people. [Laughter.] 
l\lr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. I'll now recognize myself. 
I want to get back to Professor Clinton's testimony about 
'Marbury v. Madison, and his historical analysis of what that case 
meant when it was decided, and how the Supreme Court dealt with 
that case over the following 100 years. Is there anyone who dis-
agrees, who would express disagreement with what Professor Clin-
ton adds, and then I'll give him a chance to respond. Professor 
Currie? 
Mr. CURRIE. Indeed, I do disagree and I'm happy to have the op-
portunity to say so. The Supreme Court itself has never suggested 
that Marbury v. Madison should be limited so narrowly, and the 
Supreme Court has always understood that it has the power to test 
the validity of any act of Congress or any state legislation that 
comes before it in case controversy. If one goes back to the inten-
tions of the Framers, which have been invoked here and which I 
do think have an important role to play in the interpretation of the 
Constitution it's perfectly clear from the record of the Constitu-
tional Convention that the Framers of the Constitution intended judicial review as a part of the system of checks and balances. Not just to prevent the powers of the courts from being unconstitution-
ally infringed by acts of Congress, but to prevent Congress from 
unwittingly or deliberately exceeding the limits on its own powers. 
That's the way it was described by Hamilton in the Federalist Pa-
pers. That's the way it was understood by innumerable Members 
of the early Congress. 
The question often came up, do we have the constitutional power 
to pass a particular bill? Every once in a while somebody would 
say, let's leave it to the Supreme Court. A number of people here 
today have rightly criticized that approach. Members of Congress 
have an independent obligation to construe the Constitution for 
themselves and to obey it. But everyone on both sides of that de-
bate during the first 12 years in Congress said, of course the 
Courts have an additional check on the constitutionality of legisla-
tion passed by Congress. And that means that Congress will not al-
ways have tlie final word. That's inherent in a system of checks 
and balances. 
Sometimes the Court may make a mistake, but ~gain, if the 
Court makes a mistake, it's dangerous to destroy the Court. I said 
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the court was an umpire; I didn't say it was the only umpire. In 
baseball, you've got umpires now. The Court is the third base um-
pire, the Congress is the first base umpire, and the home plate um-
pire is the people of the United States, who will ultimately see to 
it that wrong decisions by the Court get corrected one way or the 
other. The Dred Scott case, the Child Labor case, Plessy v. Fer-
guson, a whole lot of wrong decisions of the Supreme Court have 
not steod the test of time; they have not withstood the opposition 
of the people, for in the long run and here I certainly agree with 
Professor Strossen, in the long run the .people's good sense will pre-
vail. That's why we have a Constitution, that's why we have the 
Supreme Court as one of the umpires, that's why obligation of 
Members of Congress are also obliged to interpret and respect the 
Constitution. 
Mr. CANADY. Would anyone else like to comment on the histori-
cal issue before I give Professor Clinton a-ehance to respond? Pro-
fessor Devins? 
Mr. DEVINS. This is an extension of what Professor Currie was 
just saying. I think that no branch speaks the last word, -even on 
a particular case. It's a circular process and if you have four um-
pires, they must all be in play all the time. Along those lines, it's 
important we look at Marbury as a precedent to recognize what 
Marbury speaks to is only the power of the Court to interpret the 
Constitution and not to the power of the Court to speak the last 
word about the Constitution. 
Mr. KINKOPF. I'd like to, if I might--
Mr. CANADY. Yes, Professor Kinkopf. 
Mr. KrNDOPF. That is, again, just to amplify on Professor Curries' 
remarks, but it, I think, would profit us to bear in mind what it 
would mean if each branch would be the ultimate arbiter of its own 
power. I think that would effectively, or potentially, would effec-
tively eviscerate Congress in that. Chairman Canady, you men-
tioned in your opening remarks the President's authority to inter-
pret the Constitution pursuant to the Take-care Clause. Congress 
could enact laws, but the President could decide himself not to en-
force those laws so that it wouldn't leave to Congress-it would end 
up undermining Congress's authority in that way, to allow the 
President simply to determine that he's not going to enforce any 
statute of Congress with which he disagrees as to Congress's basis 
of authority. 
Mr. FRANCK. I would just like to go on record as saying that I 
absolutely agree with Professor Clinton's view of the history of 
these matters. I've looked into much of the same history myself. I 
find, as Professor Clinton does, Madison saying quite the opposite 
of what Professor Currie asserts he says in the First Congress. I 
also find it interesting that in the question of the Court's role as 
the enforcer of the boundaries on Congress's power, you have this 
statement on the interstate commerce power from John Marshall 
in Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824. He says that the reach of Congress's 
power over commerce among the states must be controlled authori-
tatively not by the judiciary, but by the people through democratic 
processes-those are my words, so far-then Marshall says, such 
are, Uthe restraints on which people must often rely solely in all 
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representative governments." Where Professor Currie and I em-
phatically agree is that the home plate umpire is the people. 
Mr. CANADY. Mr. Fisher? 
Mr. FISHER. I want to comment on something that Neil Kinkopf 
said about the Take-care Clause. Maybe he can explain it again be-
cause, to me, if Congress passes legislation, the President is to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed. He doesn't have authority to 
pick and choose, and say, I'm not going to enforce this. 
There was a case in the Reagan years where the Justice Depart-
ment decided that it wasn't going to implement all of the Competi-
tion in Contracting Act, and the Circuit Court, the Appellate Court, 
said that the President doesn't have such authority; that would be 
like a line-item veto. Well, we have one, live with one now, but at 
that time, that was considered a forbidden act. You enforce all the 
laws; you don't pick and choose. 
Mr. KINKO~F. Right, I agree with you, Professor Fisher, and I ap-
preciate the opportunity perhaps to clarify what I said. I agree that 
that is not for the President to do, and my concern would be that 
if we were to adopt the position that each branch is the ultimate 
arbiter of its own authority we would end up very quickly in a very 
significant constitutional crisis. And I think the Court's approach 
which accommodates and is greatly deferential to each branch's 
view of its own power, but which is not finally deferential allows 
us to avoid those constitutional conflicts and I think properly en-
forces the Constitution's structure. 
Mr. CANADY. Professor Clinton? 
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I'd first like to ask Professor Currie; some-
thing he said confused me. I agree with you that Congres-s does not 
have the last word on all constitutional questions, but are you say-
ing that the Court does? 
Mr. CURRIE. No. As I tried to say a few moments ago, I think 
each branch has a negative. Each branch, if it says something is 
unconstitutional, can prohibit it from going into effect. I think 
that's what the Framers intended and I think that gives us maxi-
mum protection for constitutional rights. 
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I'm unclear as to why you think I disagree 
with that. 
Mr. CURRIE. Well, if you don't disagree with it, fine. 
Mr. CLINTON. I think all I really said was that it seems to me, 
according to the original understanding, that each branch of gov-
ernment was to be the final judge of its own powers. I think that's 
way the constitutional history of the country went for at least a 
100 years and then things started changing in the late 19th cen-
tury. 
Mr. CURRIE. What I took you to say-Mr. Chairman, if I may-
I took you to be taking a narrow view of Marbury v. Madison, say-
ing that it only upholds the power of the Court to strike down 
those acts of Congress which interfere with its own functions, and 
I'm saying I do not agree with that. Gibbons v. Ogden was just 
cited as an example of a narrow view of judicial review, but actu-
ally what the Court did there was to review the constitutionality 
of a substantive act of Congress. 
Mr. CLINTON. Well, isn't it true that a Court's holding is gen-
erally confined to the situation of the case. 
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. Mr. CURRIE. I hope so. 
Mr. CLINTON. It seems like if you interpret Marbury that way, 
that's all that could be drawn out of the case in terms of judicial 
review. 
Mr. CURRIE. Marbury doesn't stand alone. We have 200 years of 
other decisions of the Supreme Court, reviewing the validity of sub-
stantive decisions of Congress, and I that history supports that au-
thority. 
Mr. CLINTON. But it seems to me that history doesn't really start 
until about the 1890's and that's where the historical problem 
comes in. Sure, if the Court had decided other cases right away and 
continued to do that throughout the 1800's, and the 1820's, 1830's, 
and the 1840's, and on, at an increasing rate, that would be one 
thing; but the fact seems to me to be that the Court did not do 
that. It waited, in effect, almost 100 yearg before it ever invalidated 
an act of Congress, other than the Dred Scott case-we have to 
admit that was an exception. But that was the only exception until 
1895, it seems to me, where the Court actually invalidated a Fed-
erallaw on grounds other than those stated in Marbury~ 
Mr. CURRIE. The Court had practiced substantive judicial review 
ever since of Hylton v. United States in 1796 in which it was asked 
to invalidate an act of Congress imposing a tax on the ground it 
violated the direct tax apportionment provisions of Article I. The 
Court recognizes and exercises the power of judicial review not only 
when it in fact strikes down a statute, but whenever it asks the 
question, as it asked innumerable times throughout the 19th cen-
tury, is this act constitutional. The historical record supports the 
Supreme Court's power to do that, and I don't think tod.ay anybody 
is going to cause us to retreat from judicial review of acts of Con-
gress on substantive grounds that do not affect the jurisdiction of 
the Court. That's a very established and very essential part of our 
checks and balances. 
Ms. STROSSEN. I'd just like to echo that and to say I think it 
would be very dangerous if we inferred from the fact that it took 
the Supreme Court a long time to exercise its power of constitu-
tional review with respect to particular acts of Congress that, 
therefore, that means the Supreme Court doesn't have that power. 
Take the area where I have continued to voi(.'e concern, in the 
acts of Congress that violate the First Amendment. We've had 
them for a long time; earlier on in today's session, somebody men-
tioned the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Supreme Court did not 
have occasion to find those unconstitutional Interestingly enough, 
it was Congress that stepped into the breach by .failing to re-enact 
the law. But it was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court for the 
first time struck down an act of Congress as violating the Free 
Speech guarantee in the First Amendment, and I would be loathe 
to infer from that historical record that, therefore, the Supreme 
Court does not have the power to strike down acts of Congress that 
do violate the First Amendment. 
Mr. CANADY. Mr. Fisher? 
Mrs FiISHER. The point that David Currie just made about the af-
firmative role of the Supreme Court I think should be underscored. 
That gives you the creative, constructive power. You're the ones 
who are deciding what national legislation should be, and, OD the 
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whole, the Supreme Court comes along and says, you're right, 
you're right, you're right, and occasionally they say, you're wrong, 
and you're back on the dialog again. But the affirmative part of ju-
dicial review just emphasizes how large a role the Congress plays 
and the Court is generally instrumental in supporting you. 
Mr, CANADY. Well, thank you for your comments. All of you have 
made a very important contribution to our hearing today and I 
want to extend my gratitude to you. 
I want to thank the members of the subcommittee-we actually 
had pretty good attendance today for a day that Congress is not in 
session, and I'm grateful to the members who were able to be here. 
I wish we could continue, but time is racing on. I do thank you, 
and this is a discussion that will go on, and I think the issues that 
we've raised today are important issues, not just for the sub-
committee, but for all Members of Congress to reflect on and hope-
fully some of the things that have been discussed today will be dis-
cussed more widely in the Congress as we go about our constitu-
tional responsibilities. 
Thank you very much. The subcommittee is adjourned. 
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject 
to the call of the Chair.] 
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ESSAY 
JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY AND POLmCAL 
INSTABILITY . 
Neal Devins* and Louis Fisher·· 
JUDICIAL supremacy is down but hardly out. Notwithstanding calls by interest groups that Congress Uis. now the co~ of last 
resort.,,1 the myth of judicial exclusivity nonetheless· persists. The 
popular press . treats Coun rulings as definitive,! law school case-
bOoks typically identify . constitutional law as the work of the Su-
preme Coun/· and when a government official. make that Reagan 
Administration Attorney General Edwin Meese .. argues that Su-
preme Court decisions are not 64binding on . all persons and pans of 
government.'" editorialists and representatives of the Washington 
Post. New York Times. and American Bar Association are sera 
into a state of apoplexy.~ Among I~gal academics9 however. it is 
• Ernest W. Goodric;h professor of law and a lecturer in 50vemmcna .lthe College 
of William .ad Miry. Alan Meese. John McGinnis. Suzanna Sherry. Emily Sherwin. 
and Bill Treanor provided valuable commentary on an earlier verSion of this essay, 
•• Louis rasher i5 Senior · Specialist in Separation of Powers al the Coftsressional 
·Rcscln:b Sc"icc Or tHe Library of CongrCS5. 
. t W. John Moore. In WhOle CoU"? 23 Nat" J. 2396. 2400 (1991). . 
: In a 1987 survey cond"'Icd by lhc Hears. Corporation and reponed in abe WIlS"-
ing.oft POSI. six out of ten respondents idel1tirled the Supreme Coun as the -(mal 
authority on constituUonaI claanle.- For the Pone Ibosc six were -correctIJ.·· Ruth 
MarCU5. Consululion Confuses Mosa Ameraas: Public III-Informed on U.S. Blue-
print. Wash. Post. Feb. 15. 1981. at A13~ See 1110 Joan Biskupic. The Shrinking 
DockCL Wash. Post. Mar. 18. 1996. at AIS (discuum,lhe Supreme Coun·s sbrinkin! 
dockCI and noUn,: "The imponancc of the Court. of course. is not in iu numbers. I~ 
is in abe Court havinl the lUI word. The justic;:es me &he final arbiter of whal is in the 
Constilulion.'" . ,'. 
J Sec Neal E. Devins. Correspondence: 1be SluR of COasUlulional Law. 77 Iowa L 
!In. 179S (1992). 
• Edwin Meese ilL ne Law of the Constitution. 61 Tul. L Rev. 979, 983 (1987). 
• Michael Kinsley. McCle's Slink Bomb. Wash. Post. Oct. 29. 1986. at AI9: Anthony 
Lewis. Law or Power? N,Y. nmts. Oct. 27. 1986. at AD: SIUlrt Taylor Jr .. Uberties 
,?nion Deaounces M .... N.Y~ Times. Oct. 24. 1986. at AJ7 (quotinl then-ABA' 
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now commonpJace to discuss constitutional law as something larger 
and more complex than merely court rulings. fa The degree to which 
some scholars now dismiss the Supreme Court as the exclusive 
source of constitutional law prompted Mike Paulsen recently to 
ask. somewhat plaintively: "Will nobody defend judicial supremacy 
anymore?"? 
Fear not Mike. Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer have heard 
your cry.- In an analysis that is "neither empirical ~or historicar" 
(it cannot be), they derive judicial supremacy from 4>'preconstitu-
tional" norms.9 In particular, Alexander and Schauer believe that 
vesting in the Court the authority to interpret, with finality, the 
meaning of the Constitution contributes to poJitical stability.1lI Cor-
respondingly. they claim that "an important-perhaps the impor-
tant-function of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to 
be done. nil 
Alexander and Schauer's argument is important, provocative. 
and unconvincing. To their credit, by grounding judicial suprem-
acy on law's settlement function, they have reinvigorated the aca-
demic debate over democratic government's duty to obey Court 
edicts. Nevertheless. if stability is the problem, judicial exclusivity 
is not the answer. Their ahistorical analysis collides with every-
thing we know about the Court as a political institution. In par-
president Eugene C. Thomas as saying that this disregard would "'shake the founda· 
tions of our system"). 
• See. e.~ .. Louis Fisher. Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Proc-
ess (1988): .Louls Fisher & Neal Devins. Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (2d 
ed. 1996): Robert F. Nagel. JudiCial Power and American Character: Censoring Our-
selYes in an Anxious Age (1994): Neal Devins. ed .• EJected Branch Influences in 
Constitutional Decisionmaking. Law & Contemp. Probs .. Autumn 1993. at 1. 3-4; 
Barry Friedman. Dialogue and Judicial Review. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993): Michael 
J. Klarman. Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions. 82 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 (1996): Sanford Levinson. Could Meese Be Right This Time"? 61 Tu!. L. Rev. 
1071 (1987): Michael Stokes Paulsen .. The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Sav What the Law Is. 83 Oeo. W. 217 (1994): David A. Strauss. Presidential In-
terprelation of the Constitution. IS Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993): Robin West. The 
Aspirationa) Constitution. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 2-'1 (l993). 
, Michael Stokes Paulsen. Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to 
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber. 83 Geo. W. 385. 38S (1994). 
• Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer. On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation. 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997). 
·Id. at 1369. . 
-Id. at 1375-77. 
II Jd.. at 1377. 
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ticular, Alexander and Schauer do not take into account how con-
centrating complete interpretive authority in the Court would cre-
ate political instability and undermine the fragile foundation that 
supports and sustains judicial power. Instead of suggesting that the 
judiciary can settle in any decisive way such contentious issues as 
abortion. affirmative action. federalism, privacy, race districting, 
and religious' freedom, the record of the last two centuries points to 
a more modest and circumscribed role for the courts. I: No doubt at 
various times in our history the Supreme Court has attempted a 
more ambitious agenda, but it has done so at great cost to itself and 
the nation. U 
Perhaps we are being unfair. Alexander and Schauer "engage in 
direct normative inquiry,"'" considering democratic acceptance of 
what judicial supremacy ··should" be. I!' Yet. even if it was under-
stood that the Court should have the last word on the Constitution's 
meaning, judicial exclusivity would marginalize the Constitution by 
overwhelming the obligation to fol1ow the Court's constitutional 
judgments with the competing policy-driven "«:>bligations n of govern-
ment officials. I. In other words. absent the constraints imposed by 
social and politica] forces, the Court's constitutional judgments will 
be less relevant and hence less stable. The tugs and pulls of politics 
therefore make the Constitution more relevant and more durable. 
I. PRESERVING THE CONSTITlITION 
Can the Constitution be preserved and honored without .... a final 
interpretive authority for choosing among competing [constitu~onal] 
interpretations?"I': For modern day defenders of judicial suprem-
acy. like Alexander and Schauer. this question is little more than 
rhetorical. Suggesting that the ··seulement and coordination func-
tions of law"" are the Constitution·s -chief raison d'etre;t.if judicial 
I: See infra Pan II.A: notes 1! 1 .. 120 and accompanying text. 
It See infra notes 76-86. 101·104 and accompanying leXI • 
... Jd .. at 1370 . 
• , Id. at 1369. 
fa See infra Part II.B. Makin, matters wone. lhe Coun might well attempt to dem-
onsrrate ils lasl word SlalUS by purposefully distancing lIseJr from populist sentimenl 
chrou,h iu decisions. 
" Aleunder "Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1381. 
IIld. at 1376. 
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supremacy is heralded as the onJy way to protect "a single written 
constitution" from ·"shifting political fortunes. ,,:c, This conclusion. 
however, is not suggested in the text or structure of the Constitu-
tion. the framers' intent, historical development. or even Supreme 
Court declarations of its own status as the ultimate and final inter-
preter of the Constitution.:1 Instead. the overriding value pro-
moted by the framers was a system of checks and balances. with 
each branch asserting its own powers and protecting its own pre· 
rogatives. 
Alexander and Schauer dodge this historical bullet by reminding 
us that their inquiry is ""normative" and suggesting that, in any 
event .. "[t]he present, and not the past. decides whether the past is 
relevant. ,,:: For an essay on whether a Constitution ought to have 
an authoritative interpreter, this bit of trickery might suffice. For 
an essay on "The Constitution of the United States:' however, it is 
self-contradictory to argue that judicial supremacy is needed to de-
fend the Constitution. Claiming a power for the Coun that was 
never intended hardly preserves and defends the Constitution. In .. 
stead, this claim debases and threatens constitutional government. 
The Constitution's text. its original intent. and intervening prac-
tice support a form of judicial review far more limited than that of-
fered by Alexander and Schauer. Indeed. no specific language in 
the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to declare cer .. 
tain governmental conduct unconstitutional .. let alone the exclusive 
authority to do so. Judicial review can be derived from some sec· 
tions of the Constitution .. but in almost every instance it is the 
power of federal courts to strike down state actions or to void con-
gressional statutes that threaten judicial independence . .!.\ The de· 
.' Jd. at 1381. 
:!It Id. at 1376. 
;, On Coun declarations of its lasl word status. see text accompanying nOles 58·75: 
see also Louis Fisher. The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy. 2S Suffolk U. L. 
Rev.8S (1991) (discussing various Justices· interpretations of the Court's role). 
:: Alexander &. Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1370. 
:J The specification lhat the ··Constitution. and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. .. shall be the supreme Law of lhe land: and lhe 
Jud,es in every Stale shall be bound thereby:' U.s. ,Const. art. VI. makes clear that 
federal couns must review the actions or Slale governments. One might argue that 
coftp'essionaJ statutes nOI ··;n [pJunuance" of the Constitution are subject to judicial 
nullification. bue judicial reyiew oyer the coequal branches represents a major al· 
JI'Indi.zemenl and requires convincing evidence. Furthermore, in extendinllhe judi-
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bates that occurred during state ratification conventions suggest 
that the framers believed judicial review of Congress was limited 
and the President had the power to independently interpret the 
Constitution.:" Although there was some support for a broad con-
ception of judicial review,':j no one argued for judicial supremacy.:' 
Early Court rulings. confirm this understanding. From .1789 to 
1803, several Justices wondered whether the power of judicial re-
view would reach to congressional and presidential actions. They 
. could not decide whether the power existed .. whether it was vested 
in the Court. or under what conditions it might be invoked.:-: 
Certainly judicial supremacy would have been alien to the mem-
bers of the First Congress. During the debate in 1789 on the Presi-
dent's removal power. Madison saw no reason to defer to the judi-
cial power to all cases -arising Under the Constilution ..... it was "'generally supposed 
that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature:" 2 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. at 430 (Max Farrand ed .• rev. ed. 
]937) (hereinafter Records]. For example .. cases of a -judiciary nalure" would in-
clude congressional statutes that reduce the salaries of federal judges. However de-
fined. the idea of cases of a "judiciary nature- is something far short of giving the Su-
preme Court ultimate control over the meaning of the Constitution. At the Virginia 
ratifying convention. for example. Madison interpreted "arising under" 10 justify ju-
dicial review only against the states. 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions 
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 532 (Jonathan Elliot ed .. 1968). Alex-
ander Hamilton made the same point in Federalist No. 80. The Federalist No. 80. at 
503 (AJexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed .• 1961). In addition. sev-
eral delegates at the Philadelphia convention spoke in favor of judicial review when 
invoked against unconstitutional Siale laws. 2 Records. supra. at 92·93 (remarks by 
Gouverneur Morris and Jamts Madison). 
:. See Paulsen. supra nOle 7. at 219~92: Frank H. Easterbrook. Presidential Review. 
40 Case W. Res. L. Re\,. 90S. 921·22 (1990). 
!' See William Michael Treanor. The Case o/Ihe Prisoners and the Origins of Judi-
cial Review. 143lJ. Pa. L. Rev. 491 (1994). 
:. Sylvia Snowiss. Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 195·97 (1990). 
:'f See Hylton v. United Stales, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171. 175 (1796) (Chase. J.) 
(emphasizing that if the Supreme Coun had such a power it should never be exer-
cised ""b"l in II very clellr CIIS"-); see also comments in Calder v. BUll. 3 U.S. (3 Dalt.) 
386.399 (1798) (Iredell. J.) (the authority of the court to declare a statute void is of a 
"delicate" nalure and the Coun will not use such power except in a "clear and urgent 
case") and Cooper v. Telfair .... U.S. (4 DaU.) 14. 19 (1800) (Chase. J.) (while some 
CircuilS have decided the Supreme Coun could declare an act unconstitutional. the 
Supreme Court itself has nol 50 held). Moreover. when John Marshall provided lhe 
rationale for judicial review in Marbury. it was through a chain of reasoning lhat pre-
supposed presidential authority 10 interpret the Conslitution. See Easterbrook. su-
pra note 24. at 919·20. 
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clary on the constitutionality of what Congress was about to do.!l' 
While acknowledging that "the exposition of the laws and Consti-
tution devolves upon the Judiciary," he begged to know on what 
ground '·any one department draws from the Constitution greater 
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the 
several departments?",2? 
Early presidents also believed that each branch of government 
should act as an independent interpreter of the Constitution. George 
Washington's firSt veto was on constitutional grounds.)!) Thomas 
J efferson, viewing the Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized 
speech critical of the government) as patently· unconstitutional, used 
his pardon power to discharge u every person under punishment or 
prosecution under the sedition law.")) Andrevi Jackson announced 
his own theory of coordinate construction in a message vetoing leg-
islation to rechaner the Bank of the United States.32 Since the Coun 
had previously upheld the constitutionality of the Bank,3:t Jackson 
was under pressure to consider the matter as settled by precedent 
andjudiciaJ decision.~ He disagreed: The Supreme Coun's authority 
over Congress and the President would extend only to "such influ-
ence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. "J~ 
Jackson's position has been followed by every other President. 
Abraham Lincoln, in repudiating Dred Scott v. Sandford,}6 argued 
that if government policy on "vital questions affecting the whole 
:I I Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales cd .. 1834). Yet in introducing the Bill of 
Rights in the HouS4: of Representatives. Madison predicted that once they were in-
corporated into the Constitution. "independent tribunals of justice will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rig.hts: they will be an impene-
trable bulwark aga.inst every assumption of power in the Legislalive or Executive,·' 
Id. at 439. 
:! Id. at SOO. 
"'See Easterbrook. supra note 24. at 907. 
't Leller from Thomas Jefferson 10 Mrs. John Adams (July 22. 1804). in 11 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 42. 43 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed,. 19(5). See also 
Easterbrook. supra note 24. at 907.(noling that the effect of Jefferson's pardon was 10 
nullify the: statutes Mas much as if the Supreme Court had held lhem unconstitu-
lional"). 
Q 3 A Compilation of the Messales and Papers of the Presidents 114445 (James D. 
Richardson cd •• 1897) [hereinaher Compilation I, 
»McCulioch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (]819). 
"3 Compilation. supra nole 32. alll44. 
" lei. at 114S. 
-60 U.s. (19 How.) 393 (18S7). 
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people is to be irrevocably fixed" by the Supreme Court~ "the peo-
ple will have ceased to be their own rulers. "r, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt lashed out at the Lochner Court for taking the country 
. back to the .... horse and buggy" days.lI Richard Nixon's campaign 
to undo Warren Coun liberalism/9 Ronald Reagan"s attack on Roe 
\I. Wade,al and Bill Clinton"s embrace of efforts to .... reverse u Court 
standards governing religious liberty'" also follow this pattern. 
For its part, Congress has launched numerous challenges to the 
Court. In response to Dred Scott. Congress passed a bill prohibit-
ing slavery in the territories.,u Disagreeing with the Court's 1918 
ruling that the commerce power could not be used to regulate child 
labor~ .1) Congress two decades later again based child labor legisla-
tion on the commerce clause.'" Public accommodations protections 
contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the 
wake of a Supreme Court decision rejecting such protections:'~ 
More recently, lawmakers have challenged Court rulings on abor-
tion" busing, flag burning. religious freedom .. voting rights, and the 
legislative veto ..... 
Judicial exclusivity. then .. finds no support in Congressional and 
White House practices. in the debates surrounding the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution, or in the Constitution itself. To the 
extent that language and tradition matter • .a7 the argument for judi-
cial supremacy is a nostaner. 
" 7 Compilation. supra nOle 32. at 3210. 
"4 The Public Papers and Addressc=s of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Coun Disap-
proves. 1935. at 2()9.)U (Samuel I. Rosenman .:d .• 1938) (hereinafter Public Papers of 
Roosevelt] . 
.. See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6. at 94-95. 247-18. 
·'410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6, at 184·94. 
"See Remarks on Sianina the Relicious Freedom Restoration Act or 1993. 2 PUb. 
Papers 2000 (NoY. 16. f993): -
.e: Act of June 19. 1862. c. 111. 12 Sun. 432 (-An Act to secure freedom to all Per-
sons within the Territories of the United Slates'"). 
"Hammer Y. Dagcnhart. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) . 
... This episode is recounled in Fisher It Devins. supra note 6 .. at 70-76 . 
.If See id. at 87·94 • 
.. See ,enerally ide (discussin. recent constitutional challenges before ahe Coun) . 
• , For an ar,ument thallanluale matters. see Frederick Schauer. Easy Cases. !i8 S. 
Cat I- Rev. 399 (1985). For the classic argument that tradition matters. see Young-
stown Sheel" Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579.593·97 (1952) (Frankfurter. J •• con-
currin,); see also McCulloch v. Maryland. 17'U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 323·24 (1819) 
132 
92 Virginia Law Review [VoL 84: 85 
Alexander and Schauer 9 as well as others before them, have 
navigated this terrain. discounting the relevance of notoriously 
ambiguous texts and indications of intention which presuppose that 
the Uintentions of long-dead people from a different social world 
should influence us."'" When it comes to judicialexclusivitY9 how-
ever, the problem with "·tak[ing] neither original intent nor inter-
vening practice as autboritative'Y<&9 is that there is not a scintilla of 
evidence supporting the Court's ultimate interpreter status.'oC· AI· 
exander and Schauer, for example, never explain how judicial ex-
ciusivitY9 a principle derived from ""the nature of law·" can trump, 
well, the sl.preme LAW of the land. Suggesting that "preconstitu-
tional" norms and ··meta-rules'· are more imponant than the Con· 
stitutionitself' is. in the end, not enough to pull off the impossible 
feat of demonstrating fidelity to the Constitution by disregarding 
its basic command about the separation of powers. 
II. PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY 
There may be an element of unfairness in our efforts to link the 
Constitution's design with interpretive theories intended to make 
the Constitution the ·"supreme law of the land.·' We do not~ for ex-
ample. consider the central question which animates Alexander 
and Schauer's admittedly "normative inquiry .. - that is, ""[w]hat ... 
is Jaw for?";! Yet .. even assuming-as they do-that law's principal 
function is to '''settle [matters] authoritatively.... and promote 
(contending that historical practices are relevant in determining the division of pow-
ers among the branches), 
... Sanford Levinson. Law as Literature. 60 T c=x. L. Rc\', 373. 379 (J982). See also 
Alexander &. Schautr. supra note 8. at 1370 (explaining "what in facl has the status of 
law. and ~'hat should ha\'c lhe status of law-can onlv be decided non-hisloricallv-). 
Moreover. as a maner of '~Qlpolilik. ··non .. deference is often load political stratejy,'" 
and lawmakers and Ihe President suffer "neither l~galJy nor politically·' for making 
"polilic.ally popular or otherwise anrac:ti,'e poJicy decisions ... nally inconsistent with 
established precedent." Id. at 136~·66. 
If Alexander &. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1370. 
!It Oc:casional claims by Supreme eoun Justices that they speak the last word. prove 
jusl the opposile. Ihat is, the Court is extremely sensitive to social and poliiical forces. 
See infra Pan II.A. 
t. Alexander &. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1369. J370. 
• lei. al 137(). 71. 
133 
1998] Judicial Exclusivilyand Polit;callnSlability 93 
"stabjlity~"~~ the argument for judicial supremacy falls short. With-
out the powers of purse and sword. "'[t]he Court must take car: to 
speak and act in ways that allow people to accept. its decisions."" 
As such. rather than advance its institutional self-interest through 
claims of judicial supremacy., the Court understands its role in gov-
ernment as limited. Correspondingly., even if Coun decisions were 
viewed as final, elected officials would sublimate their Uduty to 
obey the law .... to allegedly overriding duties more consistent with 
their policy preferences. This marginalization of the Constitution 
is directly at odds with the .settlement function of law. For the 
Constitution to truly operate as a stabilizing force .. it must be rele-
vant to the lives of democratic government and the American peo-
ple. Judicial exclusivity cannot accomplish this task; rather., stabil-
ity can only be achieved through a give-and-take process involving 
all of government as well as the people. 
A. Settling Transcendent Values 
The history of the Supreme Court has been a search for various 
techniques and methods that will permit the judiciary to limit and 
constrain its own power. Justices understand. either by instinct or 
experience, that the hazards are great when the Court attempts to 
settle political., social., and economic matters best left to the politi-
cal process.~~ Despite occasional utterances from the Coun that it 
is the "'ultimate interpretern :r.6 of the Constitution .. Justices by ne-
cessity adhere to a philosophy that is much more modest. circum-
spect, and nuanced. Rather than settle transcendent values, Court 
decisions. at best. momentarily resolve the dispute immediately be-
fore the Court. 
11le strongest support for this proposition. ironically,. comes 
from those cases in which the Court has defended its authority to 
bind government officials through its interpretation of the Consti-
tution. MarbflTY v. Madison.~ the supposed foundation of judicial 
c, Id. at 1371. 1376. Law actually has many different natures including flexibility. 
ulility. and the service of human needs. 
" Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 50S U.S. 833.865 (1992). 
44 See infra notes 62. 78. 86. 94 and accompanying teXl. 
,. See infra not~s 63· 7J . 
"" U.S. (1 C,anc:h) 137 (1803). 
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supremacy,414 nicely illustrates how political challenges to the 
Court's interpretive authority and claims of judicial supremacy are 
inextricably linked to each other. When Marbury was decided. the 
Supreme Court and its Chief Justice. John Marshall, were under at-
tack. Court foe Thomas Jefferson had just been elected President 
and. at his urging, Secretary of State James Madison openly chal-
lenged the Court's authority to subject executive officers to judicial 
orders." Further complicating matters, were the Court to rule 
against the Jeffersonians. Marshall believed that his political ene· 
mies would push for his impeachment .. "'! Un\villing to engage in a 
head .. to-head confrontation with the Jeffersonians. the Court's 
supposed war cry in Marbury, that "[ilt is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is .. "·· is 
window dressing for the Court's reasoning in ultimately ducking 
the Marbury dispute on jurisdictional grounds." As such, other 
than to assure that William Marbury did not get his job and to 
usher in a claim of judicial review debated ever since., Marbury set-
tled very little .. if anything. 
On those few occasions when the Court does insist that it is the 
"last word" in interpreting the Constitution. such announcements 
- See. e.g., Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1. 18 (1958). Marbury. of course, did nOI 
rule that the Court's constitutional interpretations were final and definitive: instead, 
the Court simply declared lhat it had the power to invalidate unconstitutional Con-
gressional action. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) at 177-80. " 
• Specifically. when William Marbury challenged Madison's failure to deli\lcr him a 
judicial commission. Madison refused to present a defense. thereby forcing the Court 
to decide the case without the benefit of the executive's arguments. See Fisher &. 
Devins. supra nole 6. at 25·35. 
1111 Manhalltook the impeachment threat seriously .. contending Ihat if would be bet-
ter for tbe elected branches 10 reverse a Coun opinion by statule than to impeach 
Supreme Court Justices. See 3 Albert J. Beveridge. The Life of John Manhall: Con-
met and Conslruclion. 1800-1815. at 177 (1929) (citing tener from John Marshall .. 
Chie! Justice. 10 Samuel Chase. Associate Justice (Jan. 23 .. ]804». Along these same 
Jines. a modern day Courl which regularly and unabashedly frustrated majorilarian 
preferences might find its members subject to the threat of impeachment . 
.. S U.S. (I Cranch) at 177. 
III As Chief Justice Warren Buraer nOled: ·'The [C]oun could stand hard blows. but 
not ridicule. and tbe aJe houses would rock with hilarious laulhter" had Marshall is· 
sued a mandamus ignored by the Jelfcnon administration. Warren E. BUfler. The 
Doctrine of Judicial Review: Mr. Mlnhall. Mr. Jeffenon. and Mr. Marbury .. in Views 
from tbe Bench: The Judiciary and Constitulional Politics 7. ]4 (Mark W. Cannon 
and David M. O·Brien eds •• I98S). 
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must be understood within their political context. Cooper v. Aaron.~ 
the decision that Alexander and Schauer embrace, exemplifies this 
practice. The Court's claim that federal court constitutional inter-
pretations are l-4osupreme,,601 was made in the face of massive Southern 
resistance to Brown v.Board of Educaliont"~ including Arkansas· 
enlistment of the National Guard to deny African-American 
schoolchildren access to Little Rock's Central High School.~ 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. which reaffirmed the "central hold-
ing" of Roe v. Wade. similarly underscores the Court's belief that 
'~a surrender to political pressure" would result· in "profound and 
unnecessary damage" to the Coun.rt7 The threat of resistance to its 
orders likewise animated invocations of judicial supremacy in 
Baker v. Carr,tt1t Powell v. McCormack.1N Uniled Stales v. Nixon,-:U 
and City of Boerne v. Flores. 71 
., 358 U.S. 1 () 958). 
III 358 U.S. at 18. The best academic treatment ofCoop~r is Daniel A. Farber. The 
Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Coop~r v. Aaron Revisited. 1982 U. III. L Rev. 
387 (1982). 
~ 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
M See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6. at 242-56. Moreover. recognizing inhercnt 
limns on its power to compel Southern schools to comply with Brown. Coop~r was 
the Courfs onlv statement on school dese2rcution from 1955-64 (whcn Comtress 
encoura2cd thc -COUTt to reenter the school dC2ere2ation frav throu2h its enactment 
of the 1964 Civil RhthlS Act). - - . -
-, 50s U.S. 833. 853. 867.869 (1992). Refusing to bend to the stated desires of the: 
presidents who appointed them and overrule Roe -under fire,,· Justices Sandra Day 
O·Connor. Anthony Kennedy. and David Souter "all[ed] the contending sides of a 
national controversy to end their national division by accepting" ... ··the Coun's in-
terpretation of the Constitution:' ld at 8:)7. The Casry plurality. however. validated 
political challenges to Rot's rigid trimester standard by replacing it with a more def-
erential"undue burden" test. Id. at 873-79. 
~ 369 U.s. 186. 211 (1962). At oral arguments. c:ounsel for Tennessee suggested 
thai they might resist coun-ordered reapponionment. Jack Wilson. Assistant Attor-
ney General of Tennessee. advised the Coun aboul the sovereign rights of his state. 
56 Landmark Briefs and Ars.umcnl$ of the Supreme Court of the United Slatcs: Con-
slitutional Law 656. 658-59. 666 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper cds .• 1975) 
(hereinafter Landmark Briefs) • 
.. 395 u.s. 486. 549 (1969). In PDw~ll. the House of Rc:presentatives signaled that it 
might resist a courl order requiring il to seat Adam Clayton Powell. See Roben B. 
McKay. Comments on Powell v. ,WcCormack. 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1] 7. 12S-29 nn.42-44 
(1969). 
"418 U.S. 683. 70~ (1974). During oral arguments .. Nixon·s attorney James St. 
Clair cquivcxaaed on Nixon's willinpess to accepl the Court's judlment on executive 
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The Supreme Coun's practice of declaring itself the final word 
on the Constitution's meaning when it feels especially challenged 
by the other branches is anything but surprising. Invariably, the 
Court takes a bold stand because it fears that the political order 
will ignore its command. These sweeping declarations of power 
cloak institutional self-doubts .. much as a gorilla pounds his chest 
and makes threatening noises to avoid a fight. Invocations of judi-
cial supremacy .. for example .. often place few demands on the gov-
ernment (as in Marbury) or are linked with popular outcomes. a~ in 
Cooper., Baker v. Carr, Nixon, and Casey.-:~ 
Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the mili-
tary.7J the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners 
public acceptance.7.. In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler and 
Gregory Mitchell observed. the Court seems to believe c·that public 
acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution-
that is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacy-
enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions.'·'~ 
privilege as binding on the President. See 79 Landmark Briefs. supra note 68. at 861. 
87)·72.879: Alexander &, Schauer. supra note 8. at 1364 & no.21-22. 
" 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Invalidating congressional crtons to "'overrule" Empio.Y. 
menr Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). the Boerne Court told COOi~ress lhat it 
-will treat its precedents with the respect due them- and that "[t]he power to inler-
pret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary .... 117 S. Ct. at 
2172.2166. 
:0: With respect to Cooper. ~lihoU8h Arkansas" Governor Orval Faubus' repudiation 
of Brown scored points with in-staie voters. national public opinion ravored President 
Eis~nhower's decision to make; Cooper a reality by sending federal troops into Little 
Rock. See Gerald N. Rosenberg. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? 78 (1991). Like Cooper. Baker v. Ca" risked ill will with stale officials in 
order to reach an outcome popular in the national political arena. -Of sixty-three 
leadinl metropolitan daily newspapers.thiny-ei,ht favored the Coun"s disposition or 
the [Boker) case. Icn opposed it. and the remainder expressed neutral or confused 
opinions.- Richard C. Conner. The Apportionment Cases 144-17 (1970). With re-
spea to Ni.ton. public opinion suonlly suppuned the Coun"s authority to order the 
Presidenl to release the tapes. See Louis Harris. President Should Obey Order to 
Give Up Tapes. The Harris Survey. July 29. 1974. Case.v. in upholding Ro~. relied 011 
an ·undue burden"" standard that matched public opinion. See Neal Devins. Shapin, 
Constitutional Vatu.:s: EI.:cted Government. the Supreme enun. and the Abonion 
Debate 73-74 (1996). 
n Alexander" Schauer. supra note 8. at 1366 &. n.34 . 
• ~ See Cilsey. 'OS US. 3t 96'~ (recognizing the connection between tbe Coun"s 
"legitimacy· and "people"s acceptance"). 
~Tom R. Tyler &. Gregory MitcbeU. Lt!~itimacy and the Empowerment or Discre-
tionary ulal Authority: The United States Supreme Coun and Abonion Ri,hlS. 43 
Duke U. 703. 7J' (1994). 
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This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary seems to be 
conclusive proof that Coun decisionmaking cannot be divorced 
from a case's (sometimes explosive) social and political setting. 
A more telling manifestation of how public opinion affects Court 
decisionmaking is evident when the Court reverses itself to con-
form its decisionmaking to social and political forces beating 
against it. 7. Witness, for example .. the collapse of the Lochner era 
under the weight of changing social conditions. Following Roose-
velt's 1936 election victory in all but two states, the Coun. embar-
rassed by populist attacks against the Justices, announced several 
decisions upholding New Deal programs." In explaining this trans-
formation, Justice Owen' Robens re~ognized the extraordinary im-
portance of public opinion in undoing the Lochner era: U Looking 
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the 
popular urge for unifonn standards throughout the country-for 
what in effect was a unified economy."" 
Social and political forces also played a defining role in the 
Coun's reconsideration of decisions on sterilization and the eugenics 
movement," state-mandated flag salutes.·' the Roe v. Wade trimes-
ter standard.M1 the death penalty.1: states" rights."3 and much more.Aoi 
,. Recognizing the nexus between its aulhorilY and public ac:ceptance. the Court is 
rarely out or step with prevailing mores. See. e.g., David Adamany. Le!titimacy. 
Realigning. Elections. and the Supreme Courl. 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790 (1973); Raben 
A. Dahl. Decision.Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker. 6 J. PUb. L. 279.285 (1957); Richard Funston. The Supreme Coun and Crill· 
Cal Elections. 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Re\,. 795 (1975): Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanen-
haus. Publicity. Public Opinion. and the Coun. 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985. 1023 (I990). 
"On the role of the 1936 elcc:tions, sec Michael Nelson. The President and the 
Coun: Reinlerpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937. 103 Pol. Sci. 0.267 (1988). 
On populist attacks. see Fisher. supra notc 6. at 211. For an alternative explanation. 
see Bam' Cushman. Rethinkint. the New Deal Court. 80 Va. L Rev. 201 (1994). 
"Owe~ J. Roberts. The Co;" and the Constitution: The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Lectures. 1951. at 61 (195 1). 
"See Louis fisher. Social Influences on Conslitutional Law. 15 J. Pol. Sci. 7. 11·15 
(1987). 
*'See David R. Manwarins, Render Unto Caesar. nle Flas·Salute Controversy 
154-60 (1962): H.N. Hirsch. The Enipna of Felix Frankfuner lS2·S3 (1981). 
I, See Devins. supra note 72. at S6-77. 139-48 . 
., See Fisher. supra nOle 6.8175·76 . 
•• See Mark Tushnet. Living in a Constitutional Moment?: LO/H: and Constilu· 
IiouJ Tbcory. 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev.84S (1996). 
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It did not matter that some of these earlier decisions commanded 
an impressive majority of eight to one.1S Without popular support. 
these decisions settled nothing. Justice Robert Jackson instructed 
us that ·'(t]he practical play of the forces of politics is such that ju-
dicial power bas often delayed but never permanently defeated the 
persistent will of a substantial majority.,t116 As such, for a Court that 
wants to maximize its power and legitimacy .. taking social and politi-
cal forces into account is an act of necessity. not cowardice. Corre-
. spondingly t when the Court gives shon shrift to populist values or 
concerns, its decisionmaking is unworkable and destabilizing." 
The Supreme Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a par-
ticular case. but not in the larger social issues of which that case is a 
reflection. Indeed, it is difficult to locate in the more than two cen-
turies of rulings from the Supreme Coun a single decision that ever 
finally settled a transcendent question of constitutional law. When 
a decision fails to persuade or otherwise proves unworkable,1/\ 
elected officials. interest groups, academic commentators. and the 
press will speak 'their minds and the Court. ultimately, willlisten.lI'I 
Even in decisions that are generally praised .. such as Brown. the 
Court must calibrate its decisionmaking against the sentiments of 
the implementing community and the nation. In an effort to tem-
per Southern hostility to its decision, the Coun did not issue a 
... For a useful summary of instances where the Coun ovenumed earlier precedent. 
see Michael J. Gerhardt. The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Dccisionmakinl! 
and Theory. 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68. app. (1991). -
.. Sc:e. e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. S86 (1940) (upholding manda-
tory naJ salute). overruled by West Va. Slate Bd. o( Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
• Roben H. Jackson. Maintaining. Our Freedoms: The Role of th.! Judiciary. ]9 Vi-
tal Speeches of the Day 759, ;61 (1953) . 
., This is not to say that Coun dec:isions at odds With popular will are always desta-
bilizing. Our point. instead. is thai the Justices must bt= somewhat sensitive to social 
and political forces to avoid a destabilizing populisl backlash or rcpudialion of the 
Court. 
• The Court. (or example. abandoned its decision in NDlional L~lJg,,~ 0/ Cities v. 
Us~ry. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). because il produced doctrinal confusion rather than cre-
ale an inaeJli,ible prin~iple for federalism. See Fisher '" Devins, supra note 6. al 
94-104. 
lit On ahe power of the press and Kademic: commentators, see LawreocE C. Mar-
shall. Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibilities. 84 Nw. U. L Rev. 832. 
842·50 (1990); UndaGreenhouse. Telling the Counts Slory: Justice: and Joumalism 
at the Supreme Court. 105 Yale W. 1537 (1996). 
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remedy in the first Brown decision.'" A similar tale is told by the 
Court's invocation of the so-called "'passive vinues.n that is, proce-
dural and jurisdictional mechanisms that allow the Court to steer 
clear of politically explosive issues;' For example. the Court will 
not '''anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it...... '·formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required9 " or u pass upon a constitutional ques-
tion . . . if there is . . . some other ground,,·· such as statutory con-
struction, upon which to dispose of the case.t: This deliberate 
withholding of judicial power reflects the fact that courts Jack bal-
lot-box legitimacy and need to avoid costly collisions with the gen-
eral public and other branches of government."'·' 
It is sometimes argued that courts operate on principle while the 
rest of-government is satisfied with compromises.'#.I This argument 
"'See Brown v. Board or Educ .• 347 U.S. 483 (1954). More than a decade after 
Brown. a federal appellate court nOled: -A national ertort. bring.ing. together Con-
gress. the executive. and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful the ri,ht of 
Negro children to equal educational opportunities. Tht corcns acting Dione hDl;t 
failtd.- United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Edue .• 372 F..2d 836. 847 (5th eire 
1966), eert. denied. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. Davis. 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
For (urther discussion. sec infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text. 
-. See Alexander M. Bickel. The Supreme Court. 1960 Term-Foreword: The Pas· 
sive Virtues. 7S Han'. L. Rev . .10 (1961). 
-: Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.s. 288. 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis. J .• concurring) 
(citations omitted) . 
• ~ Correspondingly. the threshold teslS or jurisdiction. justiciability. standing. moot .. 
ness. ripeness. political questions. and pruden"al considerotions are ~nvoked regu-
larly and deliberately to protect an unelected and unrepresentatIve judiciary. See 
Don B. Kales. Jr. &. William T. Barker. Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a 
Coherent Theory. 62 Cal. L. Re\'. 1385 (1974): David A~ Logan. Standing 10 Sue: A 
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis. i 984 Wis. L. Rev. 37 (198-J): Gene R. 
Nichol. Jr .• Rethinking Standing. 72 Cal. L Rev. 68 (1984). A typical example of this 
strategy is the usc: of ripeness in 1955 to avoid decidin! the constitutionality of a Vir· 
,inia miscc,enation statute. Coming on the heels of the desegre~ation case of 195 .... 
the Court was concerned that striking down a law banning. interracial marriages 
would confirm the imaained fcars of c:ritics of dCSClrclation who warned that inte· 
,rated schools would lead to -mon,relization" of the ;hite race. Years later. after 
the principle of desegrc:gation had been safely established and Con!rC",ss and the 
President had forled slfon!! bipartisan majorities to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
the Court was then politically positioned to strike down ~he Virginia statute. See 
Lovin, v. Virginia. 388l!.S. 1 (1967): Naim v. Nairn. 350 U S. 391 (1955). 
"The classic stalement of this position is Herbert We~hil(;r .. Toward Neutral Prin-
cipJes of Constitutional Law. 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 14-15 (1959). See also Earl Warren. 
The Memoirs of Earl Warren 6 (19n) (explaining that progress in politics "could be 
made and most of len was made by compromising and taking half a loaf where a 
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is sheer folly. A multimember Court. like government .. gropes in-
crementally towards consensus and decision through compromise. 
expediency, and ad hoc actions. "No good society." as Alexander 
Bickel observed, "can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be 
principle-ridden. "IJ~ 
Courts, like elected officials. cannot escape "[ t ]he great tides and 
currents which engulr~ the rest of us." Rather than definitively set .. 
tle transcendent questions .. courts must take account of social move-
ments and public opinion.or. When the judiciary strays outside and 
opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk. 
The Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits 
within the permissible limits of public opinion, Correspondingly. 
"the Court's legitimacy-indeed, the Constitution ·s-must ulti-
mately spring from public acceptance:' for ours is a hpolitical sys-
tem ostensibly based on consent.""" 
8. How Not 10 Marginaliz.e the Constitution 
"In urging officials to subjugate their constitutional judgments to 
those of the Supreme Court .. "'" Alexander and Schauer condemn 
the possible repudiation-by elected officials and the pubJic-of 
Court decisions that operate outside of the societal mainstream. 
Under this account, courts should not bend to such lawless behav .. 
ior: instead, elected officials ought to face up to their "·obligation·' 
to treat Supreme Court decisions as law. Accordingly .. the current 
system. where courts take social and political forces into account. is 
seen as back wards. 
To say that the current system is. well .. the current system does 
not answer Alexander and Schauer's admittedly normative inquiry. 
What if democratic government saw Supreme Court decisions as 
whole loaf could not be obtainc:d. The: opposite is true so rar as the juditial process 
was concerned. "). 
"Bickel. supra note 91. at "'9 . 
.. Benjamin N. Cardozo. The Nature ofthe Judicial Process 168 (1921) . 
., A number of studies explain how couns Ie nerally stay within the political 
boundaries of their times. See supra nOles 72. 76 . 
... Murphy &: Tancnhaus. supra note 76. at 992. See also Tyler &. Mitchell. supra 
nOle 75 (e"plaining that the public·s acceptance of the Coun's role: as interpreter of 
the Constitution improvc$, the chances of the public accepting the Cour"s controver-
sial decisions) . 
.. Alexandcr " Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382. 
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definitive statements of the Constitution·s meaning? Would such a 
system. as Alexander and Schauer contend~ "achieve a degree of 
settlement and stabilityn and fot.remove a series of transcendent 
questions from short-term majoritarian control?"'''·· 
Of course not. A strict bifurcation--centering constitutional in-
terpretation in the courts while allocating other policy decisions to 
nonjudicial actors-would put both sectors on widely divergent 
paths. Policymakers would believe the Constitution to be irrele .. 
vant .. something to treat with indifference. Lawmakers would de-
bate policy divorced from constitutional concerns. As a conse .. 
quence~ the Constitution would diminish in value and stature. If 
the Court viewed the Constitution as its exclusive domain. it would 
not moderate its opinions to take account of social and political 
forces. The two sectors would come to speak different languages. 
with courts increasingly out of step with the political institutions. 
Judicial exclusivity creates disincentives for the courts to function 
within the governmental orbit and. as such. is destabilizing. 
The failings of judicial exclusivity. we think" are best illustrated 
by Dred Scott.11JI a heinous decision that demands disobedience. At 
the time the case was to be decided. the Court was sufficiently con-
fident in its .fohigh and independent character·" that lustice John 
Catron advised President-elect James Buchanan that .. in the matter 
of Dred Scott. the Court would "decide & settle a controversy 
which has so long and seriously agitated the country .•• 111: Buchana~ 
took the Court at its word: In his inaugural address .. he assured the 
nation that the issue of slaverv was before the Coun and would be 
"speedily and finally settled ...... lUl The judicial settlement was cer-
tainly speedy but not final. Two days later .. the Court issued Dred 
Scott .. propelling the nation into a bloody civil war that left. out of a 
population of approximately 30 million .. more than 500 .. 000 dead 
and another 300 .. 000 wounded. II" 
&til Id. at 1380. 
1M Dred ScOIl v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) . 
.,., LCller from John Calron to James Buchanan (Feb. 19. 1857). in 10 The Works or 
James Buchanan 106 n.1 (John B. Moore: cd .• Antiquanan Press Ltd. 1960) (1908·11) . 
... 6 Compilation. supra note 32. at 2962. 
-The World Almanac and Book of FaclS 184,380 (Roben Famighclli ed .. 1997), 
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Abraham Lincoln, through words and deeds, sought to counter-
mand Dred SCOII. M What if Lincoln. applying Alexander and 
Schauer~s logic, treated the decision as definitive vis-~-vis the Con-
stitution? The answer comes as a surprise: Lincoln, while having 
an "obligation to follow Dred Scott because of [the Supreme Court 
as] its source .. tllift could have repudiated the decision through ac-
tions directly at odds with it,. say,. his issuance of 'the Emancipation 
Proclamation. Court decisions. under Alexander and Schauer"s 
view .. are ~~overridable obligations~-Iegally binding but appropri-
ately subject to civil disobedience in times of crisis. IU) 
Alexander and Schauer do not blink when making this argu· 
mente In language critical to their analysis. they answer Uthe chal-
lenge of Dred Scoct,,:IIJ. ~&Given the inadvisability of designing a de-
cis' p edure around one case that might never be repeated. it 
r to treat Dred Scott as aberrational, recognizing that offi-
always override judicial interpretations if necessary .. espe-
are willing to suffer the political consequences. " lilt 
as they might .. it will not do to treat Dred Scott as aberra-
Supreme Court regularly confronts divisive, emotional 
JSSILIeS where lawmakers and the public may well find U over-
Gtaeso , that warrant civil disobedience.IID Moreover. if policy· 
1 Supreme Coun rulings as final,. some outlet will have to 
expressing discontent with the consequences of disfa-
__ • rulings. In panicular .. knowing that they cannot engage 
in co=::tiJlIlJlDIlal dialogues which challenge the underlying correct-
ness decisionmaking. policymakers may well engage in 
civil . nce. especially when the voting public disapproves of 
...-.-. Court decisions were necessarily binding on the panies (Dred Scon 
and -, but could not bind the elected government to judiciallY-Imposed 
poliq.!miiiEk.-,,_. 7 Compilation. supra nOle 32. at 3210 . 
.. AJI:::IIiDIdc.i- It. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382 . 
.... 
-
. n a provocative: response: to Alexander &. Schauer. Emily Sherwin 
aai:dlllt:dlC Coun OUlht 10 have the last word on all questions of constitutional 
ing slavery. See Emily Sherwin. Ducking Dr~d SCOII: A Re-
Ak::uJllder and Schauer. Const. Comm. (forthcoming [NEED DATE» 
am.:z:zpl". _ on file with author). 
·s.a:note 46 and accompanying lexl: infra nOles Ill-lIS and accompanying 
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the Court. Rather than "aberrations." such chaJlenges may become 
an important part of public life. 
Consider, for example. the willingness of democratic institutions 
to resist Court rulings on abortion. affirmative action. busing. child 
labor. the death penalty. flag burning. gay marriage. the legislative 
veto. school prayer. voting rights. and religious liberty.1I1 Today, 
these challenges take place in the framework of give-and-take dia-
logues between the Court. elected officials. and the pubiic. Were 
judicial supremacy to rule the day. however. some or aU of these 
challenges might become "occasions for disobedience. "112 Indeed. 
when Supreme Court decisions on the minimum wage. m abor-
tion, , ... and religious libertyll~ already have been analogized to Dred 
Scott. there is good reason to think that such challenges wilt in fact. 
take place. Whether or not they succeed, it is difficult 10 see how 
judicial exclusivity would either promote stability or nul . y m,ajori-
tarian control of transcendent questions. 
Even if Dred Scotl is truly aberrational. judicial e y IS 
likely to marginalize the Coun and. with it. the Coa5bJDtion. 
Democratic institutions will only take the Constitution ly if 
not 
'tical 
they have some sense of stake in it. Alexander and Schauer 
disagree; for them. a virtue of judicial exclusivity is that 
discussion "might be richer precisely for its lack of reliance ritu-
alistic incantations of constitutional provisions. nil. Yet y by f lng 
out politicized constitutional discourse. the Courfs educati 
tion will be severely limited as will the enduring values t 
stitution itself. U7 
III Several of these episodes are discussed in Fisher &. Devins. supra note 6. 
II: Alexander &. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382. 
III xe 4 Public Papers of Roosevelt. supra note 38. at 20S. 
"' Sec Ronald Reagan. Abortion and lhe Conscience of the Nat ' 21 
(1984); see also Justice Scalia·s dissent in (AStJ.'. S05 U.S. at 984 (Scalia. J. _ ) 
(equaling the Supreme Court's reaffirmalion of aOOnion righlS with D,nt 
.. , See The Reli"fouS Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969 
Senale Comm. on Ihe Judicial"\', I02d Cone. 42 (1993) (statement of ~ 
mas. General Counsel. Baptisl joint Commiitee on Public Affairs). 
II" Alexander'" Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1385. 
", •• At its beIC." che Supreme Court produces ··reasoned opinions l 
claim to be che resident philosopher of the American constitutional 515& 
Funslon. A Vital National Seminar: The Supreme Coun in American Pnln~:II 
217 (1978). Sec: also Christopher L. Eisgruber. Is ahc Supreme Court 
Institution? 67 N.v.U. L. Rey.961 (1992) (assening tRatlhe Supreme Colltt: __ ... 
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Alexander and Schauer are hardly troubled by this state of af-
fairs. If anything, they think policymakers ought to steer clear of 
a1l matters touched upon in Supreme Court rulings. In order to 
"generate[] a single conception of what the Constitution re-
quire[s]:'1I1l for example, they would encourage lawmakers not to 
expand constitutional protections beyond the floor set by the Su-
preme Coun.1I1J By this jnterpretation, Alexander and Schauer 
would then disapprove of legislation authorizing disparate impact 
proofs in voting rights and employment discrimination legislation: 
legislation and regulation authorizing the assignment of women to 
combat aircrafts; ]egislation and regulation allowing federal em-
ployees .. including members of the armed services .. to wear an item 
of religious apparel on their clothing; and other initiatives launched 
by democratic government in the face of Supreme Court decisions 
limiting individual rights. lZlt 
By stifling public discourse in this way ~ the Constitution becomes 
less relevant. Constitutional arguments will no longer be used as a 
roadblock to stymie progressive reforms or. alternatively .. to ex-
pand constitutional protections beyond the ··floor .... set by the Su-
preme Court. While Alexander and Schauer do not foreclose poJi. 
cymaking on matters that implicate constitutional values. elected 
officials are discouraged from doing so and .. when they do. they are 
forbidden from discussing those fundamental values that underlie 
the Constitution and .. with it .. the United States itself. The vinues 
of ·"settlement for settlemenfs sake"·':' pale in relation to these 
costs. 
These costs are particularly acute in two categories of cases that 
are outside the radar of judicial supremacy proponents. One in-
volves underenforced constitutional norms. that is. matters that for 
limes uses hs educative function to orrer ··Iessons·· to inspire citizens): Eugene V. 
Rostow. The Democratic Character of Judicial Review. 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193" :!08 
(1952) (describing Court"s role in the discussion of problems. declaration of prine ... 
pies. and as an educational body). 
u, Alexander II. Schauer. supra nOle S. at 1385. 
"'Sec ide 
"'See Fisher &. Devins. supra nOie 6. at 256-88 (discussing employment and vot· 
in,). 3O,S·16 (discussin, women in ahe mililary): see also 10 U.s.C. § n~ (1994) 
,.ddressinl reliJious apparel in military): Peler Baker. Workplace Religion Policy 
Due. Wash. POSI. Aug.. 14. 1997. al AI (describing executive guidelines proleeli~, 
reJi,iouJ expression in lhe fedenl workplace). I" Aleunder " Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1385. 
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one reason or another are not likely to make their way into court.I~~ 
Here, it is left to democratic government to define the Constitu-
tion's meaning. Yet 9 if elected government is discouraged from 
thinking about the Constitution, it is unlikely that these matters 
will receive serious treatment~ if any at all. I!.' 
The second category involves instances in which e Court sees 
itself as a partner with government in shaping co - utional values. 
As a way of minimizing error, miscalculation.. dless con .. 
flicts with society and coequal branches .. the Co times en-
lists the help of elected government.u" School ation is a 
particularly telling example of this practice. M a decade 
after Brown, the percentage of African-Americ en in all-
black schools in the South stood at ninety percenl. l~~ 
Through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other fi initiatives. 
I:: The best treatment of this topic is Lawrence Gem~ Sager, F 
eal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. 
Examples of underenforced constitutional norms include the 
recess appointments. the incompatibility clause. war powers. 
discussed in Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interprel3tio 
18 Pepp. L Rev. 57 (1990) (ar!!uing that many separation of --~ cs.:.w::s 
lied not in the courts. but through trade-orb and compromises ~r-c:a: 
and Congress). See also William Michael Treanor. The Ori~ ndII~:m::d:m 
the Takings Oause and the Political Process. 95 Colum. L. 
(describing the property rights movement as illustrative of 
give serious treatment to underenforced constitutional norms). 
I!J Alexander and Schauer are wrong in presuming that the pab:tK:;;a;t:Jbr.;!IIIdIR::s~ vt!r 
give serious treatment to these maUers. See Mark V. Tushnet, 
in Conslitutional Law. 81 Minn. L. Rev. t (1996) (discussin!! Imsl~:i-= a.l5adca 
of the "emoluments clause:' 3 constitutional provision unlikely lO 
the federal courts). 
I:' The Court and Congress have acted jointly on many COIlSllIlCICS.m 
Fisher. supra nute 6, at 247-51. An early example is Congress· r·~_r 
Supreme Court ruling Lt!;sy ,'. Hard:n. )35 U.S. 100 (1890). In me 
COU" ruled that a stale's prohibition of intoxicating liquors co to 
"oriJinal packagc:s- or kegs. but qualified us opimon by sa~in, 
exclude incomin! articles -without congressional permis..\ion. ,. 
gress quickly overturned lhc decision by allowing statc:s. lhrou_ 
10 regulatc Incoming. liquor "in on!final packages or otherwise.-
Acr. ch. 728. 26 Stat. 3)3 (1890) (codified at27 U.S.C. § )21 (J ).. 
example: is Congress's prohibition of newspaper searches. 42 U.s.c. I .... _.,;. !'II ..... 
wake of Z"rcher l'. SIDnlord Dail:~·. a decision upholding. SUCD 3IICID'd-=s 
leltslallve efforts 10 proJect "against poSSIble abuses:' 436 U.s. s.l1. 
further discussion. see Fisher It Dcvln5. supra note 6. at 3. . 
a=f Gary Orrield. Public School Desegregation in the United . a l 5 
(1983). 
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however, this figure had dropped to twenty-five percent in 1968.1:. 
More significant, with the President, congressional leadership. and 
the public committed to undoing Jim Crow laws, the Coun was 
emboldened to attack discrimination and segregation ··root and 
branch."m 
Herein lies the real danger of judicial exclusivity. In rejecting 
such constitutional decisionmaking by other branches, judicial ex-
clusivity does ]jule to promote stability. It encourages acrimony. 
not cooperation. Democratic government, rather than engage the 
Court in a constitutional dialogue, will give shon shrift to the Court 
and the Constitution. For its part, the Court will neither enlist 
democratic government's help nor look to public opinion as a 
measure of its legitimacy. No longer constrained by its responsi-
bilities as educator (Why educate if populist constitutional dis-
course is not a public good?) and cenain of its status as final consti-
tutional arbiter, the Coun will see little value in calibrating its 
decisions against social and political forces. I!J( Indeed. any such 
calibration would implicitly reject a decision making model that 
equates stability with supremacy. 
Pragmatism and statesmanship must temper abstract legal analy-
sis. De T oqueville recognized in the 1830s that the judicial power 
"is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion. (Judges] are 
all-powerful as long as the people respect the law~ but they would 
be impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law ..... ·=" 
Arguments to the contrary .. that judicial exclusivity will have a sta-
bilizing effect .. won·t do~ To be stabilizing .. court decisions must 
command respect and be generally acceptable and understandable. 
c. Cont;nlling Colloquies 
Law. as Morris Raphael Cohen wrote in 1933. is anything but a 
"closed. independent system having nothing to do with economic. 
political. social. or philosophical science .... 1'1. As this study reveals .. 
1:.ld. 
'1' Green y. County Sc:h. Bd ... 391 U.S. 430. 438 (1968). 
,=- On thiS point. see Eissrubcr. supra note 1 17 .. at 1014-2 J • 
• " 1 Alexis de Tocqucvillc. Ocmocracy in America lSI (Phillips Bradley cd .• 1945) • 
•• Morris R. Cohen. Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 380-81 
n..86 C 1933). 
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courts cannot be separated from the social and political influences 
that permeate all aspects of constitutional decisionmaking. The 
question of whether three branch interpretation is qualitatively 
better than judicial supremacy, however, remains. Alexander and 
Schauer consider this question irrelevant to their analysis. Focus-
ing on the stabilizing and coordinating functions of law 9 they em-
brace judicial finality as the best and only means available to save 
the Constitution from "interpretive anarchy. ,.114 We. of course. 
disagree with this claim. Perhaps more fundamentally, we think 
that the dialogue that takes place between the Court. e]ected gov-
ernment. and the American people is as constructive as it is inevi-
table and therefore more stable. 
Constitutional decisionmaking is not well served by making 
challenges to Supreme Court decisions "more difficult . ., if not , 
"futile. nil! Complex social policy issues .. especiaJly those that im-
plicate constitutional values. are best resolved through ·'the sweaty 
intimacy of creatures locked in combat. t,B~ Judges and politicians 
sometimes react differently to social and political forces. Congress .. 
for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims of large 
populous interests" or on the claims of the wealthy and the power-
ful. since that tends to be the best route to re-election. 'ttl.'" Courts .. 
in contrast. are less affected by these pressures. for judges possess 
life tenure. U~ Accordingly. because special interest group pressures 
affect courts and elected officials in different ways. a full-ranging 
consideration of the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes 
is best accomplished by a government-wide decjsionmaking proc-
ess. For this reason. couns and elected officials should both be ac-
tivists in shaping constitutional values. 
I" Alexander & Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1379 . 
• ,z Id. at 1386. 
,., Alexander M. Bickel. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 261 (J962). 
'''Sle~en G. Calabrese. Thayer"s Clear Mislake. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269,273 (1993). 
"~See id As 10 what jud!!es maximize. see Richard A. Posner. What Do Judges 
and JUSbc:e5 Maximize'?: (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does). 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. I (1993). 
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No doubty this politicization of constitutional discourse win con-
tribute to partisany value-laden constitutional analysis.'~ Never-
theless, complex social policy issues are ill-suited to the winner-
take-all nature of litigation. Emotionally charged and highly divi-
sive issues are best resolved through political compromises that 
yield middle-ground solutions. rather than through an absolutist. 
and often rigidy judicial pronouncement. 
Judjcia~ supremacy yields unworkable solutions. not a more eq-
uitable world. M[G]ovemment by lawsuit," as Justice Robert Jack-
son warned. "leads to a final decision guided by the learning and 
limited by the understanding of a single profession-the law.·ym 
Alexander Bickel puts the matter more directly-"doubt[ing] ... 
the Court's capacity to develop '"durable principles'" and therefore 
doubting '-that judicial supremacy can work and is tolerable .• y.~ 
Political realities and constitutional values require the judiciary 
to share ,vith other political institutions and society at large the 
complex task of interpreting the Constitution. Constitutions do not 
govern by text alone or solely by judicial interpretation. They 
draw their life from forces outside the courts: from ideas .. customs,. 
society" and statutes. Through this rich and dynamic political proc-
ess. the Constitution is regularly adapted to seek a harmony be-
tween legal principles and the needs of a changing society. Bickel 
described the couns as engaged in a "continuing colloquy with the 
political institutions and with society at large.'" a process through 
which constitutional principle has "'evolved conversationally not 
perfected unilaterally."'" 
III. CONCLUSION 
The chief alternative to judicial exclusivity is not .iinterpretive 
anarchy" ", •• , with each public official at every level of government 
making independent judgments of the Constitution. Nor is there 
'''' Sec ,cnerally Louis Michael Seidman" Mark V. Tushnet. Remnants of Belief: 
Contemporary Constitutional Issues (1996) (discussing the effect of political innu-
ences on constitutional debates) . 
• n Roberl H. Jackson. The StrUBle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a CriSIS in 
American Power Politics 291 (1941). 
,. Alexander M. Bickel. The Supreme COU" and the Idea of Progress 99 (1970). 
, .. Bickel. supra note 133. a124O. 244 • 
... A .. under " Schauer. supra note 8. at 1379. 
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. any evjdence that the main. purpose of the Constitution was to vest 
a final interpretive authority in a single branch. The overriding 
value of the framers was a system of checks and balances that is an-
tithetical to vesting in any branch a monopoly on' constitutional 
values. The result, from the start, was "coordinate construction, ".-. 
with each branr:, capable of and willing to make independent con-
stitutional interpretations. That system has endured for more than 
two centuries without deteriorating into interpretive anarchy. 
No single institution, including the judiciary, has the final word 
on constitutional questions. It is this process of give and take and 
mutual respect that pennits the unelected COUl! to function in a 
democratic society. By agreeing to an open exchange among the 
branches. all three institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold 
excesses in check. and gradually forge a consensus orl constitu-
tional values. By participating in this process, the public has an 
opportunity to add legitimacy, vitality, and meaning to what miSt'lt 
otherwise be an alien and short-lived document. Therein lies true 
stability. 
H. See FISher. supra nole 6. at 2J 1. 
o 
